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Fuel economy and emission challenges are pushing automotive OEMs to develop alternative 
hybrid-electric, and full-electric powertrains, increasing variation in potential powertrain 
architectures, which exacerbates the complexity of control software used to coordinate various 
propulsion devices. Safety of this control software must be ensured through high-integrity 
software monitoring functions that detect faults and ensure safe mitigating action is taken. This 
monitoring functionality has itself become complex, requiring extensive modification for each 
new powertrain architecture to develop, calibrate, and verify the software to ensure safety as 
defined by ISO 26262. However, it must also be robust against false fault-detection, thereby 
maximising vehicle performance availability to the customer. It is therefore desirable to 
investigate whether novel approaches for software safety monitoring can address the 
manufacturer’s complexity and calibration burden whilst robustly achieving safety with 
minimal effect on availability.  
In this thesis, two novel functional safety monitoring concepts have been conceived and 
developed. First, an Adaptive Safety Monitor is introduced that aims to directly reduce the 
necessary safety software fidelity through new reasoning surrounding safety and driver 
expectation. An improvement in robustness is demonstrated by successfully using a low-
fidelity safety software coupled with an adaptive safety monitor instead of a conventional 
high-fidelity model approach, and was shown to both accurately detect erroneous torque 
demand and prevent false-positive detection. Secondly, a novel Principal Component Analysis 
based safety monitor is introduced. An automated PCA model derivation process is developed 
that derives safety software automatically from the control software, with minimal effort from 
the OEM, and is shown to both quantitatively and qualitatively detect software faults within 
5Nm of torque demand. These concepts are supported by a literature review, development 
context in relation to the ISO 26262 standard, and a set of ideal monitoring attributes derived 
from ISO 26262, ISO 25010, and expert opinion. A Matlab/Simulink electric vehicle model 
was created to serve as a simulation test-bed for both concepts. Lastly, considerations for 
verification and validation are explored before both developed concepts are evaluated 





























1 – Summary 
 
The introduction will outline the motivation behind this project by discussing the demands of 
the automotive market and pressures on automotive OEMs, recent technology advances, and 
the trends that these advances have yielded in the automotive sector. The new challenges these 
trends bring to the automotive OEM will be discussed with particular attention drawn to 
increased vehicle control software complexity, leading to increased development costs for the 
manufacturer. From this, the research question will be asked, along with the aim and objectives 




1-1 – Motivation 
 
1-1.1 – Manufacturer Development Burdens 
 
Modern vehicle manufacturers (OEMs) are being challenged more than ever before to develop 
new technologies to meet the demands of the market. Governments around the world are 
implementing ever-more stringent emissions legislation, such as the upcoming Euro VII terms 
in Europe, along with a replacement for the New European Drive Cycle that aims to provide 
emissions figures that better match real world driving, through the World Harmonized Light 
Vehicle Test Procedure [1]. To comply with these new emissions targets, manufacturers must 
develop their vehicles with the environment in mind. The penalties can be severe, as not 
meeting these targets for a mass-market vehicle will lead to heavy fines imposed on the 
manufacturer. Simultaneously, more demanding customer expectations in performance – 
seemingly at odds with reducing emissions – have forced manufacturers to improve vehicle 
technology in most other areas to remain competitive. Customers in most markets are seeking 
cars with better driving performance, refinement, features, and fuel economy, and new vehicle 
technologies are important to satisfying consumer desire in purchasing new vehicles [2]. 
 
1-1.2 – Recent Technology Advances 
 
Technology advances in recent years have transformed vehicle engineering design capabilities 
and added features to vehicles in the large automotive sector that is still expanding. 
Underwood [3] highlights a number of key technological advances that have fostered the most 
change. 
 
1-1.2.1 – Computing Power 
 
Developments in microprocessors have, in general, followed Moore’s Law [4] under which 
the transistor density in mainstream microprocessor circuits double roughly every 18 months. 
In turn, this means processor speed in mainstream microprocessors is continuously increasing. 
Figure 1-1 shows the result of Moore’s Law since the 1970s with respect to how transistor 






Figure 1-1: A recent visualisation of the impact of Moore’s Law, yielding exponentially 
increased average clock speed in mainstream microprocessors [5, 6] 
 
Couple this trend of increased performance with the decreased manufacturing and energy costs 
per unit of performance, and the use of persistently more powerful processing devices in 
consumer vehicles remains feasible. Figures 1-2 and 1-3 show the reduction of manufacturing 











Figure 1-3: Improved energy efficiency per microprocessor instruction [6] 
 
Indeed, established microprocessor companies have developed high performance computing 
processors specifically for new software applications in the automotive, such as Engine 
Control Units (ECUs) [7].  
 
1-1.2.2 – Networking 
 
Communication technology, specifically wireless communications, has increased 
exponentially too. Over time, Nielsen’s Law of Internet Bandwidth [8] has described this trend 
as a 50% annualised growth in internet bandwidth. The introduction of high speed wireless 
internet protocols, such as 4G and the upcoming 5G service, can deliver wireless speeds of up 
to 20 Gbits/s [9]. Primarily driven by the consumer cellular phone demands, this 
communication service is already being used by vehicle entertainment systems. Already the 
wireless network is impacting consumer driving habits, as live traffic updates are being 
produced using information from clients connected to the wireless cellular network. With 
network capabilities seeing continuous investment in both first and third world countries, 
automotive manufacturers are seeking ways to utilise these newfound communication 
capabilities through new vehicle features that meet consumer demands. Further to this is the 
development of high-speed short-range communication protocols such as Dedicated Short-







1-1.2.3 – Battery Technology 
 
Battery electric accumulators used for electric vehicles (EVs) are another trend that is seeing 
great strides in advancement. An obstacle to electric vehicles has – until recently – been the 
performance limitation of providing enough energy density (kWh/kg), and the cost limitation 
of reducing battery price per kWh ($/kWh). Recent breakthroughs in battery technology, and 
the establishment of more raw material suppliers and mass production battery manufacturers, 
has addressed both limitations, as average power density has risen and cost per kWh has fallen 
[10]. Indeed, based on 2012 forecasting, major automotive manufacturers have, in fact, been 
able to exceed predictions in reducing battery cost, shown in Figure 1-4 through analysis 




Figure 1-4: Wood Mackenzie 2012 battery cost forecast, with recent data and near future 
prediction by some major automotive OEMs [10]. 
 
Currently, lithium-ion batteries have been the main technology used in the automotive 
industry, but next generation research is already underway, with the much more widely 
abundant sodium-ion being a favourable avenue to drastically reduce the cost per kWh. Many 






1-1.3 – Automotive Industry Trends: Autonomy, Connectivity, 
Electrification. 
 
The key technology drivers in the automotive industry has resulted in three identifiable 
technology trends emerging in the automotive sector: Autonomy, Connectivity, and 
Electrification [12], known as the ‘ACEs’ trends.  
 
1-1.3.1 – Autonomy 
 
Autonomy refers to some level of vehicle intelligence, whereby the vehicle can take over 
functions typically performed by the driver. This primarily includes control of acceleration, 
braking, and steering, but can extend to making driving decisions based on the environment, 
such as changing lanes, taking an exit, merging with the flow of traffic, and obstacle avoidance. 
SAE J3016 [13] is a published standard for categorising various ‘levels’ of autonomous 
capabilities a vehicle has; this is shown in Table 1-1. 
 





























































Many manufacturers have sold Level 2-capable autonomous vehicles, but the ‘tipping point’ 
comes when Level 3 is reached, as this moves the responsibility of monitoring the driving 




manufacturer. Currently ‘autonomy’ is most widely seen in automated emergency braking 
systems which are expected to be mandated in Europe in the near future [14].  From a safety 
perspective, autonomy is seen as being able first to result in crashless vehicles to reduce road 
traffic accidents significantly through the aid of warnings and interventions for the driver, 
before eventually becoming ‘driverless’ vehicles, whereby the vehicle is able to fully control 
itself on the road and keep the occupants safe. Public opinion of driverless vehicles is still 
split, with recent high-profile fatalities being blamed on self-driving systems [15]. However, 
Underwood’s [3] forecast predicts the first stepping stone of crashless vehicles will lead to 
more widespread public acceptance of driverless systems, with these systems set to improve 
with more testing enabled by the recent technology advancements in networking and 
computing power. 
 
1-1.3.2 – Connectivity 
 
Technology advancements in wireless internet bandwidth and new short-range communication 
protocols have opened the possibility for the development of ‘connected vehicles’. These are 
vehicles that are connected to a network capable of supplying useful information that can affect 
driving decisions by either the driver or the autonomous vehicle, either through short range 
communication between nearby vehicles, between the vehicle and a greater infrastructure 
network, or generally between the vehicle and a connectivity cloud [3]. The information 
available to a connected vehicle can help aide infrastructure traffic flow, through the use of 
‘intersection move assist’, ‘cooperative adaptive cruise control’ (or ‘platooning’), and live 
traffic information in order to reduce journey travel times and improve fuel efficiency [3]. It 
can also be used as a safety tool, utilising features such as ‘do not pass warning’, ‘control loss 
warning’ and ‘forward collision warning’ to help make better driving decisions.  
 
A safety pilot has been conducted by the US Department of Transportation over a three year 
period starting in 2015, called The Ann Arbor Connected Vehicle Test Environment, whereby 
~2800 vehicles were equipped with short range communication send/receivers [16]. These 
‘vehicle awareness devices’ transmit ‘basic safety messages’ continuously, sending location 
and velocity data to a central network, which is then shared with nearby vehicles. Interestingly, 
the basic safety message is communicated over 5.9 GHz channel frequency, which was 
specifically set aside by the US Federal Communications Commission to support intelligent 
transportation systems, as far back as 1999; clearly, then, connected vehicles have been a long-





1-1.3.3 – Electrification 
 
Electrification of vehicle powertrains – of the three ACEs trends – is the furthest developed 
trend so far, yet still in its infancy in terms of development potential and market share. Electric 
powertrains were in fact first seen at the dawn of the motorcar era, but never found mass 
market appeal due to limitations on performance development versus the internal combustion 
engine [17]. Primarily, battery technology has been the greatest roadblock to mass market 
ownership. Over the past two decades, however, electrified powertrains have become a 
popular choice amid rising fuel prices and as battery technology has progressed to make such 
vehicles more commercially feasible in the mass [17]. Typically, the electric motors are still 
coupled to an internal combustion engine (ICE) in a hybrid-electric vehicle (HEV) or plug-in 
hybrid-electric vehicle (PHEV) application, but as battery technology advances more fully-
electric vehicle (EV, also known as battery-electric vehicles, BEV) models are expected to be 
offered by manufacturers.  
 
The State of Innovation 2017 report by Clarviate Analytics [18] looks at novel patent families 
granted across technology sectors in order to track research activities and technology 
advancement, with the most recent results shown in Table 1-2. 
 
Table 1-2: State of Innovation 2017 tracking of patent subsectors submitted globally 
within the automotive sector. 
 
% Subsector 2016 2015 % Change 
23% Alternative powered vehicles 42880 37844 13% 
11% Navigation systems 21568 19753 9% 
11% Transmission 20299 20175 1% 
10% Seat, seatbelts and airbags 19754 18165 9% 
10% Safety 19076 18551 3% 
7% Suspension systems 13431 12827 5% 
6% Steering systems 11925 10841 10% 
6% Pollution control 10667 10114 5% 
5% Security systems 9217 8627 7% 
4% Braking systems 8262 7654 8% 
4% Engine design and systems 8048 7845 3% 





Within the automotive sector, the subsector that saw both the greatest percentage and year-
over-year change in novel patent families was alternative powered vehicles, which the report 
notes comprise of mostly of electrified powertrain innovations. Tightening emissions is 
leading to some countries imposing national bans on new vehicles sold with non-electrified 
powertrains. These countries reportedly include the UK, China, India, Germany, France, 
among others, imposing such a ban between 2030 and 2040 [19]. Most drastically, the 
Netherlands has announced a ban on any non-zero-emission vehicle sold from 2030 [20]. The 




Figure 1-5: Market share percentage of BEV and PHEV of new cars sold within major 
European countries in 2017 [21]. 
 
With a combined EV and BEV new car market share less than 2% for most major European 
countries, and the emissions legislations being imposed by their governments, the market 
capitalisation potential is very high for electric vehicles over the coming years and into the 
future. 
 
1-1.4 – ACEs and Software Complexity 
 
While the ACEs trends advance the quality of product for consumers, meeting the demands of 
the market through greater convenience, performance, efficiency, and connectivity, there is an 




questions surrounding consumer lifestyle habits with regards to vehicle ownership. Many 
companies are investing in shared ownership business models, with on-demand vehicle hailing 
for a regular subscription fee. Autonomous vehicles are seen by many experts as the biggest 
fundamental change to the automotive industry since the introduction of the car itself. 
Integration of autonomous technology with the current road traffic rules and human drivers is 
also a concern: autonomous systems have already been blamed for many fatal incidents in the 
US and Europe [15], [22]. though most can attribute improper use and lack of driver 
intervention as the ultimate enabler. The connectivity trend will require significant investment 
from either private automotive companies, or local, national, and even international 
governments to improve the wireless communication infrastructure of vehicle-to-grid and 
vehicle-to-vehicle networks [3]; in either respect, the cost will most likely be passed onto the 
consumer through added purchase price or through taxation. Widespread vehicle 
electrification will require significant upgrades in the power grid capability to be able to cope 
with the demands of vehicle charging, resulting in more expensive electricity unit prices from 
the power suppliers, and possibly increased taxation due to national infrastructure upgrades 
[23].  
 
Aside from the given research and development costs associated with any new technology, the 
ACEs trends all share a common denominator in increased software complexity. Each of the 
ACEs trends require significantly more information to be processed; autonomous vehicles 
process large amounts of visual data from cameras, as well as Lidar and radar systems, to 
understand the state of the environment around the vehicle. It must then process this data into 
the most suitable action/reaction, calling on much stored data [13]; this complexity is further 
compounded if the autonomous system is continuously learning through performance analysis.  
 
Connectivity requires wireless and information processes to be incorporated with the vehicle 
software system, requiring additional computational power to process the numerous streams 
of information that is used to change performance and aide in driving decisions and driver 
recommendations. Autonomous vehicles can rely on  vehicle-to-anything data to make driving 
decisions [24], and with the introduction of 5G networks capable of 1 to 20 Gbit/s data transfer 
[9] potentially huge amounts of network data can be made available for the vehicle control 
software to use. The network data could provide information of every local vehicle, pedestrian 
and object detected by the network of cars, all of which needs to be processed by the vehicle 
for the best course of action. 
 
Electric powertrains introduce a fundamentally different method of delivering drive torque 




diesel ICEs. The software that controls the torque delivery, and management of the various 
subsystems of the electric powertrain (such as the inverters and accumulators), is both complex 
and substantially different from the software that controls torque delivery through an ICE. A 
single vehicle model may have had a range of different petrol or diesel powertrain variants, 
probably shared between some vehicle models, however, with the introduction of electrified 
powertrains in the mainstream automotive market the number of possible powertrain varieties 
for a single vehicle model similarly increases. In all, the cumulative software complexity and 
development effort required for a single vehicle model across all powertrain variants increases 
substantially. Furthermore, new driveability, efficiency and performance control features 
continue to push up software complexity over all hybrid and electric variants.  
 
1-1.4.1 – Powertrain Control Software 
 
The software that is primarily responsible for the control of all powertrain functions, and which 
contains all driveability, performance, and efficiency features, is called the ‘functional 
software’. The functional software takes vehicle states, environmental measurements, and 
driver input, specifically, the accelerator pedal. Using these signals, the functional software is 
able to produce a ‘torque demand’, which is the overall powertrain torque that is requested 
from the powertrain [25]. This torque demand is then distributed between the various 
propulsion actuators for actualisation, with software components dedicated to controlling the 
individual actuators. When one considers all the factors that go into determining the 
appropriate torque demand, compounded with the trend of electrification, clearly the 
functional software that will become increasingly complex.  
 
1-1.4.2 – Safety Software 
 
Due to the software separating driver from powertrain control (i.e., there no longer exists a 
mechanical linkage between accelerator pedal and powertrain actuators), the functional 
software becomes a safety critical component. As such, it is essential that manufacturers verify 
that any unreasonable risk is mitigated within the functional software, as a fault or malfunction 
in the functional software can lead to a hazard. Indeed, the recent introduction of ISO 26262 
Road Vehicles – Functional Safety [26] has warranted that manufacturers who aim to be ISO-
compliant must prove that freedom from unreasonable risk is ensured in all electronic and 
electrical systems, including software.  
 
With the complexity in the functional software, however, the verification of such freedom is a 




Therefore, OEMs instead develop a simpler set of software which acts as a watchdog or 
comparator to the functional software, and which can be much more easily verified; this is 
called the ‘safety software’. The safety software is a simplified version of the functional 
software, containing only the most important components of the functional software to ensure 
that safety is being achieved. It checks to see whether the torque demand being asked by the 
functional software is plausible, expected, and safe; the safety software is a fault detection and 
fault reaction mechanism used to ensure the vehicle meets the safety requirements set out by 





Figure 1-6: Functional and Safety Software in the context of driver controlling vehicle 
acceleration. 
 
Compared to the functional software, the safety software is of a reduced complexity to enable 
feasible verification of safety, but also comes at the cost of some level of reduced accuracy 
when compared to the functional software. The safety software errs on the side of caution, but 
doing so can result in reduced system robustness, leading to an unnecessary loss of vehicle 
availability to the driver due to omitted functional software components in the safety software. 
Therefore, it becomes an issue of software fidelity: high fidelity safety software will be more 
accurate and robust, but its complexity will result in much higher development and verification 
efforts, whereas low fidelity software is less complex with reduced development and 
verification efforts, but at the cost of robustness. OEMs aim to develop the lowest cost safety 





Unfortunately, with the anticipation of much more complex functional software due to the 
ACEs trends, the safety software will in turn also start becoming more complex, as otherwise 
the fault detection system becomes much less robust. This leads to increased development and 
verification costs per powertrain variant. Furthermore, with the wider range of powertrain 
variants available, the cost of development and verification for the safety software for all the 
variants within a single vehicle model offering cumulatively increases the cost far beyond what 
it has been before, with the current safety software approaches. Safety software in particular 
is seeing a great amount of innovation and research, as can be seen in Table 1-2, where the 
automotive subsector of ‘safety’ (which excludes ‘seats, seatbelts and airbags’) is responsible 
for 10% of novel patent families being submitted in 2016 [18], putting it in the top five most-
researched automotive subsectors according to this metric of innovation.  
 
1-2 – Research question 
 
Given the prospect of significantly increased software development, verification, and 
implementation costs to the OEM as the ACEs trends will tend to increase software 
complexity, the following research question should be asked:  
 
• Could a new approach or method of implementing safety software reduce the cost 
burden on the manufacturer, while still ensuring the safe operation of the functional 
software in vehicle powertrains? 
 
1-2.1 – Aims and Objectives 
 
The research question has prompted this investigation into the current method(s) used by 
OEMs to achieve safety through safety software. Jaguar Land Rover, an external automotive 
OEM, has provided funding for this project, as well as made available expertise from its safety 
team. Using these resources, and expertise at the University of Bath, the aim of the project is 
as follows: 
 
• Investigate new safety software concepts and evaluate them against the current state 
of practice. 
 





1) Objective 1: Understand current state of practice, and identify new concepts from 
literature. 
 
A literature review will be conducted into fault detection methods, considering the 
current state of practice in the automotive industry, and other industries such as 
aerospace, locomotive, nuclear power plants and process engineering. 
 
2) Objective 2: Identify ideal concept attributes and score candidates against them. 
 
The application within which the concept will be applied, and ISO 26262 standard 
which governs the topic, needs to be understood such that the intended application can 
be appropriately scoped. Furthermore, with expertise available from the OEM, as well 
as other applicable standards governing the software, a list of desirable attributes can 
be identified, against which candidate concepts and the benchmark can be scored 
against. These scores can be weighted according to desirability, and are used to narrow 
down the concept candidates to only those that provide the highest chance of success 
before being investigated.  
 
3) Objective 3: Establish a testing method for testing performance of the concepts. 
 
To test whether the concepts are able to detect faults and perform satisfactorily, a valid 
testing method must be devised, including the development of a testing environment 
within which the concepts can be evaluated. 
 
4) Objective 4: Conduct detailed investigation into candidate concept(s). 
 
With the concepts selected from the literature review, ideal concept attributes 
identified, and a testing environment established, the detailed investigation and 
development of the concept candidates can be undertaken. 
 
5) Objective 5: Determine if candidate concepts could be suitable for a future production 
vehicle using ideal concept attributes.  
 
After the concept investigations take place, they are re-evaluated and re-scored against 
the ideal concept attributes post-investigation, using the outputs of the detailed 
concept investigations. The final evaluation will discuss each concept’s score with 




1-3 – Thesis Structure 
 
The contents of each of the seven chapters of this thesis is detailed below: 
 
1) Chapter 1: Introduction, containing the motivation for the project. Here, the current 
automotive technology trends of autonomy, connectivity, and electrification are 
highlighted, and the problems they bring to the OEM are discussed, specifically, 
increased software complexity. The software used in automotive vehicles is discussed, 
with focus on safety software. The research question is then asserted, and aims and 
objectives highlighted.  
 
2) Chapter 2: The literature review, looking at the current state of practice with regards 
to safety software and fault detection in the automotive industry. This is then expanded 
to other industries, such as aerospace, locomotive, and nuclear power plants to identify 
possible concepts. A map of concepts is created and categorised, and these concepts 
explained and discussed. A number of these are subsequently selected based on their 
initial potential.  
 
3) Chapter 3: An overview of the ISO 26262 standard, discussing mostly the concept 
phase of the standard, where the safety lifecycle process begins. In the first part of this 
chapter, a walk-through of the concept phase is conducted, leading to the functional 
safety requirements that provide the context within which the concepts are being 
developed within. Safety nomenclature and their meaning for the subsequent chapters 
are defined here. The next part of this chapter contains the identification of the ideal 
monitoring, using ISO 26262, ISO 25010, and OEM expertise from Jaguar Land 
Rover to determine which attributes are desirable in a safety concept. These are then 
weighted according to desirability. The benchmark concept and concept candidates 
identified in the literature review are then scored using knowledge gained from the 
literature review to eliminate low scoring concepts. The last part of this chapter 
introduces the test method, through the use of an electric vehicle model made in 
Matlab/Simulink software environment, ending with the testing method for the safety 
concepts being established at the end of the chapter. 
 
4) Chapter 4: A detailed investigation into the adaptive safety monitor concept, this 
chapter provides a novel justification for the use of an adaptive module in the 




and the way this new reasoning may allow for some adaptive function to be used. 
Furthermore, this adaptive function can allow a less complex set of safety software to 
be used while maintaining and/or improving concept reliability. The concept is then 
explained, and then tested using the test environment from Chapter 3, specifically with 
the use of a vehicle creep controller, and the results analysed. An automated 
optimisation technique is finally described and tested that aides in parameter tuning, 
and forms the basis of what could constitute future work with automated derivation. 
 
5) Chapter 5: The second concept candidate is investigated, a principal component 
analysis (PCA) based safety concept. The development of the concept is documented, 
starting from fundamentals being applied to a linear system in a vehicle program to 
detect torque errors. A novel method of being able to identify fault direction as well 
as magnitude through output signal offsetting is introduced. Non-linear systems are 
then investigated, leading to the conception of the Local PCA concept which divides 
the system operating ranges and fits local PCA models to them. After this, an 
automated subdivision PCA process is created, which enables automated PCA-based 
safety software model generation based only the training data inputs and outputs. 
These models are then stored and used in real-time as a successful safety monitor to 
estimate torque error in the control software, demonstrated through a vehicle 
simulation. Finally, the limitations of the concept are discussed, and alternative PCA 
module architectures are presented. 
 
6) Chapter 6: With the two key concepts investigated primarily for functional 
suitability, the verification and validation concerns unique to each concept is discussed 
in this chapter, along with their potential solutions. The two concepts are then 
evaluated against the original ideal concept attributes, with an updated post-
investigation score and discussion for each attribute leading to final concept scoring 
and recommendation. 
 
7) Chapter 7: In this final chapter, a summary of the research activities undertaken in 
this thesis is presented. The original research question is revisited and answered 
through the discussion of how the research activities meet the objectives set in this 
chapter. An overall conclusion is drawn, and future research activities originating 






1-4 – Conclusion 
 
Functional software used to control vehicles and their powertrains are a significant burden to 
OEMs in the process of product development. New automotive technology trends, autonomy, 
connectivity, and electrification (ACE) are set to exacerbate this burden through necessary 
increased functional software complexity, which drives increased safety software complexity, 
using current safety software approaches. It is therefore worthwhile to examine if novel 
approaches could reduce this burden. 
 
With the project motivation outlined, and the research question proposed with the aim and 
objectives of the project, a literature review will be conducted to provide context within the 
field of fault detection safety systems, the current state of practice in the industry, and to 


























2 – Summary 
 
A literature review needs to be undertaken to understand which safety concepts have seen 
successful implementation. This literature review will seek to cover the automotive industry 
to identify a concept to benchmark future concepts against, and to identify a number of 
preliminary concepts for future investigation. The fault detection strategies in the automotive 
sector will first be explored, then other industries such as locomotive, industrial plants and 
aerospace. Finally, safety concepts will be identified and discussed before the concept 
candidate shortlist is presented. 
 
• Objective 1: Understand current state of practice and identify new concepts from  




2-1 – Fault Detection Strategies in the Automotive Sector 
 
First, the current state of practice of safety monitoring in the automotive industry needs to be 
understood. This section will cover the benchmark concept against which future concept 
candidates will be evaluated.  
 
2-1.1 – ISO 26262 Overview 
 
ISO 26262 [27], released in 2011, is a new standard by which functional safety in road vehicles 
can be verified. A second edition was released in 2018 [28],but as this project was undertaken 
under the first edition, that will be used going forwards. The first edition contains ten parts 
that cover a traceable safety lifecycle process from the Concept Phase (Part 3 [27]), through 
the Product Development Phases (Parts 4-6 [29-31]), to the Production & Operation Phase 
(Part 7 [32]). Management guidelines (Part 2 [33]) are provided, as are Supporting Process 
information (Part 8 [34]), ASIL-Oriented and Safety-Oriented Analysis recommendations 
(Part 9 [35]). Vocabulary (Part 1 [26]) and Informative Guidelines (Part 10 [36]) make up the 
rest of the standard. Chapter 3 goes into more detail with regards to applying ISO 26262 to 
this project, but a few important ideas and concepts need to be introduced for this chapter.  
 
ISO 26262 uses a ‘Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment’ to identify potential vehicle-level 
hazards resulting from item-level malfunctions, with the item in this project being the 
powertrain functional software. Each hazard is classified by its severity, exposure, and 
controllability, using the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) to determine how much 
risk a particular hazardous situation poses to safety. Subsequently, the commensurate rigour 
of development and verification for the item is required by the OEM to show that unreasonable 
risk has been mitigated. The ASIL-ratings range from lowest priority with Quality 
Management (QM, an acceptable level of risk), through to ASIL A, B, C, and finally with D 
requiring the most development rigour. A ‘safety goal’ is then assigned to each ASIL-rated 
hazard, which is then realised through a ‘functional safety concept’; this is what the safety 
software is for the powertrain functional software, a functional safety concept that mitigates 
unacceptable risk due to possible malfunctions in the functional software.  
 
2-1.2 – E-Gas Safety Software Concept 
 
In 1995, a consortium of German manufacturers (BMW, Daimler, VW, Porsche, and Audi) 




standards for electronically controlled throttle bodies that were beginning to see widespread 
use [25]. As of 2002, the workgroup had released a standardised functional safety monitoring 
concept for gasoline and diesel ECUs, and their concept is designed to implement a high-level 
safety requirement, specifically the ‘prevention of unintended acceleration’ (which, according 
to their own hazard analysis and risk assessment, yielded an ASIL-B rating). It uses a central 
functional monitoring architecture with three levels: Level 1 is the ‘functional level’, which 
contains all of the complexities of normal operation, calculating torque demand, which 
includes all the variables that account for drivability, fuel efficiency, performance, driver 
modes, powertrain transient compensation etc. Here, a faulty torque demand could lead to a 
violation of safety, and therefore the safe operation of the functional level needs to be ensured. 
This task is carried out by Level 2, the functional monitoring level, which calculates the 
‘permitted torque demand’, given some of the same information. Level 2 houses the safety 
software which calculates the permitted torque demand, and should the permitted torque 
demand exceed the torque demand from the functional software, a fault will be flagged, and 
the appropriate fault reaction or limitation will take place. Finally, to ensure that some 
hardware fault has not compromised the ability of the Level 2’s monitoring integrity, a Level 
3 subroutine is implemented, spanning over both the primary integrated circuit on the 
functional controller, and a separate integrated circuit called the monitoring controller. Figure 








2-1.2.1 – Continuous Torque Demand Monitor 
 
From the E-Gas Continuous Torque Monitor [25], a software-specific application of the safety 
concept can be created, called the ‘continuous torque demand monitor’. Instead of measuring 
directly the components of the vehicle powertrain in a feedback loop, the continuous torque 
demand monitor specifically looks at the cumulative torque demand desired by the system, 
before being interpreted by the propulsion actuators; this makes the monitor actuator 
independent, as it limits the scope to just the functional software. 
 
The safety software typically uses a simplified mathematical model of the functional software 
to estimate whether the functional software behaves as it should. The safety software model 
takes in some of the same input signals as the functional software, including driver inputs (e.g. 
accelerator pedal position, steering angle, mode selection), powertrain and vehicle states (e.g. 
actuator rotational speed, gear selection, differential engagement status, battery state of 
charge), and environmental conditions (e.g. ambient temperature, humidity) to calculate the 
permitted torque demand. Not all signals are used, owning to the safety software being 
simplified. The actual torque demand is measured from the functional software, and the 
permitted torque demand subtracted from the actual torque demand to calculate the difference 
between the two, called the ‘nominal torque error’, which is sent to a fault decision block. If 
the nominal torque error is above some acceptable threshold, it is assumed that a malfunction 
has occurred, and because the safety software is more rigorously verified for safety, it is 
assumed that the malfunction has occurred in the functional software, and a fault is flagged by 
the system. When this happens a fault reaction mechanism is triggered to bring the vehicle 
back to a safe state. For example, if an excessive amount of torque is detected from the 
functional software, the fault reaction mechanism may limit torque to the maximum safe limit 
such that the driver retains control of the vehicle. Figure 2-2 shows the architecture of the 








Figure 2-2: Continuous torque demand monitor, an example of model-based safety 
software design. 
 
Figure 2-2 is the basic concept of how the safety software ensures that the functional software 
is operating correctly. In practice, there are many extra complexities bespoke to each vehicle 
and OEM, including monitors within the safety software model around different parts of the 
torque structure. The fault-check block is also not simply the instantaneous error of the 
measured and expected torque outputs, but often incorporates some level of statistical analysis, 
taking into account historical variables and counters. The fault check block also depends on 
other variables, as a fault in one context does not necessarily mean a fault in another, for the 
same calculated error. 
 
The E-Gas software architecture is commonly used in the automotive industry for functional 
safety, especially among the Workgroup members and their suppliers. But as powertrain 




electrification, the interdependency and relations between new and existing functions and 
features increase the chance of a fault developing. In order for the E-Gas three-level approach 
to achieve the same level of robustness, the Level 2 monitoring functions need developing at 
a greater effort and cost, such that all possible fault causes and noise factors are accounted for. 
 
2-1.2.2 – Safety Software Complexity 
 
With the release of ISO 26262, the key question arises for the safety software engineer: ‘how 
does one know the system is safe enough?’ The straightforward answer is simply that if there 
is any error between the measured torque output and the expected torque output, then the 
system is not safe. In order to detect with 100% accuracy the occurrence and magnitude of any 
fault, the safety software model in Figure 2-2 needs to be a perfect representation of the 
functional software. Such a safety software model would yield an ‘ideal expected torque 
output’, which feeds into the error calculation block to produce the ‘actual torque error’. This 
has zero error under normal operating conditions, but under malfunctioning conditions a fault 
occurs, an error value is produced. To have a perfect safety software model that could quantify 
the true magnitude of the malfunction with 100% accuracy would require that all signals and 
processing code for every possible noise factor be taken into consideration. A perfect set of 
safety software, however, is far too complex to feasibly verify, and so its fidelity needs to be 
reduced to ease the burden of development and verification; doing so introduces noise factors. 
 
Noise factors are variables and underlying processes that, left unaccounted for, reduce the 
accuracy of the error calculation. The degree to which they affect the error calculation is 
dependent on the significance of that noise factor. Safety software complexity is reduced by 
choosing those noise factors that have the least significance, and would not reduce the ability 
of the concept to detect the presence of a safety-critical malfunction. Should the complexity 
be reduced too far, robustness of the safety monitoring concept is impacted, as it will 
incorrectly determine a fault has occurred – based on the safety model – when a true fault has 
not. Such a scenario is termed a “false positive”, whereby safety is maintained, but availability 
of the function is unnecessarily reduced. Causes of noise factors usually fall into the following 
categories [38, 39]: 
 
• Unstructured Uncertainties: Plant, component, or environment dynamics and 
variables that are not accounted for a priori in the safety software, leading to 




For example, not accounting for vehicle mass when estimating torque error by 
measuring vehicle acceleration. 
• Process Noise: Limitations of the embedded software environment to perform 
perfectly accurate calculations of the physical domain. For example, accumulation of 
rounding errors due to using software variables with low bit depth.  
• Measurement Noise: Inaccuracies in the sensor measurement of the physical domain. 
For example, the high-frequency noise often found in accelerometer measurements, 
which often needs to be filtered and approximated. 
 
Attempting to account for every possible noise factor in such a highly dynamic plant – while 
keeping the safety monitor robust – is infeasible. Besides this, checking if any fault occurs (no 
matter how small), is usually over and beyond the requirement for meeting even the most 
stringent ASIL D rated safety goal. While that is the ultimate goal for the safety software, 
achieving this state in reality proves to be more effort than is required to ensure safety of the 
item; this is why engineers simplify the safety software by making the safety software model 
less representative of the functional software. This results in a system that estimates the 
expected torque output rather than perfectly imitates it, thus it is called the ‘estimated expected 
torque output’, and the corresponding error calculation yields the ‘estimated torque error’. 
Because it is not fully representative, there is some degree of signal variance where noise 
factors have not been fully modelled and accounted for. 
 
It is important to remember that having a safety software model that is not fully representative 
of the functional software does not necessarily mean the safety goal would not be met. Indeed, 
as long as the safety goal is met, the safety software model can be as simple as needs be. What 
could change is the probability of a false positive. Engineers overcome this by incorporating 
an error threshold in the fault decision block that will ignore small error values, attributing 
them to the fact that a simpler, less representative safety software on its own will have some 
error variance under normal conditions. Even if there actually is a small fault, it would not be 
a safety risk to the driver as long as the safety objective is still met. A more representative 
safety monitor can generally use a smaller error threshold without false positives occurring, 
whereas a less representative safety monitor typically needs a larger threshold as normal error 
variance is greater due to more unaccounted noise factors being present. As with most things 
in engineering, a balance needs to be found, where the error threshold in the safety software is 
small enough to reliably detect if the safety goal is close to being missed (without 
misdiagnosing a fault where there isn’t one), but such that the safety software is developed at 




towards compensating for noise factors that have the greatest effect on variance and signal 
noise, as these are the most likely to give a false reading.  
 
2-1.2.3 – Adaptive Safety Monitor Concept 
 
The problem with rising safety software complexity due to the ACEs trends [3] has been stated. 
If, however, there were some way to use a simplified safety software model and still achieve 
safety, this would directly reduce the complexity of the safety software. The problem, 
naturally, is that this would also incur many more false positives due to noise factors that are 
left unaccounted for in the simpler safety software. However, if there were some way to adapt 
to these noise factors through an additional software function, while still achieving safety, 
robustness could be regained. Therefore, this theorised ‘adaptive safety monitor’ is a direct 
answer to the problem of safety software complexity by achieving the same result, with enough 
robustness, all while using a simpler safety software model that requires less development, 
verification, and implementation effort [40]. The adaptive safety monitor is discussed further 
in Chapter 3 during concept selection, and throughout Chapter 4.  
 
2-1.2.4 – Safety and Electrified Powertrains 
 
It is worth briefly discussing the effect that hybrid and electric vehicle and system design has 
on safety. Conventional ICE vehicles use only one torque source, whose power is split between 
two or four wheels through one or more differentials. Vehicle handling can be affected by 
which axle(s) are being driven, and the position of the engine mass with regards to these axles. 
Besides these arrangements, and active differential control (i.e. torque vectoring), there is not 
much else in a conventional powertrain that can significantly affect vehicle dynamics in the 
event of unintended acceleration or deceleration. With the introduction of electric motors, 
however, the number of powertrain system variants become much greater [41]. Because of 
this, some powertrains are susceptible to new hazards that require consideration, and new 
safety goals.  
 
In addition to the ICE powertrain topologies, electric motors can be placed on the engine 
crankshaft, after the transmission but before a differential, on the previously un-powered axle 
before a new differential, a motor per wheel. These options are not exclusive either, so a 
combination of many of these can be seen. The 2016 Honda NSX hybrid vehicle, for example, 
uses two motors independently driving the front wheels, and a third motor aiding the ICE with 
torque fill and regenerative braking [42]. From a safety point of view, independently driven 




occurs, but can also cause the car to change course through unintended lateral yaw [43, 44]. 




Figure 2-3: 2016 Honda NSX, an example hybrid powertrain with independent electrically 
driven front wheels. [45] 
 
Additionally, depending on system architecture, a fault in one of the wheels could cause it to 
generate current and drive the other motor(s), further worsening the unintended steering effect 
[46]. Using this powertrain layout brings with it the added safety goal of ensuring that the 
cross-axle difference in torque from the motors is not enough to cause unintended vehicle 
instability. Achieving safety could require that steering angle, vehicle heading estimation and 
wheel slip be accounted for in the safety software.  
 
In summary, therefore, while having a variance of powertrain topologies bring with them 
exciting opportunities for better vehicle dynamics, it also presents an opportunity for new 
hazards. To the OEM, this stresses the importance of functional safety in the products it sells, 
and the need to ensure powertrain malfunctions do not lead to vehicle level hazards in all 
powertrain variants. The extra effort to ensure safety is now more difficult than ever due to 
these unique powertrain characteristics, hence why new safety concepts are of interest. It is 
possible that other industries could use safety concept methods that are now worth examining 
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2-2 – Fault Detection Strategies in Other Sectors 
 
Safety concepts span a great number of industries and fields where ensuring the safe operation 
of electronically controlled systems is vital. There are many different methods used in practice, 
but a select few are typically favoured by certain industries; this is because some methods lend 
themselves better to some applications than others, be it due to flexibility, cost effectiveness, 
accuracy or robustness, available resources, packaging constraints etc. Moreover, engineers 
specialising in a certain industry use well established safety concepts that are both familiar to 
them, and are proven in the field. Indeed, ISO 26262 Part 4 Section 7.4.3.4 [29] encourages 
the use of “well-trusted automotive systems design principles” in order to reduce systematic 
failures. Oftentimes, standards agencies, institutes and organisations that govern codes of 
practice for a particular industry issue safety monitoring standards, endorsing a handful of 
safety monitoring concepts for their field. This was not the case with ISO 26262, as ISO 
intentionally provided a broad risk-based verification and assessment process for validating 
whatever method an OEM would like to use for the desired application, rather than a one-
method-fits-all approach. In doing so, ISO has left it up to the engineers to tailor their approach 
for their specific application in the widening scope of items that are electronically controlled 
in a vehicle. For this reason, it makes sense to assess the safety monitoring concepts found in 
industries outside of automotive as well. 
 
When changing focus to other industries, it is important to remember that the frame of 
reference of the environment in which safety concepts and monitors operate has also changed. 
Vehicles are consumer products used in a dynamic and noisy environment, whereas the nuclear 
industry’s massive plants operate within tightly controlled, low-tolerance environments. 
Nevertheless, there are elements of safety concepts that could be adapted for a hybrid or EV 
application. 
 
2-2.1 – Locomotive 
 
In many ways, road vehicles are similar to trains. Both operate in dynamic environments, both 
have self-contained drive units (both ICE and electric motors), and both carry occupants. 
Trains are, however, commercial modes of transit that are often supported and operated by the 
government. More importantly, trains operate on fixed routes. Because of this, trains have 
been using standardised Train Running Diagnostic Systems for over 40 years, consisting of a 





• Train Coach Running Diagnostics System. 
• Trace Hotbox Detection System. 
• Trackside Acoustic Detection System. 
• Trouble of Moving Freight Car Detection System. 
• Track Performance Detection System. 
 
Of the five diagnostics systems, only the Train Coach Running Diagnostics System is located 
on the train itself, whereas the rest are trackside. Analysis for trackside diagnostics takes place 
away from the track at the railway control centre through ‘Communication-Based Train 
Control’ [49, 50]. For road vehicles, this is not yet a feasible concept, as the infrastructure has 
not yet developed for Cloud-based diagnostics to be implemented in every vehicle, but the 
future of connected vehicles may bring with it the telemetry infrastructure to implement an 
external safety concept [50]. [51] uses an external monitoring method using cameras to capture 
data on rail tracks, which are then processed using trained ANNs to detect cracks in the 
railroad. However, the reliability is hampered by numerous noise factors such as glare, weather 
and obstacles. In 2018, Renault released the SYMBIOZ concept, a level 4 prototype vehicle 
that uses special highway telemetry to aid in the autonomous vehicle capabilities [24]. 
 
The Train Coach Running Diagnostics System is part of the main ‘Train Control and 
Monitoring System’ that handles all vehicle controls within the ‘Train Consist Level’ [52].The 
system architecture includes two Vehicle Control Units (one active, one redundant), and a 
Safety Control System consisting of a Safety Supervisor and Wheel Slide Protection. The latter 
two are SIL (Safety Integrity Level) validated and are required to comply with IEC 61508 
[53]. Since trains are commercially operated, and since packaging is less of a constraint than 
in a road vehicle, the monitoring system can use more sensors at greater cost, measuring 
current flow to electric motors. 
 
Guo et al. [54] submitted a patent for detecting a system fault in an electric power locomotive, 
whereby multiple data inputs are analysed and compared against a fault knowledge library. If 
abnormal data was found, it would match an entry in the library, and a fault-reaction would 
occur. This is called an Expert System, as a knowledge base is pre-programmed before 
commission (see Figure 2-6). While this can be useful to some degree in automotive safety 
software, the sheer number of variants and environmental noise factors mean that developing 
this knowledge base will require significant effort. An interesting train diagnostics paper was 
written by Sunder et al. [55] where they developed a safety concept for detecting component 
faults in an ICE-2 trailer type by analysing trailer vibrations, though not for the purpose of 




concept was applied to identifying bearing cage failures in electric motors by [57]. Data was 
collected with accelerometers, and analysis was conducted in the time-domain, in the 
frequency-domain, and with statistical discriminants in parallel, finding that each were useful 
in detecting different types of faults. For road cars, then, it could be possible to study vibrations 
in parts of the powertrain to detect if torque is being applied, with whole vehicle vibration 
measured as a control measurement to isolate what is happening in the powertrain alone. In 
reality, vibration-type torque monitoring is better suited for trains as there are fewer noise 
factors to account for, and the level of fidelity needed to accurately measure torque rules out 
this approach. Component vibration characteristics could also change over time with wear, 
which would need to be tested and modelled. However, some of the statistical techniques seen 
in this paper such as examining the variance, skewness, low-band Kurtosis and high-band 
Kurtosis could be used for identifying errors through a noisy signal [55]. 
 
2-2.2 – Industrial and Nuclear Power Plants 
 
Industrial plants are of a different nature to the topics seen so far. The purpose they serve is 
not a transport mission, and the plant environment itself is tightly controlled so as to reduce 
external noise factors. In an effort to mitigate risk, reduce errors, and increase efficiency, the 
majority of the normal operation is controlled either automatically or by a human-operated 
control centre, particularly in the nuclear field where radiation poses a significant threat to life.  
Despite this, power plants and process engineering plants are still staffed by human workers 
whose safety is of the utmost importance, and as such require safety measures to be 
implemented in the control systems to ensure this. Many of the safety objectives are easily 
ensured with regular quality management tasks such as scheduled component maintenance, 
sensor calibration, actuator tests, equipment cleaning and verification [58]. Different types of 
plants have different maintenance requirements and operational safety precautions, typically 
based on the SIL associated with the risk involved. These risks vary as much as the purpose 
of the plant; a nuclear power plant (NPP) needs to ensure safe nuclear material handling, 
whereas a pharmaceutical chemical processing plant must ensure that the product is 
manufactured correctly. 
 
Ensuring safety, in many ways, does not make business sense in the automotive world. 
Leading automotive manufacturers invest a lot of money developing redundant fault detection 
systems that may not even be needed over the course of the vehicle’s lifetime. Adding a new 
feature introduces cost, both through developing its functionality, but also through developing 
its corresponding safety mechanism. Safety systems are implemented, therefore, for the prime 




the vehicle. For industrial plants, however, safety monitoring is inherent to the business model. 
While a failure may or may not cause harm to workers, it will always affect production i.e. 
loss of profit. A catastrophic failure is usually due to either an extraordinary external 
circumstance such as an earthquake [59] (something that can be planned for but not avoided), 
or the compounding effect of a series of multiple small failures within the plant. Since 
chemical plants and NPPs are commercially operated, more money is typically spent on the 
safety systems than in a consumer product. Some examples of failure consequences could 
include: 
 
• Nuclear reactor meltdown. 
• Incorrect chemical ratios. 
• Fire or Explosion. 
• Pollutant escaping into the environment. 
 
To avoid these, then, the application of safety monitoring techniques in industrial plants are 
imperative. Of all accidents and safety system failures, NPPs receive the greatest amount of 
attention due to the nature of the material being handled, and the resulting effects of a failure. 
The most infamous incident occurred in 1986 at the Chernobyl power plant in Ukraine [60] 
after a reactor meltdown resulted in an explosion, releasing large amounts of radiation into the 
atmosphere. More recently, the 2011 Fukushima disaster was a result of an off-shore 
earthquake and subsequent tsunami that damaged electrical power supply lines and safety 
infrastructure, causing loss of cooling function to all the reactors [59]. 
 
NPPs adhere to a strict maintenance schedule on all measurement equipment to reduce the 
likelihood of a sensor or data transmission fault occurring. IEC/IEEE 61582 governs safety 
standards in NPP instrumentation and control important to safety [58]. NPPs require very 
accurate measurements in order to tightly control reactor temperatures. Testing the conditions 
of electronic equipment is important to safety, and includes standards for indenter modulus 
tests [61], elongation at break tests [62], oxidation induction time tests [63], and optical time 
domain reflectometry [64]. In the past two to three decades, NPPs have shifted away from 
analogue control to digital electronic automated instrumentation and control. This has 
increased functionality, but also complexity, leading to greater risk of latent and common 
cause faults  [65].  Electrical/electronic functional safety is covered generally by IEC 61508 
so similar terminology such as Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is used in this context. The 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safety policy promotes the use of redundancy, 
diversity and independence in safety-critical measurement and signals [65]. Diversity means 




include varied design and measurement principles, and/or different components bought from 
different vendors. Redundancy means multiple measurements and sensors for a safety-critical 
parameter, such as reactor temperature. The multiple signals are then processed via voter 
software to that tests for faulty signals or signal carriers. A triple modular redundancy chip 
was developed and tested by Hiari et al. for an automotive application, reducing cost by 
containing it on a single microchip [66]. Figure 2-4 shows their design of triple modular 




Figure 2-4: Example Triple Modular Redundancy design for fan speed [66]. 
 
Others have extended this to N-modular redundancy, with [67] demonstrating a number of 
alternative arrangements to suit the application, which is reducing hardware power 
consumption in their case. [68] suggested a quadruple modular redundancy approach using 
three hardware redundancies and an additional adaptive software approach to be resistant to 
dual-point faults. Quadruple redundancy is also needed to truly be tolerant to Byzantine faults, 
a subset of faults that are based on the Byzantine generals problem [69]. Independence is 
attained through isolating electricals, physically separating and dividing communication 
between each subsystem. With multiple redundancy can come complexity, however, so the 
IAEA recommends purchasing pre-qualified and trusted commercial-off-the-shelf hardware 
and software components to reduce the possibility of risk with new system design.  
 
With the high level of information available by the various sensors and resources available, 
and given the tightly controlled environments, statistical methods are popular in industrial 






2-2.2.1 – Analytical Redundancy 
 
All fault detection processes require system measurements in order to understand the current 
state of the plant. These measurements are made using sensors within the plant. If the sensor 
was to fail, the fault detection would not be able to measure how the system was performing, 
and thus could not know if the system develops a safety critical fault. Often, the same sensors 
are used for functional and safety software, but this is not always the case. In order to overcome 
this, some level of redundancy needs to be implemented such that the safety software can still 
operate in the event a sensor fails. The simplest answer would be to introduce multiple sensors 
(or actuators); this is called hardware redundancy. Usually the most robust option, it is a 
necessity in some applications such as throttle pedal position, but brings with it extra hardware 
costs as well the difficulty of packaging extra components. 
 
The other option is that of analytical redundancy, the process of estimating the sensor output 
by relying on algebraic relationships between that particular measurement, and a number of 
other dependent process variables. Analytical redundancy is typically described by two 
categories [70-72]: 
 
• Direct Redundancy: A ‘virtual sensor’ value is computed by combining the values 
of other sensors with an algebraic model. The virtual sensor value is then cross-
checked against the measured value from a real sensor. A sensor fault would show a 
discrepancy between actual and computed values. 
• Temporal Redundancy: Differential relations between a physical plant (or actuator) 
and sensor value – using a priori models of the physical plant – can be used to check 
the plausibility of a single sensor. For example, if a wheel speed sensor estimates 
vehicle speed has increased from 10 m/s to 40 m/s within a time step of 10 ms, though 
both values are plausible in isolation, it is likely impossible that the vehicle had 
accelerated at a rate of 3000 m/s2, indicating a sensor fault. 
 
Using analytical redundancy is also beneficial in isolating a fault source in some cases [73] 
[74]. For example, Tabache et al. [75] used analytical redundancy to reconstruct a virtual 
sensor from other variables in an EV powertrain. Tabache et al. highlights that safe operation 
of electric motors in a road vehicle operate on quality sensor measurements from motor 
current, voltage and speed sensors. These sensors are subject to faults originating from 
disconnections, as well as signal noise, drift and offset. They therefore developed a fault 
tolerant control system, whereupon, if a fault was detected in the actual speed sensor, the 




hardware by way of a voter scheme. It is therefore possible that some ‘virtual torque sensor’ 
could be derived for use in a safety software model. [76] used a mathematical engine model 
to generate the expected engine output under healthy conditions, from which they could derive 
residuals for fault detection. 
 
2-2.3 – Aerospace 
 
Much like both the automotive and locomotive industries, aeroplanes are self-propelled 
vehicles that carry passengers and goods in a highly dynamic environment. Of particular 
interest is the fly-by-wire technology that is used in most modern aircraft and jets, where a 
pilot (or autopilot) request a certain action that the control system then uses to determine 
actuator actions. Planes experience very many noise factors during operation that aren’t as 
significant in both the automotive and locomotive fields, such as altitude change (which brings 
with it greatly varying temperatures and air density), cross wind, and mass changes due to fuel 
burn. Tactical aerospace vehicles are particularly vulnerable to faults as many of them are 
aerodynamically unstable [77]. Military aerospace contractors purposefully designed them for 
agility, with the ability to perform manoeuvres that are impossible in a commercial passenger 
aircraft. In order to keep the tactical aircraft flying, then, a huge effort is placed on the control 
systems engineers to keep the aircraft stable because the training and mental strain for a pilot 
to fly the vehicle would make it unfeasible. 
 
Since aircraft operate off the ground there is the inherent risk that, if a component should fail, 
the worst-case scenario is a crash landing which is usually much more severe in an aircraft 
than a road vehicle due to collision speed and crash structures. The easiest way to ensure safety 
in case of a failure is hardware redundancy, but aside from the inevitable added cost, this is 
usually not even a viable option due to weight and packaging constraints. Safety monitoring 
is therefore doubly important, as the safe state of the aircraft may not allow an engine to simply 
be shut off since the aircraft might not be able to land safely; naturally, this is even more of a 
risk with helicopters due to their relative inability to glide without power. The requirements 
for aircraft airworthiness is described by an inverted relationship between failure severity and 










Table 2-1: Classification of aerospace failures based on fault severity and likelihood [78] 
 














Large functional capability reduction. Few 





Normally occurs with hull loss. 






From Table 2-1, parallels can be drawn with ISO 26262 in how failure classification is 
determined, as both use a severity and probability (related in many ways to ‘exposure’ in ISO 
26262). ‘Controllability’ is a key criteria that was added to ISO 26262 [35], as the writers 
wanted to capture the drivers’ ability to avoid an accident when assessing risk.  In some areas, 
system monitoring goes hand-in-hand with safety monitoring, as the airline wants to check 
that the aircraft is functioning as efficiently as possible. Health management and fuel burn are 
arguably the two greatest operating costs to commercial airlines, so the airlines want to ensure 
that their jets are operating at their best performance and catch any faults that could be 
detrimental to achieving that performance. Safety monitoring, in a way, is an inherent by-
product to system health monitoring, but it should be noted that health monitoring does not 
cover all safety functions. 
 
As computing electronics made their way into aircraft, digital computers took over many fly-
by-wire functions, and subsequently became responsible for flight-critical functions [79]. 
Initially, ensuring the safety of a flight-critical system was achieved through hardware 
redundancy, adding multiple sensors, actuators, and computers to ensure that a fault was 
extremely improbable. A voting system was devised such that the correct signal could be 
identified. Some traditional analysis techniques included: 
 
• Limit Checking: Fault presence if pre-set plant limits were exceeded. 
• Frequency Spectrum Analysis: Some plant measurements produce a certain 
normal frequency spectrum. Deviation could indicate a fault presence. Some 





• Fault Dictionary Approach: Compare system behaviour with known fault 
characteristics, trained a priori. 
 
However, with the sheer number of components that require redundancy in an aircraft, the 
added cost was astronomical both in buying the components but also weight and added 
maintenance. As such, with more powerful computer processor hardware being developed, 
analytical redundancy began to emerge to meet safety goals with less hardware components 
needed, with the model-based approach used most readily. The model utilises analytical 
redundancy to reduce hardware-redundancy components (e.g. triplex hardware redundancy 
reduced to duplex [66]) and a knowledge-based approach that makes use of human system 
knowledge to form the expert system approach. The expert system is useful for a complex 
system such as an aircraft or road vehicle, in that it combines quantitative reasoning (analytical 
and hardware), and qualitative reasoning (knowledge-based approach) to expertly detect faults 
in the system in addition to using some process history. The aerospace industry has used what 
is called fault-tolerant control architecture. Figure 2-5 shows an example of fault-tolerant 
control system design. 
 
 
Figure 2-5: Fault-Tolerant Control system design [77] 
 
Figure 2-5 shows an example of fault-tolerant control where multiple controllers are designed 
with a ‘decision logic’ block that switches between them based on a perceived fault. The fault 
is determined within what is called the ‘residual generator block’ [77]. For the residual 
generation code, parity space is used which is based on the state-space model. A set of 
relations, called parity relations, results to zero unless there is a fault, whereby the result will 




selects the optimum subsystem controller based on the remaining healthy actuation channels. 
With simulation on real data, Mukhopadhyay et al. [77] found that the controllers could 
effectively diagnose and find the fault in real time. [80] used a Kalman Filter bank to detect 
faulty sensors in an aircraft gas turbine system. The method showed promise in being able to 
identify a fault sensor by generating residuals in one of the Kalman filters when it had failed. 
This could be used in a ground vehicle powertrain to detect a faulty sensor where multiple 
redundant ones are available. Figure 2-5 is actually very similar to the process used currently 
in the automotive industry. The residual generator is essentially the error between the actuator 
command and the sensed system state, so it is comparable to the error calculation block of the 
continuous torque demand monitor in Figure 2-2. The decision logic block is similar to the 
fault-check block, and the different controllers and selection would be the fault-reaction 
mechanism. Parity relations are further explored in Section 3. 
 
Mukhopadhyay et al. [77] opens up the topic of Reconfigurable Flight Control - or more 
generally reconfigurable controllers - reprograms a particular functions controller based on a 
fault occurrence, in an attempt to reallocate actuator responsibility and maintain a safe level 
of performance. Typically, a fault-tolerant control system requires: 
 
1) A sufficiently robust, reconfigurable controller. 
2) A sufficiently robust fault detection and diagnosis scheme. 
3) A reconfiguration mechanism. 
 
Reconfigurable control is seen in the automotive industry where Wang & Wang [81] used 
fault-tolerant control in a four wheel independently driven electric vehicle. Should one of the 
motors fail, their control effort redistribution would ensure a safe and controllable vehicle for 
the driver. Zhang & Jiang [82] classifies Reconfigurable Flight Control methods as linear 
quadratic regulator, eigenstructure assignment, pseudo-inverse, model following, multiple 
model, fuzzy logic, adaptive control and neural network; some of these will be discussed later 
in this section. Zhang & Jiang does note, importantly, that most of these methods assume a 
perfect fault diagnosis is already available, which is sometimes not the case.  Ultimately, then, 
while the actual reconfiguration mechanism is part of the overall safety concept, it is more part 
of the fault-reaction mechanism than the fault-detection strategy [83], and thus falls just 






2-3 – Fault Detection and Diagnostic Methods 
 
From analysing the various industries, the topic of fault detection software concepts can be 
broken up into two major categories: model-based [74] and process history based [84]. A 




Figure 2-6: Classification of a number of different diagnostic techniques [84] 
 
Figure 2-6 shows the classification and relations between a number of different diagnostic 
methods. Model-based approaches are what have been described in the E-Gas concept, where 
a mathematical safety software model is used to determine if the system is behaving as 
expected, or if a fault has occurred such that performance has deviated. The mathematics in 
the model is an interpretation of the physics that happen within the vehicle. The interpretation 
of the physics (i.e. the a priori knowledge) can therefore be classified into two types of 
expressions:  quantitative model-based and qualitative model-based. Quantitative model-based 
methods find a mathematical functional relationship between system inputs and outputs 
through the use of transfer functions or filters. Qualitative model-based approaches on the 
other hand uses equations that express the relationships as qualitative functions centred around 





Process history-based approaches, on the other hand, can only use a large amount of historical 
input and output process data as it’s a priori knowledge. The ways in which historical datasets 
are interpreted, called the ‘feature extraction’ processes, can also be classified as qualitative 
and quantitative. Qualitative methods examine qualitative trends, whereas quantitative 
methods can either be statistical-based extraction methods, or non-statistical such as neural 
networks. As there are many diagnostic types to consider, only quantitative model-based and 
quantitative process-history based will be examined in depth in this report, as they seem to be 
more directly comparable with the current benchmark. 
 
All fault detection systems need some level of a priori knowledge to determine if a fault has 
occurred; without knowing how the system should behave, the safety software cannot know if 
the system is misbehaving. Venkatasubramanian [74] examines the underlying commonality 
between all diagnostic methods in how the measurement data is handled. In all methods, the 
following process is followed: 
 
1) Measurement space: The inputs into the diagnostic system, this is where the sensor 
measurements (including processed but not altered signals) exist, with no a priori 
system knowledge affecting their input. 
2) Feature Space: From the measurement space, a priori knowledge is used to extract 
the features of the measurements. Developing a feature space is useful as it lowers the 
complexity of information going into the decision space. This is because features (i.e. 
faults) tend to ‘cluster’ more distinctly once a priori filtering is applied, and as such 
classification and discrimination of features become easier.  Thus, having more a 
priori knowledge benefits the transformation from measurement space to feature 
space into a more usable input for the decision space. 
3) Decision Space: Features from the feature space are mapped into the decision space 
using some form of objective meeting function, such as a threshold seen in the fault 
check block of Figure 2-2 (top or a discriminant function as part of an implemented 
search or learning algorithm. If a priori knowledge is extensively used in the mapping 
from measurement space to feature space, the burden of the search / learning algorithm 
is greatly reduced. 
4) Class Space: This is where the results of the decision space are classified into different 
failure classes, typically through the use of simple thresholds. From here, the diagnosis 
system will decide which fault reaction to undertake, based on the class of fault 





Therefore, fault detection is the combination of prior knowledge with fault searching and 
system learning algorithms to process measurement data into types of faults. Prior knowledge 
can be produced in a number of ways, depending on the engineer’s knowledge of the system. 
It could include invariant relationships between sensor outputs and actuator inputs, based on 
energy balances and material properties in a process [74]. Alternatively, it could take form in 
an appropriate system identification transform model, resulting in a bank of filters being used. 
In process-history based systems, a priori knowledge could also use statistical Gaussian 
distribution expectations of measured data. Fault detection can therefore be divided into two 
basic steps [70]: 
 
1) Generation of Error: This incorporates the Measurement Space and Feature Space 
from above, and benefits from more a priori knowledge. 
2) Decision and isolation of faults: Decision Space and Classification Space from 
above. 
 
With this in mind, each of the quantitative-type concepts highlighted in Figure 2-6 will be 
talked about in more detail. 
 
2-3.1 – Model-Based Methods 
 
2-3.1.1 – Parity Relations 
 
Parity space is one of the simplest forms of model-based fault detection methods. Frank [70] 
explains that the main idea is to monitor the parity (consistency) between the mathematical 
equations of the system (analytical redundancy relations) and the actual sensor measurements, 
and a fault is thus declared if the error between the two exceed the preassigned error bounds. 
The parity equations are obtained by rearranging and transforming variants of input-output 
and state-space safety software models, with the model structure rearranged to get the best 
coverage for fault isolation [74]. Venkatasubramanian et al. performs a review of parity 
relations in the chemical and industrial processing field, and found that while parity relations 
were easy to generate using on-line process data and can effectively isolate faults, none of the 
sources they cited could handle gross process parameter drifts without using multiple models 






In many respects, the E-Gas concept [25] used in the automotive industry is a version of this, 
using a more simply-programmable rule-based model of the functional software, and 
comparing its output with the measured output of the functional software itself. It is less 
equations-based than parity relations, owing to it being a software application with developer-
defined functions as opposed to purely relying on physical equations. 
 
2-3.1.2 – Observers and Filters 
 
In this approach, observers are designed by reconstructing the system outputs from the sensor 
measurements, and then using the estimation error to develop observers and innovation to 
develop the Kalman filters [74]. Referring to the parity relations method, Frank [70] explains 
that a closed-loop parity space approach can lead to the concept of state estimation. Observers 
are a type of state estimator that are popular in this area of control theory [82], particularly in 
chemical engineering, industrial engineering [74], aerospace [79, 82, 85, 86], and has grown 
in popularity in the automotive industry [75, 87, 88]. 
 
Patton [79] examines the use of a ‘state estimation filter’ (or observer), a fault detection 
method whereby outputs are estimated based on one or more accepted sensor signals. This is 
used to isolate both the occurrence and the source of the fault, with the aim to better understand 
what has caused the fault [79]. Depending on the type of analytical redundancy in place, 
different forms of estimation filters are available for use. If the sensor measurements are 
related by algebraic equations (called static analytical redundancy), a classical least-squares 
method is used. If they are linked by differential equations (dynamic analytical redundancy), 
and provided they are deterministic the estimation filter used is a Luenberger Observer - also 
called a simple blender - which is a dynamical combination of the measurements. The 
Luenberger Observer is typically less time consuming than other estimator techniques, but 
since it doesn’t take into account parameter variations and system disturbances, it is has some 
drawbacks in particularly noisy plants [75]. Finally, in the general stochastic case where the 
sensor patterns can be analysed statistically but not necessarily linked and predicted 
mathematically, a Kalman Filter is used, designed in respect to the measurement noises and 
disturbance characteristics [89]. Additionally, robustness is improved with an ‘unknown input 
observer’, where the fault detection filter is decoupled from unknown inputs, such that the 
fault detection system becomes insensitive to unmodelled system disturbances whilst having 
specified sensitivity to sensor and actuator faults. 
 
Kalman filters are of particular interest to this topic, as their strength lies in the fact that they 




Kalman filter is a recursive algorithm that aims to minimize estimation error. Robustness to 
other noise factors can be improved by using a bank of Kalman filters that consider all the 
available possible system models under all possible dynamical changes [90]. Each Kalman 
filter or state estimator in the bank is tuned to be sensitive to a different possible fault 
hypothesis, and then in turn each hypothesis’ probability is tested using some decision function 
such as Bayesian decision theory [91]. One possible setup for a bank of observers is to assign 
one observer per sensor or actuator, in what is called a dedicated observer scheme, tuned to 
detect faults in the sensors or actuators [92]. Figure 2-7 shows a bank of Kalman filters used 




Figure 2-7: Bank of Kalman filters as part of Multiple Hypothesis Test [79]. 
 
Kalman filters are excellent at estimating linear states in a system, but have some trouble with 
non-linearity. Dynamic systems are usually very non-linear, so an Extended Kalman Filter 
(EKF) is commonly used in practice. The EKF is a modification of the normal Kalman filter 
in that a non-linear model is linearized at each process iteration by calculating the Jacobian, 
and subsequently ignoring higher order approximation terms [87]. Patra [85] used an EKF as 
a state estimator for an attitude controller in a missile. It was found that the EKF was effective 
in stabilizing the angle of attack by effectively estimating the state of the system. In Zhang & 
Jiang’s paper [82], a two-stage adaptive EKF was used as part of a fault-tolerant control 
scheme in an aircraft, with fault parameter estimation. The EKF stage 1 first estimates the 
reduction of control effectiveness, and as such a historical sample size that is smoothed for the 
fault decision scheme is decided in stage 2. The size of the moving average window to be 
smoothed is changed so as to best reduce model uncertainties (this is the adaptive aspect of 
the filter). Compared to a PID controller, the fault-tolerant control actuator fault detection 




any known noise factor. The fast and smooth fault reaction helps to achieve the principle of 
‘graceful degradation’. 
 
Ghodbane et al. [86] uses a fault diagnosis method called Extended Multiple Model Adaptive 
Estimation, which is a technique based on a bank of EKFs. Each EKF is responsible for 
monitoring the health of an actuator, and assigning a conditional probability to each fault 
scenario. Consequently, the estimated state vector of the system as a whole is found by 
summing all EKF state vectors, each of which is weighted by the corresponding probability. 
In this case, the Extended Multiple Model Adaptive Estimation fault detection process was 
very effective in isolating the fault to a single actuator, but did take about three seconds for 
the fault to fully register after it was injected (fault probability value needed to rise), and five 
seconds to determine the fault was no longer present. In an automotive application, the delay 
could take longer than the safety window allows, and would need to be tuned for faster fault 
detection, perhaps at the expense of robustness against false positives. [93] used Kalman filter 
as part of fault tolerant control in a network distributed control system, whereby the state 
observer was able to detect a faulty sensor as well as identify and compensate for random 
network transport delays. While signal transport delays are not likely to be a problem in this 
application, their approach to handling signal disorder or loss (corruption) may be of interest. 
 
A useful variation of the Kalman filter is the unscented Kalman filter, designed specifically 
for discrete time cases in non-linear system [87]. It uses the unscented transform to address 
the problem of propagating Gaussian random variables through non-linear model functions; 
this eliminates the need for linearization altogether, improving estimation accuracy and 
lowering computational complexity [87]. Vasu et al. [87] developed an extended mean value 
engine model that averages the dynamics of an ICE for the purpose of engine control in a 
vehicle ECU. They used an unscented Kalman filter with the extended mean value engine 
model and measurement signal post-processing to describe the engine in the model while 
estimating fewer states of interest, allowing flexibility in the balance between robustly 
obtaining system information through a noisy signal and computational efficiency. Their 
estimator method was also shown to be sufficiently modifiable to be sensitive to particular 
faults. Such an application in an EV or HEV would be useful as being able to isolate and 
distinguish between ICE or electric motor torque sources, helping the vehicle enact an 
appropriate fault reaction. Tabbache et al. [75] used an EKF and Luenberger Observer as part 
of an analytically redundant voter scheme, whereby an EV electric motor speed sensor was 
supplemented by a ‘virtual sensor’, whose signal was derived from appropriately tuned EKF 
and adaptive Luenberger Observer using other system inputs. The EKF used stator current and 




determine the signal most likely to be true. They found that the Luenberger Observer had better 
performance at high speed during faulty conditions, whereas the EKF had a higher reliability 
coefficient at low and medium speed faulty conditions, and the actual speed sensor was 
naturally most reliable during healthy conditions at all motor speeds. The most reliable signal 
would then be selected for use in the motor control model based on the conditions. 
 
2-3.2 – Process History Based Methods 
 
2-3.2.1 – Principal Component Analysis 
 
A method commonly used in process engineering is called Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA), which is sometimes called Proper Orthogonal Decomposition in other engineering 
disciplines. It is closely related to Factor Analysis, where variables can sometimes be grouped 
together and represented by a lesser number of variables [94]. Hussein et al. [95] describes 
PCA as a statistical procedure working by “(decomposing) the variance and covariance 
structure of a data matrix by defining linear combinations of the columns in the original 
matrix.” Essentially, then, PCA is a data-driven modelling approach that takes a large amount 
of multivariate data, and seeks to find sets that contain correlated data within them, but such 
that the sets do not correlate with each other. It focusses on the processes occurring based on 
the variance and correlation of the outputs it measures. Because it can group data into less sets 
than there are data points, the lower dimensionality can improve fault detection and diagnosis 
using outlier statistical methods. The sets can then be used to create predictive models - if 
captured through a supervised learner environment - for use in other controllers as a knowledge 
base. Figure 2-8, from Mazzoleni et al., [96] shows how data can be processed into groups 
using a PCA variant called Principal Direction Divisive Partitioning, which was applied to an 







Figure 2-8: Principal Direction Divisive Partitioning results, showing three data clusters 
in (left), being processed into three failure mode classes (right) [96] 
 
Figure 2-8 shows how data samples between two features can be statistically divided. The two 
features in this case were arbitrary as they were each a linear combination of 21 variables, 
including actuator displacement and torque generating current. The solid and dotted lines are 
possible boundaries for class designation. This method shows a lot of promise, as it both 
identifies a fault has occurred and the cause of a fault (with a priori knowledge). In theory, 






Hussein et al. [95, 97] used PCA in conjunction with Projection to Latent Structure 
Discriminant Analysis to treat an electro-pneumatic system as a black box and robustly 
determine system health information. This is a method that looks to find a line or plane that 
can differentiate between classes depending on their values. It is based on building classes 
(visualised as clusters) using a knowledge base from which the model is trained. Hussein et 
al. found that their setup on a printing system was effective in finding faults such as high 
throttle and leakage, using signals from pressure, displacement, and vibration sensors. Their 
approach could be used in multiple automotive powertrains because it can treat the powertrain 
as a black box. This is because the system does not need to necessarily know what is happening 
in the system, but simply needs to measure what the outputs are and determine which class or 
cluster the current performance state is in based on the inputs. The drawback here is that with 
each measured variable the state becomes increasingly complex. Visualisation of data beyond 
the third dimension (i.e. more than three measured variables) requires more effort to analyse, 
but also more processing power to use as an online processor. This will heavily depend on 
how few classes the outputs can be reduced to, but it is likely that the number of noise factors 
- and the statistical overlap of recorded data – will make analysis difficult. Additionally, 
development tests of virtually all possible faults may be needed to be conducted to build the 
knowledge base necessary for the PCA fault detection; however, since the application in this 
project is a software function, gathering and recording training data could be automated, and 
thus performed very quickly at an accelerated rate (i.e. faster than real-time) during 
development.  
 
Zheng et al. [98] tried to apply PCA to an NPP, but identified that the process varies between 
“stable – transition – stable” states that aren’t as significant in a typical chemical processing 
plant. Additionally, since some variables in an NPP are sensitive to external parameters such 
as feed water flow, main steam pressure etc., PCA can’t accurately classify the data it records. 
This is a similar problem faced by the highly dynamic environment and external factors that a 
vehicle powertrain operates within. Zheng et al. [98] overcame this by developing a 
Reformative PCA-based Fault Detection Method. The method starts by using K-mean cluster 
analysis to analyse historical data and obtain datasets for various stable operating conditions. 
A ‘principal component model’ group is produced for the whole process using the K-mean 
cluster datasets. The process state is then determined, with fault detection disabled if the 
process is in a transitional state. This is done through a ‘stability factor’. Finally, the detecting 
sample’s membership to the principal component model group datasets is determined, and a 
new principal component model is produced for the current stable operating condition. This 




found that the reformative PCA method can effectively and quickly detect faults on variables 
that vary with external factors, when the traditional PCA method would not. Figure 2-9 




Figure 2-9: Comparison of T2 and Q in conventional PCA (left) and Reformative PCA 
(right), showing improvement in fault detection with Reformative PCA method [98]. 
 
A drawback to this particular concept by Zheng et al is the need to turn off fault detection 
during ‘transition states’, which is a concern for an automotive safety concept. This is simply 
because it means that fault detection could be switched off during any time where there are 
external variables affecting powertrain performance, such as a changing road gradient, 
temperature and weather, and vehicle mass changes. The time in which a fault can become a 
hazard is very small, and having any lapse in fault detection capability will make the vehicle 
vulnerable to missing a fault. If this could be overcome with another adaptive controller in 
conjunction with the reformative PCA method such that it offers full and adequate coverage, 
then this safety concept could have some merit. Otherwise, another application of PCA could 
yield similar results regardless of noise factor.  
 
Canonical Correlation Analysis (CCA) is a fusion of statistical process like PCA and expert 
systems, whereby known statistical correlations are used to set a baseline [99] uses CCA in an 
industrial processing plant-wide distributed monitoring of variables, where local nodes use 
independent CCA analyses that are cross checked with others, and can be used to diagnose 
faulty nodes as well as train new nodes. The system showed improved fault detection rates, 
improved false positive rates, and greatly improved detection speed. The detection speed is 
primarily due to reworking with a lower dimensionality at the local level, which allows data 
to be processed and transferred more quickly between the network. This may be of interest in 
a distributed control system within an ECU, but may not see as much benefit on a powertrain 
ECU for powertrain fault monitoring, as bandwidth-limited communication channels are not 




sensor precision degradation by generating residual signals in sensors when taking into 
account the canonical correlation into account. The drawback of this particular statistical 
method is the effort it takes to derive those canonical correlations in the first place, transform 
them from engineering understanding into the CCA format, and then validate that these 
relations are correct.  
 
2-3.2.2 – Neural Networks 
 
Neural networks fall into the branch of artificial intelligence. The aim of a neural network is 
to create relations between inputs and outputs in a system by evolving its internal structure 
[101]. They can be used to learn and create transfer functions where analytical mathematical 
equations are difficult to form, working by pattern recognition between input and output 
vectors [102]. The role of a neural network in the case of fault detection and isolation would 
be to use training data to develop pattern recognition for what a correctly functioning vehicle 
would operate as. The training data would be developed offline. In an online learning 
application, the neural network could possibly adapt to small parameter variations and drifts 
if the patterns aren’t suddenly or significantly different. The same neural network would then 
be able to recognise if the pattern is suddenly vastly different to normal operation, i.e. deviance 
from the training data, indicating a fault occurrence. The difficulty would be quickly and 
correctly diagnosing the source of the fault if prior data (i.e. a pattern for that specific fault) is 
not available for the operating conditions. Conversely, developing a fully comprehensive 
training dataset for the neural network could take significant effort, as virtually all driving 
conditions would need to be tested, and most – if not all – faults be artificially induced. 
 
There are many different types of neural network in use in fault diagnosis and data analysis, 
but they are typically classified by their learning strategy: supervised and unsupervised. Neural 
networks with supervised learning strategies have specific learning topology constraints 
within which they learn [84]. This reduces the task to an estimation of connection weights 
between data samples, where the connection weights are learned by using the difference 
between desired and measured parameter values. Cybenko [103] states that this method is 
useful in classifying arbitrary regions of the learning topology. One of the more widely used 
supervised learning neural network in chemical engineering is the back-propagation algorithm. 
Learning performance for neural networks is a key characteristic to try and optimise. To do 
so, some researchers have performed feature extraction by pre-filtering and data processing 
the input data [104]. Their results showed greatly reduced learning time for the neural network, 
and improved clarity in recognising patterns for fault detection. Moussavi et al. [105] used an 




motor by using an adjustment mechanism with an adaptive controller (something called Model 
Reference Adaptive Control) where together they found that a hybrid learning technique would 
improve reaction speed to change in motor dynamics, and maintain control. 
 
Unsupervised learning strategies, also known as self-organising neural networks, restructure 
their framework based on the inputs it receives, as it uses unsupervised estimation techniques. 
The objective is pattern recognition, whereby similar patterns are grouped together to form a 
class. If there is a pattern far enough away from all current classes a new class is created [105, 
106]. In this method, therefore, the threshold within which patterns are grouped together is a 
key calibration term, leading to the clustering technique, which aims to group data samples 
such that there is the greatest amount of separation between classes; with an objective defined, 
this essentially becomes an optimisation problem. K-means clustering is a commonly used 
self-organising analysis technique [107]. It assumes a set number of classes exist, and 
distributes the data such that each one has at least one data sample is unique to it. It then looks 
to self-organise to optimise separation between the classes. Puskorius & Feldkamp [108] 
showed that using a Dynamic Decoupled EKF can greatly improve learning efficiency in 
neural networks in a highly nonlinear application.  
 
Li [109] used an ANN as a vehicle state estimator for autonomous driving. They improved on 
the usual practice of relying on curve theory and the Serret-Frenet equation of vehicle 
kinematics modelling, instead using a Kalman filter to estimate lateral vehicle motion states. 
The tuning of the Kalman filter itself was done using an ANN, which combines with the 
Kalman filter to form an ANN observer. While generally favourable results were presented in 
the paper, there were significant vehicle motions that were missed or damped out by the 
method, as well as significant deviations from the true values. These deviations are concerning, 
as it needs to be verified that their characteristics will never result in a missed fault in safety-
critical software - something that does not seem feasible in the present time. [110] used 
artificial neural networks to learn the characteristics of supervised autonomous vehicle 
behaviour, which was then used to detect deviations from the intended path of the autonomous 
system, due to system faults. They were able to suggest a form of verification framework, but 
the sheer scale of the task that high ASIL safety-critical software requires for verification, and 
reliance on other technologies such as vehicle-to-grid monitoring that could be used to aid in 
reliability. 
 
Horton [102] used a simple artificial neural network (ANN) for the purpose of parameter 
identification in mapping aerodynamics in a tactical ground-to-air missile, essentially acting 




also ‘learn’ and be ‘taught’, but uses a priori knowledge of the system structure along with 
initial state estimates in order to better estimate the plant state. The Kalman filter then begins 
to adapt to the system as it is used online. The effectiveness is determined by the basic 
algorithm capabilities, and the quality of the a priori knowledge it is based on. An ANN, by 
contrast is trained offline first, over a range of operating conditions. It is more tolerant to 
system structural changes, whereas a Kalman filter may struggle if not properly programmed. 
An ANN also does not need initial parameter estimates, and does not necessarily require any 
additional online training regime to continue performing state estimates. The quality of an 
ANNs state estimates are determined by the capabilities of the chosen network learning 
architecture, and the size of its knowledge base. Horton found limitations in the neural network 
performance under new and uncertain operating environments (conditions that it had not 
trained for). He argued that these could be overcome by further online training. However, he 
combined the Kalman filter and the ANN into a hybrid structure, where the ANN acts as a 
basis for the self-adaptive linear Kalman filter estimator. The hybrid state-estimator was very 
effective, outperforming both counterparts respectively. 
 
2-3.3 – Concept Candidate Selection 
 
Now that the literature review has been completed, the concepts that have been discussed at 
length in the previous section will form the initial group of concept candidates. In addition to 
these, the benchmark continuous torque demand monitor will be revisited. As stated 
previously, a simplified safety software model would result in more noise factors being left 
unaccounted for, leading to more torque error.   
 
In summary, the preliminary concept candidate shortlist is as follows: 
 
1) The Adaptive Safety Monitor. 
2) The Kalman Filter. 
3) Principal Component Analysis. 
4) Neural Networks. 
 
2-4 – Conclusions 
 
Many fault detection methods are used throughout both the automotive industry and beyond. 
This literature review has identified some of the methods used in these industries, including 




future concept candidates will be tested against in this investigation. Four preliminary concept 
candidates have been identified for investigation, two quantitative model-based concepts: the 
adaptive safety monitor and the Kalman filter, and two quantitative process-history-based 
concepts: principal component analysis and neural networks. The next chapter will outline the 
context of the ISO 26262 lifecycle in concept phase to establish key terminology, and 
understand the structure within which these concepts will need to be developed in (Chapter 3). 
The subsequent chapter will identify ideal concept attributes to select the concepts that show 
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3 – Summary 
 
The first part of this chapter provides the purpose for the novel safety concepts being 
developed, through discussing how risk is mitigated using the ISO 26262 engineering 
framework through the derivation of functional safety requirements. The second part of this 
chapter derives additional ideal monitoring attributes. These are identified based on ISO 
26262, ISO 25010, and OEM expert opinion, and are used to select the most promising concept 
candidates for detailed investigation via a Pugh Matrix. Finally, the testing methodology will 
be established for detailed concept development and investigation in the following chapters. 
 
• Objective 2: Identify ideal concept attributes and score candidates against them. 




3-1 – Obtaining Safety Requirements for Concept 
Development 
 
Functional safety is a vehicle-level attribute, whereby the vehicle is shown to be free from 
unreasonable risk. For that unreasonable risk to be mitigated, it must be identified and 
quantified at the vehicle level, such that top level safety requirements can be defined to 
mitigate the risk appropriately. A portion of these safety requirements are then implemented 
by the safety concept. Therefore, to design an appropriate safety concept, the safety-criticality 
of that safety concept must first be understood in light of the risk it is supposed to mitigate. 
This section explores the risk relating to one potential vehicle-level hazard, such that 
appropriate safety requirements are defined for the safety concept to implement. ISO 26262 
provides an engineering framework in Part 3 to identify sources of risk in the powertrain, 
quantify what risk is unreasonable, and provide a subsequent process for developing safety 
concepts. 
 
3-1.1 – ISO 26262 Engineering Framework 
 
A familiar V-diagram is at the core of the ISO 26262 engineering framework, emphasised by 
the fact that it appears in the opening pages of each part of the standard; this can be found in 









The standard is conveniently separated into ten parts, but the technical aspects of the safety 
lifecycle takes place within Parts 3 to 7, with the remaining parts consisting of helpful 
documentation and supporting management processes. On the left-hand side of the V-diagram 
– the design phase - the parts roughly contain the following processes: 
 
• Part 3 – Concept Phase [27]: Item Definition, Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment, 
creation of Safety Goals, conception of Functional Safety Concepts (FSC) and their 
Functional Safety Requirements to meet the Safety Goals. 
• Part 4 – Product Development at System Level [29]: specifying a Technical Safety 
Concept (TSC) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) of the specific system in 
the vehicle, such that the FSC is effectively implemented, system is designed, and 
system-level verification and validation activities can be undertaken. 
• Part 5 and 6 – Product Development at Hardware and Software Level [30, 31]: 
component-level development to implement TSCs and TSRs, hardware / software 
integration, and component-level verification activities. 
• Part 7 – Production and Operation [32]: handling the commissioning of the item in 
the vehicle.  
 
Each of these parts have relevant validation and verification (V&V) activities on the right-
hand side (upward path) of the V-diagram that verify the design phase of each product 
development level, with some preliminary V&V activities also included in the design phase 
itself. Consideration for these V&V activities will be made in Chapter 6 of this project, but the 
focus will remain primarily in concept phase and system design. Full component-level 
development (Parts 5 and 6) are out of scope for the most part, but again some of the 
considerations will be touched upon throughout development in this project.  
 
To understand the context within which this project seeks to operate, it is important to 
understand the flow of requirements in order to achieve functional safety of an item at the 
vehicle level, and how they drive the need for functional safety concepts in powertrain 
software; this process begins in Part 3, the Concept Phase. Figure 3-2 shows the overview of 
this summary and the primary work products as the lifecycle travels down the left-hand side 
of the V-diagram, starting in the Concept Phase, with the corresponding ISO 26262 Part and 






Figure 3-2: Hierarchy of safety requirements [27]. 
 
Developing a system through a full safety lifecycle is a significant task and a full safety report 
is out of scope for a thesis, however, a focused demonstration through the Concept Phase 
process will be undertaken in this chapter in order to arrive at the starting point for developing 
novel function safety monitoring concepts.  
 
3-1.2 – Item Definition 
 
The starting point of the Concept phase is the Item Definition. An ‘item’ in ISO 26262 is the 
electronic/electrical (E/E) “system or array of systems that implement a function at the vehicle 
level” (ISO 26262 Part 1-1.69 [26]). The aim of defining the item is to establish its purpose, 
functionality, and interaction with other vehicle systems: its operational boundary. The E/E 
item focused on in this thesis is the powertrain system. The functional safety boundary diagram 







Figure 3-3: Powertrain System Boundary Diagram at the vehicle level. 
 
A primary function of the powertrain system is that of achieving vehicle acceleration. Using 
the boundary diagram of Figure 3-3, the functions delivered by this item is listed and 
decomposed according to the system elements. For the sake of brevity, only the function of 
vehicle acceleration will be examined.   
 
Table 3-1: Decomposed acceleration function and associated elements of the powertrain. 
 






Accelerator Pedal Transmit measured position to Powertrain ECU 
Powertrain ECU Receive inputs from accelerator pedal, drive 
mode selector, and other vehicle sensors / 
systems. 
Calculate desired vehicle direction of travel 
Calculate desired vehicle total torque demand 
Calculate actuator demand for each actuator 
Transmit actuator demand to propulsion 
actuators 
Propulsion Actuators Receive actuator demand from Powertrain ECU 
Realise torque according to demand 
 
The vehicle acceleration function in Table 3-1 can be summarised as using a sensor to 
determine a desired vehicle acceleration, which is delivered by the propulsion actuator(s). The 
powertrain ECU determines this desired vehicle acceleration by transforming the desired 
acceleration into a vehicle torque demand via a complex process within the powertrain 
functional software (hereafter “functional software”). The torque demand is then allocated to 
the various actuators, which are then controlled via software drivers in the actuator control 
software, before individual actuator demands are sent to the propulsion actuators. This is a 
very simplified contextual overview of the system commonly used in the industry (other 






The powertrain system can be regarded as one of the most complex safety critical E/E items 
within the vehicle, being operational at all times the vehicle is turned on, and active during 
each and every environmental situation the vehicle is in. It is therefore critical that the safe 
operation and the mitigation of unreasonable risk is achieved at all times. It must be ensured 
correct torque demand is delivered in relation to driver pedal demand, as a malfunctioning 
torque demand could result in unexpected vehicle behaviour, potentially leading to a 
hazardous situation.  
 
3-1.3 – Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment 
 
The next step is to conduct a hazard analysis and risk assessment (hereafter, HARA). The goal 
of the HARA is to identify and categorise the hazardous events that could arise in the event of 
a malfunction and assign a risk to these hazards. Once these have been identified, safety goals 
are defined that ensure the prevention and mitigation of identified unreasonable risk in the 
event of one of these malfunctions occurring in the item. The safety goal includes what is 
called a ‘safe state’, a tangible and attainable metric that defines safety for this item with 
respect to the hazard, typically to be attained within an allotted time once a fault is detected 
(the ‘fault-tolerant time interval’, FTTI). These safety goals form the basis for the functional 
safety concepts, as their purpose is to ensure the safety goals are met.  
 
The Society for Automotive Engineers (SAE) has released a document called J2980 [111], a 
recommended practice for surface vehicles called ‘Considerations for ISO 26262 ASIL Hazard 
Classification’. This document is useful during the development stage of the safety lifecycle 
as it provides a more detailed insight into identifying hazards and classifying the risk they pose 
than ISO 26262 does. J2980 is limited in scope as it focuses on the HARA stage without the 
prerequisite item definition, a point it stresses in part 1.2 [111]. The document compiles and 
marries many of the principles found in and recommended by a number of other applicable 
documents and standards, and reframes them in the context of ISO 26262. An overview of the 







Figure 3-4: Overview of HARA process outlined by J2980 and ISO 26262. 
 
The three main processes of the HARA will be examined more closely in this section, as it 
provides a traceable context for the reason a functional software malfunction would be 
considered hazardous, and the level of risk such a malfunction poses. 
 
3-1.3.1 – Hazard and Operability Analysis 
 
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) analysis is an explorative analysis method for identifying 
faults in the various function of an item. It does so by composing sentences with applicable 
guidewords and phrases to identify the malfunctional behaviours that could lead to hazards to 
humans at the vehicle level. The procedure is to take a function that the vehicle seeks to 
provide and apply these guide-phrases to the function to find the resultant malfunction. 
Consider the following function provided by the powertrain: “provide vehicle acceleration 
commensurate with driver demand”. Applying the HAZOP guide-phrases yields the item 
malfunctions shown in Table 3-2.  
 

















































3-1.3.2 – Situational Analysis 
 
In ISO 262626 Part 3-7.4.2 [27], the situations where a certain malfunction could lead to a 
hazardous behaviour are considered, in that the S, E and C parameters assigned to each hazard 
are determined when the situation in which the malfunction occurs is taken into account. J2980 
provides a useful graphic in Section 4.2.1.4 [111] to aid in considering the possible operational 




Figure 3-5: Possible Vehicle Operational Situations [111] 
 
The situational analysis has a great impact on each of the different ASIL determination 
parameters, and should be done carefully within the appropriate operational context the vehicle 
would be used within. Three situations are considered moving forward: 
 
• Vehicle driving in city or on country roads behind another car  
• Vehicle driving at low speed (first gear) in pedestrianised area  
• Vehicle is cruising on motorway with moderate-heavy traffic 
 
These will be considered alongside “unintended acceleration” to form the hazardous situations 








3-1.3.3 – Risk Assessment 
 
With the functions and hazards identified, the risk assessment can now take place to determine 
the risk each hazard poses to human life and property. In line with recommendation from IEC 
61508 [53] of assigning a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) to evaluate and categorise the risk of 
each hazard, ISO 26262 uses the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) to determine the 
level of effort required to mitigate the assessed level of risk each hazard poses. Whereas SIL 
categories are assessed on the severity (level of potential injury, S) and exposure (probability 
of occurrence, E), an additional parameter – control, C – is included in determining the ASIL, 
by assessing the amount of control the driver has in the hazardous situation. While ISO 26262 
does provide some guidelines in determining the appropriate S, E and C parameter values, 
J2980 gives a deeper insight in how these parameters would be justifiably evaluated.  
 
3-1.3.3.1 – Exposure 
 
Exposure is the measure of how often it is expected that a vehicle would be in the situation 
being assessed.  The exposure class in ISO 26262 comprises of five categories, ranging from 
E0 to E4, shown below with the relevant descriptions in Table 3-3 below.  
 
Table 3-3: Exposure class parameter values with quantitative descriptions in terms of 
frequency and duration from ISO 26262 Part 3 Annex B. 
 
Historical data and evidence should be used to determine a justifiable exposure parameter. 
Two methods of assessing exposure are presented in ISO 26262 – frequency and duration – 
which need to be used with common sense applied in order to ascertain the correct value. For 
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Occurs once a 
month or more 

























example, crossing a junction only accounts for perhaps 5% of average operating time (E3), but 
occurs multiple times every drive cycle (E4). The frequency method will be chosen for the 
risk assessment.  
 
3-1.3.3.2 – Severity 
 
The next step in the risk assessment is to consider how severe the injuries would be from a 
particular hazardous event. The severity class, S, is given four possible parameters, show in 
Table 3-4 with their corresponding qualifying descriptions from ISO 26262 [27]. 
 
Table 3-4: Severity Class with correlation to planar collision speeds, from various analyses 




The descriptions provided in Table 3-4 are general guidelines as the actual injury experienced 
by occupants is virtually non-deterministic due to the many factors involved, and the inherent 
chaotic nature of an accident. Within each accident situation, the severity is a distribution from 
minimal risk to human life to human fatality. The shape of that distribution curve and the 
centre of that distribution is what drives the severity classification. The primary factor 
affecting the shape of that distribution is the difference in speed at the point of collision, 
commonly referred to as “delta v”, with higher delta v values increasing the severity of injury. 
SAE J2980 provides a useful table for various planar vehicle collisions, and the 
minimum/maximum delta v ranges found to correlate with the severity classifications after 
analysing a number of global accident databases; the ranges chosen for the risk assessment are 





S0 S1 S2 S3 















collision delta v 
< 4 kph 4 – 20 kph 20 – 40 kph > 40 kph 
Rear collision 
delta v 
< 4 kph 4 – 20 kph 20 – 40 kph > 40 kph 
Side collision 
delta v 




3-1.3.3.3 – Controllability 
 
The third classification in the risk assessment is that of controllability by participants involved 
in the hazardous situation to avoid harm, which includes the host vehicle driver, other road 
users, and pedestrians. This is done either by achieving a safe state themselves (e.g. applying 
the brakes to slow car down), or by being able to perform an evasive manoeuvre (e.g. 
controlling steering to avoid hazards, moving out of the way of a malfunctioning vehicle). 
Table 3-5 correlates the four controllability classifications with the real-world possibility of 
harm avoidance by the collision participants. 
 








If dedicated regulations exist for a particular 
hazard, Controllability may be rated C0 when it is 
consistent with the corresponding existing 




≥ 99% of all drivers or other traffic participants 




≥ 90% of all drivers or other traffic participants 
are usually able to avoid specified harm 
C3 
Difficult to control 
or uncontrollable 
< 90% of all drivers or other traffic participants 
are usually able to avoid specified harm  
 
Controllability is largely dependent on the human factor in a collision, which can include how 
easily the hazard is identified, and an appropriate mitigating action taken. Some hazards have 
an intuitive reaction for the majority of drivers. For example, unintended vehicle acceleration 
can be intuitively counteracted by depressing the brake pedal [111]. ISO 26262 Part 3-8.4.2.6 
[27] considers how a driver reaction may be a key part of achieving the safety goal, and if so, 
which actions and controls are needed by the driver to ensure that controllability is achieved.  
 
3-1.3.3.4 – ASIL Determination and Completing the HARA 
 
Combining the E, S, and C parameters, the ASIL rating for each hazardous situation can be 
determined in the risk assessment. The ASIL is used to determine the risk each hazardous 




throughout the safety development lifecycle, from Safety Goal to Software Safety 
Requirement. It also specifies the level of development rigour required to ensure confidence 
that risk has been mitigated commensurate with the level of that risk. Table 3-6 shows how 
the ASIL ratings are calculated for each hazardous situation. 
 






C1 C2 C3 
S1 
E1 QM QM QM 
E2 QM QM QM 
E3 QM QM A 
E4 QM A B 
S2 
E1 QM QM QM 
E2 QM QM A 
E3 QM A B 
E4 A B C 
S3 
E1 QM QM A 
E2 QM A B 
E3 A B C 
E4 B C D 
 
Note that S0, E0 or C0 have an ASIL QM rating assigned to them, as each one indicates an 
acceptable level of risk is present. Note also that only the most likely (E4), most severe (S3), 
and least controllable (C3) classifications lead to the most stringent ASIL rating of ASIL D. 
 
Compiling the malfunctions, the hazardous situations, the risk assessment into one table for 
analysis completes the HARA. The HARA is an iterative task that can lead to reassessment as 
new information is discovered and new hazardous situations considered. Assessing all possible 
malfunctions and situations is a significant task, so an example HARA table for the 
malfunction focused on in this thesis – ‘unintended acceleration’ – is presented in Table 3-7. 
Here, three driving scenarios are examined, one at low speed, one at moderate speed, and one 











































Vehicle driving in 
city or on country 
roads behind another 
car 
Vehicle driving at 
low speed (first 
gear) in 
pedestrianised area  
Vehicle is cruising 







with the vehicle in 
front 
Frontal collision 
with pedestrian at 
low speed, no run 
over assumed. 
Front/rear collision 

















































situation. >10% of 
operation time 
Large proportion of 





etc), likely <10% of 
operation time, but 
a smaller subset of 
areas could lead to 
run-over. 
Very common 
situation >10% of 
operating time. 





 Frontal crash of 
vehicle into rear end 
of another vehicle at 
intermediate speed 
(delta v = 20 kph) 
Low collision speed 
as initial speed is 
low, and pedestrian 
is regarded as being 





delta v (> 40 kph) 






Situation can be 




time in majority of 
situations 
In low gear, 
acceleration for 
torque will be great, 
startling drivers 




reaction time such 
that <90% of drivers 
are able to avoid 
(similar to Sit. 1) 
Since at motorway 
speeds, vehicle is 





would be less 
startling to driver. 




3-1.4 – Safety Goals 
 
With the HARA completed, a safety goal at the vehicle level can be defined for each hazard 
(ISO 26262 Part 3-7.4.4.3 [27]). The safety goal is a “vehicle-level requirement” (ISO 26262 
Part 1-1.108 [26]) that – when achieved – prevents or mitigates any unreasonable risk 
identified in the relevant hazardous events in the HARA. A safety goal must therefore be 
quantified, meaning that there must be some quantitative requirement that can be met such that 
it can be shown that safety has been achieved. A single safety goal can be applied to multiple 
hazards, inheriting the ASIL of the highest hazard relying upon it.  
 
3-1.4.1 – Choosing the Safety Goal 
 
In the context of ISO 26262, and specifically pertaining to the risk assessment, the safety goal 
addresses the risk presented in a hazard such that by achieving the safe state, one or more of 
the ASIL parameters (E, S or C) is reduced. The aim is by arguing that if the vehicle were 
transitioned to the defined safe state when a malfunction occurred, the risk assessment would 
produce a new ASIL for the particular hazard. If that new ASIL rating is QM, the residual risk 
is now small enough to be reasonable with no further risk reduction is necessary: safety has 
been achieved. The safe state has to be reached before a fault can become a hazard: this is the 
FTTI, and is defined in ISO 26262 Part 1-1.45 [26]. 
 
 
Figure 3-6: Fault Tolerant Time Interval [26] 
 
One common approach in industry is by selecting the safety goal such that the driver is able 
to regain and maintain control of the situation. For example, taking any of the situations in the 




Controllability in each of the situations in Table 3-7 is not C0, but if the safe state was to 
ensure unintended acceleration remained within a manageable (i.e. controllable) magnitude, 
the controllability parameter could then be reduced to C0, and consequentially the ASIL would 
reduce to QM. The threshold would need to be manageable in such a way that the driver would 
easily be able to react to, and compensate for, the hazard, thereby mitigating the hazard. 
 
Birch et al [112] identified the hazard of ‘unintended acceleration at low speed among 
pedestrians’ in their paper about safety cases and the functional safety assessment in ISO 
26262. In an industrial case study, the hazard could be caused by the torque request and 
delivery within an electric vehicle, just as in this chapter. They prescribed the accompanying 
safety goal as ‘Vehicle positive longitudinal acceleration shall not exceed driver demand by 
over 1.5m/s2 for longer than 1 s’, with the rationale being that such a situation is controllable 
in general (C0) by the driver slowing and stopping the vehicle with application of the brake 
pedal. The FTTI for this safety goal is 1 second [112]. This is the safety goal chosen to mitigate 
unintended acceleration in all three situations of the HARA in Table 3-7, inheriting ASIL B. 
 
3-1.5 – Functional Safety Concepts 
 
In order to implement the safety goal, a method and mechanism concept is required, called a 
functional safety concept (FSC). The FSC is defined in ISO 26262 Part 1-1.52 [26] as “the 
specification of the functional safety requirements (1.53), with associated information, their 
allocation (1.1) to architectural elements (1.32), and their interaction necessary to achieve the 
safety goals (1.108)”. The FSC is where functional safety requirements (FSRs) are defined to 
functionally implement the safety goals, with at least one FSR for each safety goal. They are 
then allocated to the available architectural elements within the item. A FSR should be 
technical-implementation agnostic, meaning it should only be defined in terms of 
functionality. These FSRs will inherit the highest ASIL rating of the safety goals it is assigned 
to, which in this case is ASIL B. 
 
3-1.5.1 – Defining the Functional Safety Requirements  
 
E-Gas will serve as a strong basis for developing an FSC for the safety goal defined in Section 
3-1.4.1, especially seeing as this monitoring concept is considered industry standard [25]. E-
Gas Version 5.5 is specifically aimed at addressing the hazard of unintended acceleration in 
control units (which, according to their own HARA, yielded an ASIL-B rating), leading to its 
own safety goal of ‘prevent unintended acceleration’. To meet this safety goal, the FSRs in E-




functional monitoring activities in Level 2. Table 3-8 shows each of the FSRs that are allocated 
to the ECU specifically, and subsequently the monitoring software; a summary is also provided 
to aid understanding. 
 
Table 3-8: Summary example of ECU-allocated FSRs for E-Gas FSC 
 
Safety Goal 
Vehicle positive longitudinal acceleration shall not exceed 
driver demand by over 1.5m/s2 for longer than 1 s 
ASIL B 
    




The engine control unit detects sensor faults (e.g. 
accelerator pedal, throttle-valve, brake, cruise 
control), additional torque relevant sensors / 






Torque requests of other control devices that are 
transmitted by networks shall be checked for 
plausibility (e.g. accelerator pedal, throttle-valve, 






In the powertrain control unit a safety concept shall 
be implemented for validation and confirmation of a 




Switch to safe state 
if a fault is 
detected 
In case of a fault the engine control unit shall switch 
to a safe state. 
B 
 
The derivation and definition of the FSC is the final step in the Concept Phase of ISO 26262 
Part 3 [27]. Entering into Part 4 considers the specific system that the FSC is applied to, 
generating a system-specific Technical Safety Concept and Technical Safety Requirements; 
the following thesis chapters of concept development occur chiefly at this boundary. The focus 
of this thesis will be on FSR 3, highlighted in blue in Table 3-8, whereby novel safety 
monitoring concepts will be explored to ensure the correct torque demand is being provided 









3-1.6 – Safety Lifecycle Summary 
 
In the first part of this chapter, the concept phase of ISO 26262 has provided the context and 
the purpose of the safety concept. In line with Figure 3-2, the following list summarises the 
outcomes of this section: 
 
• Function: Provide acceleration commensurate with driver demand. 
• Hazardous Situation: Unintended acceleration near pedestrians. 
• Safety Goal: Vehicle positive longitudinal acceleration shall not exceed driver 
demand by over 1.5 m/s2 for longer than 1 second. 
• Functional Safety Requirement: In the powertrain control unit a safety concept shall 
be implemented for validation and confirmation of a not permissible exceeding 
driving torque or an unintended acceleration. 
 
3-2 – Ideal Safety Concept Attributes 
 
The previous section used the concept phase framework of the ISO 26262 safety lifecycle to 
define the core task that the safety concept needs to accomplish: its functional safety 
requirement. In this section, the additional other desirable attributes of the safety concept will 
be derived and discussed. These attributes are not necessarily required by ISO 26262, but are 
desirable to the automotive OEM as it may make it easier to meet the ISO 26262 requirements, 
easier to develop, and/or easier to implement. These attributes will be used to identify the most 
promising concept candidates from the preliminary shortlist produced in the literature review. 
 
3-2.1 – Primary Motivations 
 
To identify the ideal safety monitor attributes, a general understanding of the motivations that 
go into selection of a safety monitor need to be highlighted. These main motivations were 
brought from the functional safety team working at the sponsoring OEM.  
 
3-2.1.1 – Meeting Functional Safety Requirements and Performance Criteria 
 
First, the safety monitor must be able to fulfil the task it is designed to do, namely, be able to 
always ensure safety goals are met. This is captured by conforming to the requirements of ISO 
26262, as the standard provides the framework to develop requirements against which the 




operation, which is to say, its ability to provide availability to the driver and to not 
unnecessarily limit availability due to a non-hazardous fault.  
 
3-2.1.2 – Development Effort 
 
The second motivation is that of development effort on the part of the OEM. In Chapter 1, this 
was highlighted as the main motivation for this project. The development effort of the safety 
monitors have increased as the software complexity of the functional software also increased. 
Consider two different FSCs/TSCs for the same item and safety goal, each meeting the 
FSRs/TSRs and yielding the same reliability etc. The first concept has a higher initial design 
effort than the second, so it would make sense to choose the second concept as this would be 
less costly for the manufacturer. However, if the first concept can be easily transferred between 
applications – the net effort required over all applications may be less for the first concept than 
the second, yielding a lower net cost for the manufacturer. Furthermore, the first concept may 
simply build on existing software used in industry (i.e. the E-Gas continuous demand monitor 
[25]), so the actual starting point for initial design may be higher than for the brand new second 
concept. Many engineering groups may work on the safety software across numerous 
companies, so a highly complex concept may make calibration and modification difficult. 
Related to this, and of very high importance, is the effort required to verify the concept as per 
ISO 26262. A concept would benefit from being easier to verify, as the verification effort is a 
major part of increasing the development costs of the concept. A new concept that meets the 
requirements and is reliable, but requires a significantly larger verification effort will 
ultimately cost more, particularly if any minor modification or calibration requires extensive 
reverification.  
 
3-2.1.3 – Implementation Effort 
 
Lastly, the consideration of actually implementing the concept on the vehicle and releasing it 
to the consumer. A key component in this is the hardware cost related to the storage and 
computational requirements that the concept brings. For example, a concept that requires high 
performance computing to run large amounts of data, or the storage of many variables, would 
require more expensive hardware per vehicle. In special, low volume vehicle productions, this 
may be a sensible trade off if it leads to lowered development effort, but in mass market 
vehicles, the hardware cost is multiplied many times over, so a small per-vehicle saving in 





All of these main motivators can be summarised by minimizing OEM cost as much as possible 
while still meeting the safety criteria.  
 
3-2.2 – Software Quality and ISO 25010 
 
In this software environment, ISO 26262 does not address many of the attributes associated 
with the quality of software as this is not the focus of the standard. However, many of the 
motivations that drive safety criteria are common with developing and evaluating quality 
software. For example, software that is poorly designed can lead to difficulty in full 
verification, or could lead to unnecessary resource utilisation, both undesirable attributes in 
quality software and with respect to a functional safety monitor. The quality of software can 
arguably be in relation to the low-level programming implementation and coding – which is 
largely dependent on the skill of the programmer – but can also be inherent to the architecture 
and framework of the software concept and how it is structured to meet its goals. In addition 
to qualities and attributes that can be gleaned from ISO 26262, it therefore also makes sense 
to look at an ISO standard that more directly addresses the quality of the software used in such 
systems for more possible quality characteristics. 
 
ISO 25010 is an international standard on systems and software engineering [113]. Based on 
ISO 9126:1991, it forms the second part of a series of standards governing software quality, 
SQuaRE, which stands for Software Quality Requirements and Evaluation. ISO 25010 focuses 
specifically on the quality aspect of the software itself, with other parts in the series looking at 
themes such as management (ISO 25000 [114]), measurement (ISO 25020 [115]), 
requirements (ISO 25030 [116]), and evaluation (ISO 25040 [117]).  
 
The standard separates the quality of the software into two main sections. First, the “quality in 
use” is examined, which highlights five key characteristics related to the interaction with the 
system by a human operator, either an end user or maintenance by a developer. These 





• Freedom from Risk 





The application of safety software is different to a computer program used by a consumer, in 
that there is no direct usage: it is a hidden function from the consumer. Effectiveness in this 
context is defined in ISO 25010 Section 4.1 as specifically relating to how effective the 
software is in enabling the user to achieve their goal. Efficiency addresses the resources 
required to achieve the goal of the user. Satisfaction is with regards to user experience. 
Freedom from Risk is inherent to the safety software, as that is indeed its primary purpose, so 
it is not a new attribute. Context coverage addresses the number of different scenarios in which 
a user can use the software, so would not relate to the ability of the safety software to cover 
all possible scenarios. 
 
The ‘quality in use’ model is therefore not relevant. Instead, a product quality model is 
provided by ISO 25010 Section 3.3 that addresses the quality of the software itself, not the 
usage experience. Eight key characteristics and thirty-one sub-characteristics are identified 
and shown in Table 3-9; a detailed explanation of each of these characteristics can be found in 





Table 3-9: Product Quality Model - characteristics and sub-characteristics from ISO 
25010 [113] 
 
















User Error protection 
























3-2.3 – Ideal Monitoring Attributes 
 
With guidance from ISO 26262 [26], a product quality model from ISO 25010 [113], and 
industry experience from Jaguar Land Rover, ideal attributes of the functional safety monitor 




safety monitor, any relationships with other attributes noted, and any associated 
(sub)characteristics from ISO 25010 stated.  
 
3-2.3.1 – Functional Suitability 
 
The safety concept must comply with the FSRs and TSRs from the ISO 26262 safety lifecycle. 
It must be able to reliably, quickly and accurately detect true faults that will violate the safety 
goal every time they occur, including latent and multiple faults as necessary. All true faults 
must be classified and isolated for correct fault reaction to take place. It is important to quickly 
be able to start fault reaction within the FTTI such that a “graceful transition to a safe state” 
[26] can occur, but could also lead to sensitivity from high frequency noise factors, resulting 
in false positives (affecting reliability).  
 
Related ideal attributes are Reliability and Verifiability. Related ISO 25010 sub-characteristics 
include Functional Suitability, Functional Appropriateness, Functional Completeness, 
Functional Correctness (Accuracy), and Time-Behaviour. 
 
3-2.3.2 – Reliability 
 
In this context, reliability is a subset of robustness, ensuring that maximum availability of the 
vehicles performance is given to the driver. A true fault leads only to the necessary reduction 
of availability in order to maintain safety. There is a low chance of false positives occurring 
with high reliability, due to a low sensitivity towards noise factors. Low reliability will 
unnecessarily limit vehicle performance availability with false positive occurrence. It also 
considers recoverability, as it should not unnecessarily limit performance after an ECU reset. 
There becomes a trade-off, whereby the appropriate level of engineering effort should be 
dedicated to improving reliability. In order to select the appropriate trade-off, the project and 
safety requirements should be examined. The project requirements will set the minimum level 
of availability the system should have, and the safety requirements will set the level of safety 
the system should have. Engineering effort for reliability will be complete once both sets of 
requirements have been verified to have been met during the verification phase of the project, 
i.e. limitation of unnecessary vehicle performance availability is acceptably low, and safety 





Related ideal attributes are Functional Suitability, Initial Design Effort, and Simplicity. 
Related ISO 25010 sub-characteristics include Reliability, Availability, Fault-Tolerance, 
Recoverability, and Maturity. 
 
3-2.3.3 – Verifiability 
 
A safety concept must be verifiable, in the sense that it can be verified to ensure it will always 
meet the FSRs over the lifetime of the vehicle, proving that the software complies with ISO 
26262. If the software cannot be verified to maintain safety objectives at all times, it is not 
suitable for a safety-critical application. This attribute also covers ease of verifiability, as a 
concept may be verifiable but could require great effort, leading to increased costs for the 
OEM and ultimately the consumer. On the other hand, verification could be fairly straight-
forward with easily identifiable and testable systematic testing, which in a software 
environment could be automated, reducing costs. Additionally, should the functional software 
need to be recalibrated, the amount of reverification required would also impact costs. ISO 
26262 Part 4-7.4.3.6 [29] states: ‘a decision not to re-use well-trusted design principles should 
be justified’. This is relevant here as some of the methods being evaluated are novel in this 
application (i.e. not well-trusted) and thus must be verified to comply with the ISO 26262 
standard at all times. With a process-history based concept, any stored data that is used to drive 
concept operation (such as neural network training data) needs to also be both verifiable and 
verified.  
 
Related ideal attributes are Functional Suitability, Initial Design Effort, Modifiability, and 
Simplicity. Related ISO 25010 sub-characteristics include Functional Suitability Compliance, 
Analysability and Testability. 
 
3-2.3.4 – Compatibility 
 
Compatibility covers how well the concept can operate with other items in the greater vehicle 
plant, including the functional software and other safety software modules. It also considers if 
the new concept can simply replace the existing one, or whether additional, novel development 
work is needed, and if hardware changes are required. Additionally, the safety concept should 
be able to coexist with sufficient independence from modules that are not safety critical, 





Related ideal attributes are Simplicity, Hardware and Computational Requirement, and Initial 
Design Effort. Related ISO 25010 sub-characteristics include Compatibility, Replaceability, 
Coexistence, Compatibility Compliance, and Interoperability. 
 
3-2.3.5 – Hardware and Computational Requirement 
 
This attribute is directly related to cost of implementation and packaging needs for when the 
vehicle is released, including the storage requirements and the computational resources the 
concept would need to operate. Consideration also needs to be given if a certain concept 
requires special hardware or storage facilities, e.g. an online-learning concept may need 
hardware redundancies such that if a memory unit fails, all the captured training data isn’t also 
lost. Other, more novel monitoring concepts may require specific sensors or network 
connectivity of a high minimum hardware or bandwidth specification in order to meet safety 
goals, all adding to implementation costs. As previously mentioned, the importance of this 
attribute is dependent on the economics of the target application: a low-volume vehicle model 
would put lower emphasis on these per-vehicle costs than a mass market production run would.  
 
Related ideal attributes are Compatibility and Commercial Feasibility. Related ISO 25010 sub-
characteristics include Performance Efficiency, Maintainability, Installability, and Resource 
Utilisation. 
 
3-2.3.6 – Initial Design Effort 
 
The initial design effort required to produce the concept is directly related to the cost involved 
in the development stage, and reducing the initial design effort will lead to greatly reduced 
costs. Design effort covers the necessary coding expertise for designing and calibrating the 
concept for a specific vehicle application. A high initial design effort can make commercial 
sense if it enables easy transferability of the concept to other applications, meaning the net 
cost is lower over multiple vehicle programs. Verification effort is related to this attribute as 
both contribute greatly to the cost of development, with initial design effort on the left-hand 
side of the ‘V’ cycle, and verification effort on the right-hand side.  
 
Related ideal attributes are Verifiability, Simplicity, Compatibility, Modifiability and 





3-2.3.7 – Simplicity 
 
The concept should be simple, or rather, not unnecessarily complex. This is to avoid failures 
from unconstrained complexity, and implies modularity, encapsulation within the design, and 
adequate level of granularity [27]. Highly complex concepts may be more difficult to design, 
verify, modify, and could necessitate higher hardware specification and computational 
resources. Additionally, it could be more difficult to trace changes if multiple teams work on 
the software. Therefore, keeping the concept as simple as it needs to be is usually desirable, 
unless added complexity could enable easier modification or better resource utilisation.  
 
Related ideal attributes are Initial Design Effort, Verifiability, Modifiability, Hardware and 
Computational Requirement, and Compatibility. 
 
3-2.3.8 – Modifiability 
 
Suitability for configurable architectural design, and maintainability of the software 
architectural design is desirable. With the functional software in the process of development, 
it is desirable to be able to quickly and easily calibrate or modify the concept without great 
effort. Modifiability is also related to how easily the concept could be transferred to a new 
application (powertrain or vehicle) with only some calibration work required, potentially 
reducing the initial design effort required in the new application, and thus the cost involved. 
The option to modify could be related to having that capability programmed in during initial 
design, though at the expense of simplicity.  
 
Related ideal attributes are Initial Design Effort, Verifiability, and Simplicity. Related ISO 
25010 sub-characteristics include Modifiable, Modularity, Changeability, Stability, 
Reusability, Transferability, Portability, and Adaptability. 
 
3-2.3.9 – Commercial Feasibility 
 
Feasibility for the design and implementation of software units’, the technique is only worth 
exploring if it could possibly be commercially deployed, provided it meets all other 
requirements. Ensures that development time, development costs and implementation costs 
are jointly justifiable within the business case.  
 




3-2.3.10 – Evolvable 
 
As the vehicle ages, or changes are made throughout its lifetime, the mathematical model 
becomes less representative of the actual plant. The ability of the concept to adapt to these 
changes over time could prove highly beneficial, as it could minimise effort spent on 
calibrations during the development stage as the functional software is being changed, but 
potentially even enable the safety concept to maintain reliability over a longer period of time 
and with new, unaccounted-for noise factors interacting with the system. The biggest concern 
with an evolvable safety concept is that of verifiability, as now all possible future evolution 
permutations of the concept would need to be ensured to be functionally suitable. Other 
concerns relate to how complex the system could become, and the additional hardware and 
computational requirements to process the evolution of the concept.  
 
Related ideal attributes are Reliability, Verifiability, Initial Design Effort, Hardware and 
Computational Requirement, Simplicity, Modifiability, and Compatibility. Related ISO 25010 
sub-characteristics include Adaptability. 
 
3-2.3.11 – Security 
 
Ideally, the OEM should ensure that the software is secure, such that it cannot be maliciously 
altered after commission in a way that would cause the safety concept to fail to meet its safety 
objective, ultimately endangering occupants. Currently, security analysis is not required by 
ISO 26262, but will likely be introduced in future legislation.  
 
Related ideal attributes are Compatibility, Hardware and Computational Requirement, Initial 
Design Effort, Simplicity, and Modifiability. Related ISO 25010 sub-characteristics include 
Security, Confidentiality, Integrity, Non-Repudiation, Accountability, Authenticity. 
 
3-2.4 – Importance Weighting and Pugh Matrix Score 
 
Each of the ideal attributes shown in the previous section are important selection criteria to 
help the OEM evaluate current and potential safety concepts. However, the importance of each 
attribute varies according to the needs of the OEM. These could be relative to technical factors, 
with considerations for the safety goals and associated ASILs the concept seeks to address, the 
range powertrain variations, available hardware and storage resources available, expected 




commercial factors also play a significant role in impacting attribute importance, such as the 
vehicle production cycle plans (current and future), the inter-company working groups (and 
intra-company engineering departments), budget etc.  
 
The manufacturer sponsoring this research project is looking to use the research outputs in a 
mass-market vehicle application. They are concerned with the cost of having to recalibrate and 
re-verify safety software every time there is an update in the functional software. Certainly, 
the concepts must perform the task required (i.e. be functionally suitable), and be able to be 
verified, to comply with ISO 26262 requirements. They hope that the new concepts are 
compatible with the current software and hardware, such that minimal changes are necessary 
and very little to no additional cost is added for new hardware, since the software could find 
use in thousands of new vehicles. Initial design effort is of lower importance than it being 
modifiable to allow easy transfer between vehicle powertrains, and straightforward re-
calibration. While a simple concept would be ideal, it is of lower importance, along with 
commercial feasibility, so as not to limit the consideration of possible new concepts for this 
project. An evolvable concept presents an interesting and challenging avenue of research, but 
with many questions surrounding verifiability it is of lower priority. Finally, product security 
is worth mentioning due to possible future legislation, but is not of major focus in this project.  
 
With this in mind, a weighting has been applied to each attribute according to the needs of the 





Table 3-10: Importance weighting of each attribute for this application 
 
Attribute Weight 




Hardware and Computational Requirement 8 
Initial Design Effort 6 
Simplicity 6 
Modifiability 7 




The weightings above are used to evaluate and score the current and candidate concepts using 
a Pugh Matrix, with an overall Pugh Matrix score for each concept calculated by multiplying 
the importance weight by the concept score for each attribute, and summing these results 
together. Each attribute can have a maximum score of 10 and a minimum score of 0. 
 
3-2.5 – Concept Selection 
 
Taking the concepts that were highlighted in the literature review, and knowledge of their 
strengths and any use in industry, the attribute scores could be estimated to narrow down which 
concepts have potential for investigation. In doing so, efforts could be directed towards the 
most promising concepts, and concepts that are clearly unsuitable (i.e. concepts that score less 
favourably versus the benchmark will lose their candidacy). The benchmark for determining 
concept suitability is – as identified in the literature review – the continuous torque demand 
monitor. Table 3-11 shows the initial attribute scores of each concept candidate, and the 
benchmark, as of the first year of research; the scores of the continuous torque demand monitor 
benchmark concept were derived with expert input from Jaguar Land Rover functional safety 






Table 3-11: Initial, pre-investigation attributes scores of concept candidates identified in 
the literature review scored against the benchmark concept. Total score difference to 
benchmark is shown in parentheses in the rightmost column.  
 
3-2.5.1 – Observers 
 
An initial investigation into observers – specifically, the Kalman filter – found that while they 
could be used in a functional software fault detection and diagnosis environment, such a 
concept would essentially be based on the current method for fault detection. Like the current 
method, a mathematical model of the monitored system is compared to the measured outputs 
of said system in order to produce an error value (residuals); additional mathematical functions 
would also need to be applied to measured inputs y and/or predicted states 𝑥. 
 
The strength of Kalman filters in a traditional sense is that they can “see through” noisy data 
using known dynamics, but in a software environment where the system is a user-defined 
software function, those dynamics are often highly complex, and discrete (as opposed to 
continuous states). Noise factors in the functional software would manifest themselves as 
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modelling. It seems the Kalman filter can only account for zero-mean Gaussian white noise, 
so noise factors that cause a signal offset, for example, will affect residuals and thus possibly 
register false readings. On the other hand, the residuals and observer banks could be arranged 
to be sensitive to certain faults and not to others, which would then feed into a decision block 
to evaluate fault magnitude and isolate it using the residuals. The decision block could 
theoretically look for combinations of residuals to determine if a true fault has occurred, 
ignoring false positive spikes in residuals, but this will require extensive testing and will be 
likely be made bespoke to each powertrain setup, limiting transferability. Extended State 
Observers were found to be a relatively new type of observer that again relies on system 
dynamics, but its application potential to monitor the functional software is likely low due to 
the nature of the software interactions found there, the rate at which it needs to detect a fault, 
and the safety critical nature of the application.  
 
Investigation was halted ultimately due to incompatibility between the model form of safety 
software and the form required for Kalman filter implementation. 
 
3-2.5.2 – Neural Networks 
 
From initial learning in the literature review, it was determined the primary barrier facing the 
neural network as a safety software concept is verification. The weightings are very abstract, 
making full formal verification a near impossible task. Furthermore, the more successfully 
implemented ANNs found in literature continue to evolve and adapt after deployment. 
Verifying this would be very difficult due to the abstract nature of the inner workings of an 
ANNs, and though reliability and performance may be improved through evolution and 
adaptation, verifying safety due to these post-deployment adaptations has been determined 
unfeasible at this point. Neural networks are a significant change from the current continuous 
torque demand monitor method used, as it is not clear which signals should be included in the 
input layer, and what the output layer would resemble, making the concept less compatible 
over the benchmark concept. Each modification would require full retraining of the neural 
network, as the weightings may or may not be related to the sections being modified. While 
the neural network training does not require much expertise (since it is learning for itself), the 
setup up and interpretation of the model would need to take place for each powertrain variant 
and modification, impacting initial design effort. Neural networks may require significant 
storage and computational requirements depending on the complexity, and the number of 
neuron layers; this complexity makes the concept less simple. Overall, verification is the 





3-2.5.3 – PCA 
 
From the literature, it seems that PCA has been successfully used in safety-critical fault 
detection applications, so there is reason to believe that it can be implemented successfully as 
a safety concept on a vehicle. Until the investigation is conducted, it is unknown if it is 
functionally suitable, particularly as it is a novel concept; the same can be said about reliability. 
As PCA is a process-history based method, verifiability can be dependent on the quality of the 
training data it is developed on (Verifiability) but should be easier to verify than neural 
networks owing to being able to see the components of the PCA models once derived, though 
may need some expert knowledge to interpret them appropriately. It is expected that PCA can 
be compatible with the current system, as it performs essentially the same function as the safety 
software fault detection, with the same inputs producing the torque error (compatibility).  
 
PCA is excellent at describing very large amounts of data using just a few parameters, and 
could therefore reduce the storage capacity needed; once the PCA model is derived, the 
training data does not also need to be stored on a production vehicle, so minimal storage space 
is required. Additionally, it seems that PCA only needs to perform some multiplications to 
produce a torque error from the inputs, so little computational resources are used (hardware 
and computational requirements). Attaining sufficient training data for PCA to derive the 
model during development can be a difficult – therefore costly – task for most applications, 
but since it is monitoring a software plant, it is expected that the training data can quickly be 
attained, provided full coverage can be made (Initial Design Effort).  
 
Once derived, a PCA model is self-contained and can be a simple concept to implement 
(Simplicity). However, any changes made to the functional software may require re-derivation 
of the PCA model, impacting the ease of modifiability; if the necessary training data is easy 
to obtain through automated scripts – seeing as the application is software-based – 
modification may be relatively straightforward. There is scope also to include some evolving 
automated re-derivation process, improving the PCA model after the vehicle has been sold, 
but this naturally brings with it verifiability concerns. Overall, there is potential for PCA as a 
commercially feasible safety concept.  
 
3-2.5.4 – Adaptive Safety Monitor 
 
The highest attributes score is held by the theorised adaptive safety monitor. As it is essentially 




suitable. A simpler safety software model means a reduced initial design effort, reduced 
hardware (and possibly computational) requirements, makes modifications easier, and 
provides a simpler concept overall.  
 
The safety software now can provide greater reliability to the driver, with long term changes 
to the vehicle less likely to affect false positives in the safety software due to how the concept 
changes on the vehicle according to slow moving torque errors (Evolvable). However, this 
adaptation could impact verifiability effort, as it needs to be ensured that the concept does not 
adapt in a way that could make it functionally unsuitable. Despite this, the initial attributes 
points towards the adaptive safety monitor possessing strong commercial feasibility, and 
therefore is a prime candidate for investigation. 
 
3-2.5.5 – Selected Concept Candidates 
 
Of the four potential concepts, only the PCA safety monitor and the adaptive safety monitor 
have initial scores greater than the continuous torque demand monitor, and therefore will be 
carried forwards for investigation.  
 
3-3 – Concept Development and Testing Environment 
 
To test the PCA and adaptive safety monitor concepts, a testing environment needs to be 
established. The methodology for evaluating these concepts will be to use the testing 
environment to determine if the concepts are indeed able to detect faults in a timely manner, 
versus the benchmark – i.e. they meet functional suitability requirements. The experience 
gained throughout the development of these new concepts will then been used to determine a 
post-investigation score of each attribute in Chapter 6. 
 
A development and testing environment has been created using the Matlab and Simulink 
workspace to fairly evaluate and test the selected concepts. Data collection was conducted in 
a Range Rover Hybrid test vehicle, and that data was used – along with vehicle parameters – 
to produce a vehicle model in Simulink, using the Simscape modelling toolbox to validate the 
model against the collected data; details to this modelling and validation process can be found 







3-3.1 – Twin-EV Powertrain and Vehicle Model 
 
The sponsoring manufacturer was able to provide powertrain control software for a pre-
production twin-EV powertrain. The powertrain comprises of two reduction-geared 300 Nm 
electric motors with a maximum angular speed of 7000 rpm, one on each axle driving the 
differential. It was decided that such a powertrain would suit safety concept development much 
better than the hybrid variant, as complex unmodelled transient dynamics in the ICE would be 
eliminated, as would the 8-speed transmission, reducing simulation times to ~1% of the 
previous powertrain model. The only drawback was that a test vehicle housing this powertrain 
was not available for data collection and re-validation, so the decision was made to modify the 





Figure 3-7: Twin-EV Powertrain. Black connections indicate mechanical coupling, and 
orange indicates HV electrical connections. 
 
The drawback was deemed acceptable for this investigation, as it serves the purpose of being 
a suitable environment for testing the operation and effectiveness of the novel safety 
monitoring concept candidates. The vehicle parameters for the Twin-EV powertrain are shown 
in Table 3-12. Some of the parameter values have been slightly altered from the Range Rover 





Table 3-12: List of key vehicle parameters used in Twin-EV powertrain model 
 
Parameter Value Unit 
Vehicle Mass 2000 kg 
Drag coefficient 0.37 - 
Frontal Area 3.07 m2 
CG Height 0.5 m 
CG from front axle 1.4 m 
Wheelbase 3 m 
Trackwidth 2.2 m 
Wheel Radius 0.35 m 
Tyre Friction Coefficient 0.02 - 
E-machine Inertia 0.06 kgm2 
Electrical Efficiency Constant 0.9 - 
Mechanical Efficiency Constant 0.95 - 
Max E-machine Torque (per motor) 300 Nm 
Max E-machine speed 7000 rpm 
Reduction Gear Ratio 9.04:1 - 
Rear Differential Gear Ratio 1:1 - 
Rear Differential Inertia 3.2 kgm2 
Front Differential Gear Ratio 1:1 - 
Front Differential Inertia 3.2 kgm2 
 
Many of the same vehicle parameter values were carried over from the Range Rover Hybrid 
as it was expected a similar class vehicle would eventually carry this powertrain. The 
arrangement of the new twin-EV Simscape model, centralised control structure, and driver 







Figure 3-8: Twin-EV Simscape vehicle model with centralised control system 
 
The vehicle model components are unchanged, with exception to the electric motors which 
can now produce 300 Nm at 0 rpm. A reduction gear of 9.04:1 is placed on each axle before 
the differential, stepping up the torque and stepping down the speed; the differentials both 
have a 1:1 final drive ratio. The total torque demand from the torque structure is the sum of 
torque demand to the front and rear motors.  
 
3-3.2 – Safety Software Test Method 
 
The powertrain control software provided by the OEM was calibrated for the twin-EV 
development vehicle. Due to IP sensitivity, the complex software was contained mostly within 
an S-function that was not a searchable Simulink model. However, a list of variables was also 
provided which included a torque map, whereby desired total wheel torque was calculated by 
accelerator pedal position and vehicle speed: this is used as part of the complex calculation of 
torque demand.  
 
Using just the vehicle map, and accounting for the total gear ratio from each e-machine to its 




function could be achieved without unintended interactions with – and interventions from – 
unidentifiable software components hidden in the powertrain control software. Seeing as the 
actuators are identical, the torque demand is simply split evenly for delivery. This 
comparatively simple set of software, in effect, formed the functional software that new safety 




Figure 3-9: Simplified Torque Structure from complex VSC provided by the OEM 
 
While the vehicle velocity input is calculated directly from the vehicle dynamics body 
Simscape block, control of the pedal percentage input needs to come from the driver. A driver 
model was created that would ultimately modulate the accelerator pedal to match the vehicle 
velocity with a desired target vehicle velocity. The driver model is simply a PI controller with 
an output range of 0% to 100%, though there is scope to dynamically adjust the PI gains 
through scheduling and reset integral terms as necessary. 
 
In order for concept testing and performance assessment to be made, a test method needs to 
be established. The assumption is made that if a concept is functionally suitable, it should be 
able to detect faults in the functional software due to the comparison of actual torque demand 
from the functional software, and permitted torque demand as calculated by the safety 
software. Therefore, in the absence of faults, it can be assumed the torque error would be zero.  
 
The most straightforward way to achieve this in the test environment would be to simply 
duplicate the torque structure module as the safety software model. When no fault is present, 
the torque error would be zero. If a fault were to be then injected in the torque structure (but 
not the safety software) a torque error of the difference between permitted torque demand and 
torque demand – the same profile of the fault injection – would be produced. Figure 3-10 
shows the Simulink test structure for benchmarking new concepts, with p indicating pedal 







Figure 3-10: Simulink Test Structure with driver model (yellow), functional software 
(blue), safety software (green), and Simscape twin-EV vehicle model (grey). 
 
The aim of this test is to determine whether a new concept is functionally suitable, i.e. it can 
detect the fault in the functional software accurately and quickly. The fault reaction mechanism 
and intervention system will be excluded from analysis, as fault detection is the primary focus 
of this project. The fault reaction mechanism serves a separate function to detection, as it 
simply acts when the fault detection concept determines a fault has occurred. Most of the other 
attributes will be assessed through the experience of development and anticipated challenges 
of each new concept with the expert knowledge from the literature review and from Jaguar 
Land Rover, seeing as any new concepts cannot feasibly be put through the full safety 
lifecycle; where possible like-for-like testing will be conducted. 
 
3-4 – Conclusions 
 
With the concept phase of ISO 26262 explored through the lens of powertrain safety software, 
the core task of the safety monitoring concept has been defined. The limited scope of 
addressing a safety goal preventing unintended acceleration means a focused goal of 
monitoring malfunctions of torque demand can be made, guiding future investigation. Based 




eleven ideal monitoring attributes were identified to winnow down the concept candidates to 
those that show the most promise against the benchmark continuous torque demand 
monitoring concept, shortening the preliminary concept list to two concept candidates: the 
adaptive safety monitor and the PCA safety monitor. In the following two chapters, the 
development of the adaptive safety monitor and PCA safety monitor will be detailed using the 
























4 – Summary 
 
A novel adaptive safety monitor is proposed as an innovative software fault-detection concept, 
aiming to enable transferability between powertrains without modification and minimal 
recalibration effort. This chapter will outline specific challenges of development burden faced 
by current fault-detection methods, and how an adaptive safety monitor concept can overcome 
them. Development of the adaptive safety monitor concept is discussed, with the introduction 
of a two-stage algorithm, and a performance analysis is conducted through model simulation 
to demonstrate improved robustness against false faults over the continuous torque demand 
monitor. A parameter calibration and optimisation process is then demonstrated through 
design-of-experiments, concluding with further work and an outlook into future commercial 
applications. 




4-1 – Adaptive Safety Monitor Concept 
 
4-1.1 – Safety Software Model Fidelity 
 
In the introduction (Chapter 1), the problem of rising software complexity was identified as 
putting increased burden on automotive manufacturers. The continuous torque demand 
monitor (alluded to in Chapter 1 and introduced with more detail in Chapter 2) monitors the 
functional software using a set of high-integrity safety software. Typically, this safety software 
contains a simplified version of the functional software in a safety software model; a perfect 
copy of the functional software is not used for the model, as its complexity makes the effort 
of verification too great. The safety software model used in the continuous torque demand 
monitor is, however, of a high-fidelity to minimize the modelling discrepancies between the 
safety software and the functional software, and to provide accurate torque error estimations. 
 
One way to reduce the development burden is to use a further simplified, low-fidelity model 
in the safety software. Provided the functional suitability is not sacrificed (ability to always 
meet safety goals), a simpler safety software model will be less costly to develop, validate and 
verify. Additionally, the transferability between powertrain variants could be increased due to 
the relative simplicity. However, the simplified model could consequentially at times differ 
more from the functional software it monitors in such a way that it falsely identifies a torque 
error to be an unsafe fault, leading to an unnecessary limitation of powertrain availability to 
the driver in reaction to this false fault flag. While safety is still achieved with this simplified 
safety software model, the driver has the inconvenience of reduced availability when there was 
no fault present. In this context, the strengths of a high-fidelity model can be summarised as: 
 
• Meets safety goals. 
• More reliable against false faults, leading to increased functional availability. 
 
while the benefits of a low-fidelity model can be summarised as: 
 
• Meets safety goals. 
• Reduced complexity. 
• Reduced development and verification effort. 
• Reduced cost. 
• Increased transferability between powertrain variants. 





In practice, functional safety engineers seek to strike a balance between development cost and 
robustness against false positives in the safety monitors they develop, permitting a certain 
amount of torque error to be present, provided safety goals are still met. Typically, this should 
not cause a false fault to be flagged under normal operating conditions (which in this case 
implies no malfunction has occurred and any torque error is due only to noise factors, primarily 
unstructured uncertainties), but it leaves less tolerance for any additional factors in the torque 
error to occur before a fault is flagged. The tolerance is called the ‘minimum headroom’ of the 
safety monitor, practically being considered the amount of additional torque error from a fault 
that could cause a fault to be flagged; a high-fidelity model will have a larger minimum 
headroom, and a perfect model would have a minimum headroom equal to the ‘nominal 
headroom’ – that is, the torque error permissible before the safety goal is violated. To illustrate 
this, consider Figure 4-1, which compares a representative histogram distribution of nominal 
torque error over some period of time in both a high-fidelity and low-fidelity model in the 






Figure 4-1: Representative torque error histogram and distribution under normal 
operating conditions for high-fidelity (top) and low-fidelity (bottom) safety software 
models 
 
In the nominal torque error calculation of Figure 4-1, both models are assumed to exhibit a 
torque error distribution centre around zero under normal operating conditions. Comparing the 
variance of the torque error, however, a high-fidelity model would exhibit a tighter distribution 
under normal operating conditions compared to that of the low-fidelity model, leaving a 
sizable minimum headroom to allow for manageable faults to occur without a false fault flag; 
The low-fidelity model, meanwhile, leaves much less headroom for manageable faults to occur 
before a fault is flagged by the safety monitor, unnecessarily limiting availability to the driver 





Now consider a real malfunction occurring in the functional software that is being monitored 
by the safety software model. The malfunction yields a small fault of 30 Nm which, in itself, 
does not violate a safety goal for unintended acceleration. The distribution of torque error seen 
in the safety models from Figure 4-1 will tend to shift, such that the centre of torque error 
distribution surrounds the 30 Nm fault. The higher-fidelity model, with its tighter torque error 
distribution and larger minimum headroom, can tolerate the 30 Nm fault and not cause a fault 
to be flagged. However, the lower-fidelity model, with its wider torque error distribution, 
cannot tolerate such a fault as one or more of the torque error measurements exceed the error 
threshold. Therefore, a fault is incorrectly flagged – a false positive, since the 30 Nm fault 
does not actually violate the safety goal – due to the noise factors present in such a low-fidelity 
model. Figure 4-2 illustrates this scenario. 
 
Figure 4-2: Representative torque error histogram and distribution with 30 Nm fault for 





It is also possible that unmodelled changes in operating conditions such as aggressive driver 
behavior, high altitude, and high temperatures can result in a wider distribution of torque error 
during normal operating conditions, leading to false fault flags with no real fault present in 
functional software.  
 
4-1.2 – Adaptive Safety Monitor 
 
When torque error distribution was used to visualize the effect of high and low fidelity safety 
software models, it was theorised that the safety monitor could be allowed to slowly adapt to 
manageable changes in mean error since these do not pose immediate safety violations to the 
driver, regardless of the source of the slow-moving torque error. In doing so, there is a reduced 
likelihood that a slow-moving change in torque error distribution, would cause torque error 
values at the edges of the distribution to exceed the error threshold and flag a false fault. A 
fast and significant change in torque error – one that should indicate a safety risk to the driver 
– should always cause the distribution to exceed the error threshold. A fast change of a 
manageable magnitude – such that the driver retains control and would not be put at risk – 
could still cause an adaptive low-fidelity model to exceed the error threshold since it is only 
permitted to adapt at a prescribed safe rate, potentially causing a false fault flag. The small 
fault magnitude does mean, however, that the distribution is quickly brought back below the 
error threshold, and the amount of availability lost to the driver would be minimal. 
 
The adaptive safety monitor could therefore allow a low-fidelity safety software model to be 
used as part of the functional safety concept, while still achieving safety, but with the added 
benefit of increased robustness against false faults, thereby increasing functional availability 
to the driver. The adaptive safety monitor is compatible with the existing functional safety 
concept architecture, becoming implementable between the nominal torque error calculation 
and the fault decision function. Birch et al [37] developed the first instance of the adaptive 
safety monitor, whereby the mean error is calculated and stored. For the assumed Gaussian 
distribution, the mean error is simply the mean of all the sampled torque error values within 
the torque error sampling window. Then the error offset is calculated, though this is not simply 
the most recent mean error value as it is limited to a degree based on allowable rate of change 
and maximum or minimum allowable offset value. This prevents the adaptive safety monitor 
from adapting too quickly, such that an unsafe fault would be adapted to by the adaptive safety 
monitor faster than the driver could and consequently be missed. Once the error offset is 





4-1.3 – Two-Stage Adaptive Safety Monitor 
 
Noise factors that are inherently present in non-perfect-fidelity safety software models yield 
different torque error behaviors in magnitude and rate of propagation. Certain noise factors 
propagate very quickly, such as proportional gains in a controller or measurements in the plant 
itself such as electric motor current. Others noise factors, meanwhile, propagate quite slowly, 
such as sensor drift over time, changes in controller behavior due to a small integral gain, or 
measurements in the plant itself such as compensating for actuator temperature. In a case 
where multiple noise factors occur simultaneously (as is often the case) it can be beneficial to 
be able to adapt slowly to slow-propagating noise factors, while having a different approach 
to fast-propagating noise factors.  
 
During development, it was found that performing just one offset calculation step greatly 
limited tunability of the way the adaptive safety monitor performs in this respect. If a sensor 
drift was simulated with another faster-propagating noise factor included, the adaptive safety 
monitor with only one adaption calculation would be tuned between ignoring all fast-
propagating noise factors or having to re-adapt to slower propagating noise factors when a 
fast-propagating noise factor occurred; each tune of the adaptive safety monitor parameters 
became a compromise. Therefore, a two-stage adaptive algorithm was introduced that allowed 
separately tuned responses to slower and faster torque error propagation, which improved 










Figure 4-3: Two-Stage Adaptive Safety Monitor Algorithm theoretical architecture with 
simplified safety software model, parameters, and annotated calculation steps. 
 
The Two-Stage Adaptive Safety Monitor function (highlighted by dashed outlines in Figure 
4-3) is coupled with a simplified safety software model, which is less costly to develop when 
compared to the high-fidelity model used in the continuous torque demand monitor, and 
comprises of two adaptation calculation stages tuned for different noise factor propagation 





4-1.4 – Equations 
 
The equations governing the calculation of the output of the two-stage adaptive safety monitor 
are outlined in this section. Figure 4-3 is used to describe the calculation steps and how the 
tunable adaptive safety monitor parameters are used. 
 
4-1.4.1 – Long-Term Adaptation Stage 
 
First, the long-term adaptation stage deals with slow-propagating noise factors that typically 
exhibit slow changes compensated for in the functional software, such as ambient air pressure 
or battery temperature. It seeks to adapt slowly over time in the same way a driver slowly 
begins to experience any long-term deviations from the original expected baseline behaviour. 
After obtaining the current nominal torque error, 𝛆𝛕,𝐭, in step 1 of Figure 4-3, the long-term 
mean error for current time t, 𝜀𝜏𝑙,𝑡, is calculated as the average of all nominal torque errors 












where tsample is the timestep size. Next, in step 3 of Figure 4-3, the long-term offset for current 
time t, 𝜏𝑙𝑜,𝑡, is the previous long term offset 𝜏𝑙𝑜,𝑡−1 plus the change, where rl is the long-term 
rate of change limit. The driver fault delay for time t, (Kdd,t) can prevent any adaptation taking 
place if equal to zero; the reasoning behind the driver delay is later discussed in Section 5-
2.2.2. 
 
 𝜏𝑙𝑜,𝑡 = 𝜏𝑙𝑜,𝑡−1 + (min(|𝜀𝜏𝑙,𝑡|, 𝑟𝑙) ×  sgn(𝜀𝜏𝑙,𝑡) × 𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 ×𝐾𝑑𝑑,𝑡) (4-2) 
 
The long-term offset is used in step 4 of Figure 4-3 to calculate the current long-term offset 
torque error, 𝜀𝜏𝑙𝑜,𝑡, which is the current nominal torque error minus the long-term offset, 
bounded by the minimum and maximum long-term offset limits, minl and maxl.  
 
 𝜀𝜏𝑙𝑜,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑙 ≤ 𝜀𝜏,𝑡 − 𝜏𝑙𝑜,𝑡 ≤ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑙 (4-3) 
 





4-1.4.2 – Short-Term Adaptation Stage  
 
The short-term adaptive stage deals with more dynamic changes in torque error that could arise 
through some active control systems like cruise control. Through using a smaller torque error 
sampling window to calculate the ‘short-term mean error’, immediate changes can be better 
estimated, being less weighted by historic data. This is then used to calculate the ‘short-term 
offset torque error’ with a greater allowable rate-of-change and a separate set of allowable 
offset limits. Note that the ‘short-term mean error’ is calculated using the average ‘long-term 
offset torque error’, as opposed to the nominal torque error, because it is assumed that long-
term effects would at worst compound with short-term ones to give the overall nominal torque 
error, and by offsetting long-term effects first a more accurate estimation of short-term effects 
can be obtained by the short-term adaptation stage of the safety monitor.  
 
The short-term mean error for current time t, 𝛆𝛕𝐬,𝐭, is the average of all long-term offset torque 












Next, the short-term offset for current time t, 𝜏𝑠𝑜,𝑡, can be calculate (step 6 of Figure 4-3). It is 
the previous short-term offset 𝜏𝑠𝑜,𝑡 plus the change for the sample unit, where rs is the short-
term rate of change limit, and tsample the timestep size in seconds. The driver fault delay for 
time t, (Kdd,t) can again prevent change taking place, if equal to zero. 
 
 𝜏𝑠𝑜,𝑡 = 𝜏𝑠𝑜,𝑡−1 + (min(|𝜀𝜏𝑠,𝑡|, 𝑟𝑠) × sgn(𝜀𝜏𝑠,𝑡) × 𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 × 𝐾𝑑𝑑,𝑡) (4-5) 
 
The short-term offset torque error, 𝜀𝜏𝑠𝑜, is the current long-term offset torque error minus the 
short-term offset, bounded by the minimum and maximum total offset limits, mintotal and 
maxtotal. 
 
 𝜀𝜏𝑠𝑜,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ≤ 𝜀𝜏𝑙𝑜,𝑡 − 𝜏𝑠𝑜,𝑡 ≤ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 (4-6) 
 
This short-term offset torque error, step 7 in Figure 4-3, is the output of the two-stage adaptive 
safety monitor, and can also be referred to as simply the ‘offset torque error’, since it is the 





4-2 – Performance Analysis 
 
Consider a passenger car offered by an automotive OEM with a range of powertrain options 
with automatic transmissions, including at least one ICE variant and one full-EV variant. A 
common drivability function in automatic transmission passenger cars is ‘creep’, where the 
car will very slowly move forwards from standstill upon the release of the brake pedal, up to 
a speed of approximately 6 kph. While the outcome in both powertrain variants are the same, 
the method in which creep is achieved is very different. For the ICE variant with a torque 
convertor, creep is achieved simply as a by-product of the engine idle-speed governor acting 
through the torque converter, and not directly controlled by an active controller [118].  
 
A full-EV variant, on the other hand, has to actively control the torque demand to the electric 
motors such that creep behaviour is emulated, meaning an additional functional software 
component needs to be developed in torque structure to add this capability. Consequently, a 
safety monitor likely will also need to be developed alongside in order to account for the 
additional torque demand supplied by the creep controller. Not doing so will cause a torque 
error to occur at low speed, since a torque is being demanded despite no input from the driver. 
Of course, if a fault is flagged by the safety software due to this torque error, it would be a 
false fault, and will unnecessarily limit powertrain availability. Torque demand cannot simply 
be capped either, since the creep controller will need to be able to creep up an incline, 
potentially demanding very large torque values. However, due to the slow dynamic nature of 
vehicle creep functionality, an opportunity is presented to implement an adaptive safety 
monitor on a simplified safety software instead of developing and verifying additional safety 
software. 
 
4-2.1 – Vehicle Model and Methodology 
 
A Matlab/Simulink Simscape full-EV vehicle model has been developed as a test bed for the 
adaptive safety monitor, based on a powertrain with one electric motor on each drive axle. The 
two electric motors are controlled by a torque demand supplied by the functional software 
torque structure, which itself is controlled by a driver model trying to achieve a target vehicle 








Figure 4-4: Test model architecture for fault detection performance using an adaptive 
safety monitor, which does not include a fault reaction mechanism. 
 
4-2.1.1 – Safety Goals 
 
Recall that the safety goal Birch et al. [112] defines to address the hazardous event of 
‘unintended acceleration during low-speed manoeuvre in a pedestrianised area’ is to ensure 
‘vehicle positive longitudinal acceleration shall not exceed driver demand by more than 1.5 
m/s2 for longer than 1 s’. Their fault reaction mechanism for this hazard is to limit excess 
torque demand to 150 Nm, which they justify by stating that the maximum vehicle acceleration 
that can be achieved by 150 Nm is 1.5 m/s2. Through simulation of this vehicle model, it was 
found that on a -5.5 degree downhill slope (considered the limit of designed creep functionality 
in this simulation before mechanical brake intervention is needed), an excess torque fault of 
90 Nm will give a maximum possible acceleration of 1.5 m/s2. Therefore, the torque error 
threshold will be set at ±90 Nm, with safety being achieved once torque error is contained 
within these limits. 
 
4-2.1.2 – Functional Software 
 
The creep controller for an EV (or a hybrid in EV-mode) will most likely see it incorporated 




included in the engine control software, post torque demand calculation. To emulate the 
functionality of creep found in a conventional powertrain, the EV creep controller a torque 
request to match a target creep speed. From a standstill with brake pedal applied the target 
speed will be zero, and releasing the brake pedal with no accelerator pedal input will result in 
target speed ramping up to 6 kph over a period of four seconds. When the accelerator pedal is 
then actuated, the nominal torque structure will take over from the creep controller to deliver 
torque demand. During a coast-down event, the nominal torque structure will also emulate 
engine braking through the application of brake torque through the motors, which in turn has 
an added benefit of electric regeneration. As vehicle velocity approaches target creep velocity, 
a feed-forward element in the creep controller ensures a smooth transition from nominal torque 
structure to creep control. A blending function ensures a smooth transfer of torque demand 
supply between creep control and nominal torque structure.  
 
4-2.1.3 – Safety Software 
 
A simplified model is used for the safety software, which comprises only of an accurate 
representation of the nominal torque structure and the blend function – a signal smoothing 
function that both ensures a smooth transition between the nominal torque structure and creep 
controller, but also generally smooths the response of nominal torque demand. The blending 
function could exist within the nominal torque structure, but for ease of tuning during 
development, it existed outside of the nominal torque structure. The functional software does 
not include any information about the creep controller in the calculation of permitted torque 
request, and as such it will generate some torque error whenever the creep controller is actively 
contributing to the torque demand; it is this nominal torque error that will be sent on to the 
adaptive safety monitor. A list of parameter settings for this set of simulations can be found 
later in Table 4-2. 
 
4-2.1.4 – Fault Injection 
 
In order to meet the primary safety goal of detecting and preventing unintended acceleration, 
sudden and significant erroneous torque demand must be detectable by the fault detection 
module when such a fault occurs, meaning the adaptive safety monitor must not alter the torque 
error to the point that a dangerous fault would be missed. Meanwhile, slow and/or small faults 
would not violate the safety goal and can be ignored so as not to cause a false fault flag and 




on the actual torque request in the functional software to simulate such a phenomenon, with 
the assumption that the safety software will not suffer the same fault.  
 
4-2.1.5 – Fault Detection and Reaction 
 
For this investigation, torque errors of ±90 Nm for any length of time in the will result in a 
fault being flagged by the fault detection module, owing to it violating the safety goal. A fault 
reaction mechanism has not yet been implemented in this simulation, but could be expected to 
be similar to Birch et al [112] by limiting torque demand to 90 Nm when a fault occurs 
 
4-2.1.6 – Test Case 
 
A representative simulation is used where the vehicle first enters into creep from a standstill 
with no driver pedal input, causing the target creep velocity to begin to ramp and reach 6 kph. 
Then, the driver demands a ramped speed increase at 12 s with the accelerator pedal to 36 kph 
where the velocity is then held from 17 s to 22 s. A coast-down event then takes place at 22 s, 
easing the vehicle back into creep velocity; only simulated overrun braking by the nominal 
torque structure will be used, as the driver will not use the mechanical brake pedal.  Four step-
change fault events will take place in simulations where faults are injected; their start time, 
end time, and direction are shown in Table 4-1. 
 
Table 4-1: Fault event schedule for simulations 
 
Event Start End Duration Direction 
Fault 1 7 s 8 s 1s Positive 
Fault 2 16 s 17.5 s 1.5s Positive 
Fault 3 19 s 20 s 1s Negative 
Fault 4 39 s 40 s 1s Negative 
 
4-2.2 – Results and Discussion 
 
4-2.2.1 – Simulation 1: No fault 
 
Figure 4-5 compares the nominal torque error from the functional software with the offset 
torque error calculated in the adaptive safety monitor over the fifty second simulation. Since 






Figure 4-5: Nominal and offset torque error with no fault injection 
 
Figure 4-5 shows that the nominal torque error varies by about 70 Nm due to the torque error 
introduced by the creep controller. With the adaptive safety monitor, however, the offset 
torque error varies less than 10 Nm from zero for the whole duration of the simulation. The 
most significant variation occurs during transition into and out of creep control functionality 
from the nominal torque structure at 13 s and at 27 s.  
 
4-2.2.2 – Simulation 2: 70 Nm Fault  
 
Four manageable faults of 70 Nm are injected into the torque request; these should ideally not 
cause the error threshold to be exceeded at any point by the torque error, since they do not 






Figure 4-6: Nominal and offset torque error with 70 Nm fault injections 
 
For the nominal torque error shown in Figure 4-6, a false fault flag takes place during Fault 1 
and almost including Fault 4 which nearly reaches the error threshold. The adaptive safety 
monitor, meanwhile, successfully prevents any false fault flag from taking place, always 
keeping torque error within the error threshold.  
 
Each fault causes an initial 70 Nm torque error magnitude in the offset torque error, to which 
the adaptive safety monitor then begins to adapt. An important observation to note is an 
overshoot in the opposite direction immediately after each fault event. This can be attributed, 
in part, to the creep controller actively counteracting the unexpected deviation from target 
creep velocity due to the fault when torque demand is sourced from the creep controller. The 
other factor is the adaptive safety monitor compensates for the fault over its duration after the 
initial step of 70 Nm, only for the nominal torque error to suddenly step 70 Nm back towards 
zero, resulting in the overshoot in offset torque error.  
 
A key reasoning for the adaptive safety monitor concept is that since the driver is effectively 
acts as a controller in the powertrain system, it takes into account the driver’s cognitive model 
of the powertrain, whereby a constant fault – after the initial step-change in torque error – 
would not violate the safety goal as the driver will adapt to it over time. Therefore, initially 
after a sudden change in torque error, the driver may need some time to realise a fault had 
occurred relative to their mental model, rather than immediately adapting. Following the initial 




safety monitor, this aspect could be realised as limiting the adaption rate for a short period 
after a sudden fault of a prescribed – and perhaps variable – magnitude is noticed in the 
nominal torque error; this function is included for the next simulation, where the delay is set 
to 1 second. 
 
4-2.2.3 – Simulation 3: 120 Nm Fault 
 
In this simulation, the capability of detecting unsafe faults is tested, with each 120 Nm fault 
event ideally being allowed to exceed the error threshold. This is the primary objective of the 
safety monitor, as dangerous faults cannot be missed, but over time they can be safely adapted 
to in a way similar to how the driver adapts. Crucially, it is the initial fault occurrence that 




Figure 4-7: Nominal and offset torque error with 120 Nm fault injections. 
 
From Figure 4-7, it is clear that for each fault event the adaptive safety monitor accurately 
allows all unsafe faults to exceed the error threshold to the correct amount at the start of each 
event. The additional driver delay rules prevent initial adaption by the driver to account for 
that reaction time, which is set at one second in this simulation. An overshoot is noticeable at 
the end of Fault 1, but since the adaption offset is very limited due to the new functionality, 
this overshoot is mostly due to the nominal torque error as the creep controller actively 




A very important observation and comparison is the behaviour of the nominal and offset torque 
errors during and following Fault 4. Here, due to the positive nominal torque error immediately 
preceding the negative 120 Nm fault event, the net nominal torque error at the start of Fault 4 
only reaches -70 Nm, which incorrectly does not exceed the -90 Nm error threshold. In this 
case, an unsafe fault would have been missed altogether, a critical failing of solely using the 
simplified model in the safety software. However, since the adaptive safety monitor has 
adapted to that preceding nominal torque error, it forces the offset torque error to correctly 
exceed that lower error threshold. Furthermore, the overshoot in nominal torque error 
following Fault 4 actually exceeds the positive error threshold, resulting in a false positive in 
the wrong direction; the adaptive safety monitor, meanwhile, does not suffer the same 
problem. 
 
4-2.2.4 – Simulation 4: 120 Nm fault, uphill on incline 
 
In this simulation, shown in Figure 4-8, the same four 120 Nm faults are added into the torque 
demand calculation, but now the car is on a 5.5 degree uphill incline. On an incline, torque 
demands from the creep controller are higher since more torque is required to overcome 
acceleration due to gravity, which in turn lead to larger and fast-changing torque errors. 
 
 





Figure 4-8 show the nominal and offset torque errors in this scenario. Nominal torque error 
exceeds the error threshold at creep speed, leading to many false fault flags throughout the 
simulation. The adaptive safety monitor is able to prevent most false flags from taking place, 
with the exception of the very first few seconds as the creep controller must quickly increase 
torque demand to prevent rollback and match the increasing target creep velocity. The error 
threshold is only exceeded by a small amount, however, and if the fault reaction mechanism 
is to limit torque to 90 Nm, this would only result in a very small loss of availability to the 
driver. All the faults, meanwhile, are promptly and correctly handled by the adaptive safety 
monitor. 
 
This phenomenon leads to questions about the ability of the adaptive safety monitor to detect 
real faults. Consider a scenario where a real fault of 120 Nm occurs at 13 s, when offset torque 
error is -70 Nm. To the driver, this is indeed a real fault of 120 Nm since the torque error is 
only present due to differences between the creep controller and nominal torque structure. This 
fault would be missed by the adaptive safety monitor, since the net offset torque error of only 
50 Nm does not exceed any error threshold. However, on this uphill incline, it was found that 
an excess torque of over 305 Nm is required to cause unintended longitudinal acceleration of 
1.5 m/s2. Therefore, this 120 Nm fault would not, in fact, be a missed fault in terms of violating 
the primary safety goal. Even if the offset torque error is at the lower error threshold of -90 
Nm, a 180 Nm real fault will be captured by the adaptive safety monitor.  
 
4-2.2.5 – Simulation 5: 120 Nm fault, downhill on an incline 
 
The last simulation considers adaptive safety monitor performance on a 5.5 degree downhill 
slope. Due to the long coast-down time on the hill, an axis break is necessary in Figure 4-9 to 






Figure 4-9: Nominal and offset torque error with 120 Nm fault injections for a 5.5 degree 
downhill incline, with axis break. 
 
Because of the downhill gradient, torque output by the electric motors are much less when 
compared to that on an uphill incline. Again, each true fault is successfully captured by the 
adaptive safety monitors offset torque error output, though the nominal torque error does not 
vary by much outside of fault events. Large overshoots are experienced following the Fault 1 







4-2.3 – Accuracy of the Adaptive Safety Monitor 
 
Accuracy is an attribute quality that is captured by the ideal monitoring attribute of Functional 
Suitability in Chapter 3. It is the measure of how well the safety monitor performs in terms of 
the primary safety requirements it must meet, which is to say, how often the safety monitor 
will detect and classify a safety goal violation when one occurs. From each simulation shown, 
the adaptive safety monitor has been able to detect and classify a safety goal violation at every 
occurrence. Though a truly significant improvement over the nominal method, this alone does 
not guarantee complete accuracy of the adaptive safety monitor. The purpose of the adaptive 
safety monitor is to eliminate nominal torque error due to noise factors, while ensuring 
nominal torque error due to real faults are allowed to propagate. Throughout the simulations, 
however, there are some instances where this nominal torque error is non-zero when a real 
fault is not present. While these deviations are permissible as – at worst – they result in a false 
positive, should a real fault occur in the opposite direction to the torque error due to noise, it 
is possible that the resulting offset torque error would not exceed the torque error threshold. 
In the preceding experiments for this application, there have been two sources of non-zero 
offset torque error not due to a real fault, which will be referred to generally as ‘overshoots.’ 
A brief discussion is provided with respect to how these overshoots could affect the ability of 
the adaptive safety monitor to detect a safety goal violation: its accuracy. 
 
4-2.3.1 – Accuracy during Creep Control Intervention 
 
The first source of overshoot occurs when the creep controller is active, including transitioning 
into and out of creep control. Consider Figure 4-9 of Simulation 5. Seemingly, the main 
criticism is the performance of the adaptive safety monitor immediately following Faults 1 
and 4, where significant overshoots are exhibited once each real fault ends. The main 
contribution to these overshoots is the inherent reaction by the creep controller to counteract 
against the affect the fault has on vehicle speed. At first, this would seem a vulnerability: 
should another -120 Nm fault occur at 63 s (where offset torque error is 80 Nm, resulting in a 
net torque error of -40 Nm), the lower error threshold would not be exceeded by the offset 
torque error, and a true fault seemingly missed. However, a consideration must be made for 
what the driver actually expects so soon after Fault 4. Since the torque error counteraction is 
carried out by the creep controller and not the driver, it could be argued that the driver is still 
expecting no forward acceleration during this period. By examining such a case where a 
second larger fault takes place almost immediately after the first smaller fault, an indication 
can be made on whether a fault of that magnitude would indeed be unsafe, and whether the 




and the corresponding vehicle acceleration of an initial 95 Nm fault at 79 s, followed quickly 
by a second 170 Nm fault at 80.3 s, starting from steady creep velocity of 6 kph on a 5.5 degree 




Figure 4-10: Vehicle acceleration and torque error compared on a -5.5 degree slope, with 
a 95 Nm fault followed by a 170 Nm fault. 
 
Ignoring the fact that the safety goal is not actually violated, peak vehicle acceleration for both 
the first 95 Nm fault and subsequent 170 Nm fault are actually roughly the same at 0.9 m/s2, 
due to the same reason that leads to the ‘overshoot’ in torque error in the first place: creep 
controller intervention. This shows that, though the total acceleration as the second fault takes 
place approaches 1.7 m/s2, the actual acceleration first ‘cancels out’ the -0.8 m/s2 unintended 




acceleration. Following both faults, the creep controller provides brake torque in order to 
reduce vehicle speed back to creep velocity, which would violate a -1.5 m/s2 threshold (if the 
driver still expects no deceleration); this is, however, still captured by the offset torque error, 
and therefore the adaptive safety monitor maintains accuracy at the safety goal level. Better 
calibration of the adaptive safety monitor parameters (or refinement of the creep control 
software) could improve the reliability by reducing unnecessary overshoots when no fault is 
present.  
 
4-2.3.2 – Accuracy during Driver Control 
 
The second source of overshoot occurs when the driver is in control and cannot be explained 
by the creep control intervention. Overshoots in this category can be found immediately 
following Fault 2 and Fault 3 in Figure 4-9. In these cases, only the adaptive safety monitor 
can be to blame, as the nominal torque error does not exhibit the same overshoots. The 
overshoots in these situations are generally due to the calibration of the adaptive safety monitor 
parameters with respect to its application. The overshoot immediately following Fault 2 is due 
to the driver delay parameter, as it allows the adaptive safety monitor to begin adapting after 
a set period of time. Should this reflect driver perception as intended, the resultant offset torque 
error would be an accurate representation of how the driver actually experienced the end of 
Fault 2, as they had started to adapt to the fault. The driver delay parameter value needs to be 
validated, possibly by a driver task analysis, with respect to the controllability parameter 
corresponding to the hazard that the safety goal addresses (this is discussed in Chapter 6). The 
overshoot that occurs after Fault 3 is similarly most likely due to the calibration of the adaptive 
safety monitor parameters, and for this reason investigating the calibration of the adaptive 
safety monitor parameters can prove beneficial in improving accuracy in this area, an 






4-3 – Calibration and Parameter Optimisation 
 
An anticipated benefit of using an adaptive safety monitor is that it could be transferred and 
used for many different applications within the functional software and between multiple 
powertrains. These applications vary in requirement, so the adaptive safety monitor needs to 
be calibrated somewhat for each application to ensure adequate performance. There are a 
number of (currently) fixed parameters that can be tuned to achieve optimum desired 
performance from the monitor, shown in Table 4-2.  
 
Table 4-2: Adaptive safety monitor tuneable parameters, limits, and current values. 
 
Parameter Current Value Lower Limit Upper Limit 
Long-Term Sample Window 20 s 10 s 50 s 
Short-Term Sample Window 0.1 s 0.1 s 10 s 
Driver Fault Delay 1 s 1 s 3 s 
Long-Term Adaption Rate 5 Nm/s 0.5 Nm/s 10 Nm/s 
Short-Term Adaption Rate 25 Nm/s 5 Nm/s 25 Nm/s 
Maximum Long-Term Offset 200 Nm 50 Nm 300 Nm 
Maximum Total Offset 400 Nm 50 Nm 500 Nm 
Minimum Long-Term Offset -200 Nm -50 Nm -300 Nm 
Minimum Total Offset -450 Nm -50 Nm -500 Nm 
Upper Error Threshold 90 Nm 90 Nm 90 Nm 
Lower Error Threshold -90 Nm -90 Nm -90 Nm 
 
An automated design-of-experiments process has been conceived to improve the performance 
of the adaptive safety monitor for a particular nominal torque error dataset. A controlled 
experiment takes place where a representative nominal torque error input is captured with 
known faults injected. The ideal offset torque error output of the adaptive safety monitor is 
then defined a priori. The ideal torque error output is typically what an expected response 
from a perfectly tuned adaptive safety monitor would yield, which is the elimination of all 
noise factors, capturing just the known faults at the correct magnitude, but with the inclusion 
of a valid driver delay. In this example, using the nominal torque error input taken from Figure 






Figure 4-11: Ideal offset torque error output for the nominal torque error input, used for 
parameter calibration and optimisation testing. 
 
The design-of-experiments consists of a space-filling Hobol sequence of parameter 
combinations cases (using parameter limits from Table 4-2), which an automated routine will 
use to individually test and score each case with. Some rules are used to filter out nonsensical 
cases, for example where short-term sample window is larger than long-term sample window. 
Each case is tested using the same nominal torque error, and the output offset torque error 
(𝜀𝜏𝑠𝑜) is compared to the ideal output (𝜀𝜏𝑖𝑜). A simple metric, called the torque error difference 
integral, S, is used to score the performance of each test case, shown in Equation (4-7). 
 
 𝑆 =  𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 ×∑|𝜀𝜏𝑠𝑜 − 𝜀𝜏𝑖𝑜| (4-7) 
 
A lower S for a particular case indicates the offset torque error better matches the ideal torque 
error output, and multiplying the sum by the sample time tsample ensures a normalised output 
into terms of torque error seconds (Nms); with the current parameters, an S score of 157.5 Nms 
is attained. From 8000 initial cases, 4160 were valid for testing. The cases were then sorted by 






Figure 4-12: Parameter combination cases, sorted by ascending S value 
 
The best performing parameter combination improves the performance of the adaptive safety 
monitor by 9.3% on this particular torque error dataset. The results of this test are shown in 
Figure 4-13, using the updated optimal parameter values seen in Table 4-3. 
 
 
Figure 4-13: Offset torque error output using parameters from best-performing case, 
compared to nominal torque error and ideal offset torque error. 
 




Table 4-3: Updated parameter values and change over previous. 
 
Parameter Old New Change 
Long-Term Sample Window 20 s 26.3 s + 6.3 
Short-Term Sample Window 0.1 s 0.1 s  0 
Driver Fault Delay 1 s 1.37 s + 0.37 
Long-Term Adaption Rate 5 Nm/s 9.99 Nm/s + 4.99 
Short-Term Adaption Rate 25 Nm/s 22.89 Nm/s - 2.11 
Maximum Long-Term Offset 200 Nm 211 Nm + 11 
Maximum Total Offset 400 Nm 290 Nm - 110 
Minimum Long-Term Offset -200 Nm -224 Nm - 24 
Minimum Total Offset -450 Nm -402 Nm + 48 
 
The main areas of improvement are immediately following Fault 2 and Fault 3, where the 
offset torque error overshoots seen in Figure 4-7 are reduced. Most of this can be attributed to 
the larger driver fault delay values as the adaptive safety monitor does not begin adapting until 
just before the end of Fault 2. Faults 1 and 4 still experience an overshoot after the fault finishes 
due to the fact that the short-term offset stops updating at the start of the fault to allow the fault 
to exceed the error threshold; when the fault finishes, however, the creep controller had already 
started to counteract the fault while the short-term offset doesn’t adapt, leading to the 
overshoots in both nominal and offset torque error This is clear when examining the difference 
between nominal offset torque error immediately preceding and immediately following each 
fault, as the difference is largely the same, the small difference being attributed to the long-
term offset adaption (which still slowly adapts during faults). Marginal gains are also realised 
with reduced variation as the creep controller and nominal torque structure are switched 
between (around 13 s and 27 s). With the sorted cases, the trends and effect of each parameter 
can be examined to give a better understanding of how best to select values in the future. Due 
to the highly noisy data produced this way, the sorted parameters values are filtered using 
Savitzky-Golay filtering for qualitative analysis. Savitzky-Golay filtering was chosen for its 
ability to preserve low frequency attributes while removing noise and high frequency effects 
[119]. Figure 4-14, Figure 4-15, and Figure 4-16 show the results of this exercise, grouping 










Figure 4-15: Savitzky-Golay filtered ‘torque error rate-of-change’ based parameter values, 






Figure 4-16: Savitzky-Golay filtered ‘torque’ based parameter values, sorted by ascending 
S value. 
 
The parameter with the clearest trend is the near-linear relationship between a very low Short-
Term Sample Window and the lowest S scores in Figure 4-14. Meanwhile, the lowest Long-
Term Sample Window values tend to show the opposite effect by corresponding to high S 
scores, which relates to the increase seen with the optimised parameter value over the previous 
one. Driver-delay does not seem to make much difference in this test, but may yield different 
results when faced with a different dataset. A minor trend is noticeable initially in Figure 4-15 
when using higher Short-Term Adaption Rate values to improve S score, as does Long-Term 
Adaption Rate, though not to the same degree; it may be the case that when presented with a 
larger fault over a longer period, higher Long-Term Adaption Rate has a more significant 
effect on performance. This highlights the importance of choosing a representative dataset 
from the application target to perform these tests on. Finally, none of the offset limits in Figure 
4-16 seemed to show any clear trend, but again this is likely due to the fact none of the offset 
limits were really reached in this set of experiments, and a different application could find 




4-4 – Conclusions 
 
A novel functional safety concept called the two-stage adaptive safety monitor was introduced 
in this chapter, seeking to address the issue of safety software complexity by enabling a simpler 
safety software model to be used with an adaptive element in the safety monitor, overcoming 
many of the drawbacks that would otherwise prevail, primarily robustness against false faults. 
 
A performance analysis of this concept was carried out on an electric vehicle powertrain 
simulation, where an active creep controller found in the functional software was omitted in 
the safety software for reduced cost and increased transferability. The adaptive safety monitor 
yielded very good results when the functional software encountered large faults, while also 
preventing many false fault flags from limiting powertrain availability when small faults were 
encountered. This was tested on both a flat surface, and on uphill and downhill inclines, and 
showed to be a large improvement over using the simplified safety software model alone. A 
parameter calibration and optimisation method was introduced, using an automated design-of-
experiments process to tune the parameter values in the adaptive safety monitor for a given 
drive cycle. Parameter performance trends were also identified, and further developments were 
suggested for a more comprehensive automated parameter optimisation process, such that 
performance is improved over all operating conditions, and parameter calibration costs are 
further reduced. 
 
The adaptive safety monitor shows great promise in the early stages of the safety lifecycle, but 
will still need full validation and verification ahead of product delivery. Furthermore, a full 
assessment of possible applications the adaptive safety monitor should be done to explore the 
full feasible simplification of the safety software. Part of the reasoning behind the use of the 
adaptive safety monitor is attributed to having the driver in-the-loop as a controller of the 
powertrain. Rapidly developing autonomous vehicle technology will see the driver largely 
taken out of the greater powertrain control, but the simplicity of the adaptive safety monitor 
means that it could likely be utilised in many other safety-related applications, even outside 
automotive applications. 
 



























5 – Summary 
 
In this chapter, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is investigated as a potential functional 
safety concept for software safety monitoring in a passenger vehicle. PCA, using Hotelling’s 
T2 statistic is a well-established fault detection method employed in other industries. Here, a 
Local PCA concept with an automated PCA model derivation process is developed. PCA 
models of a nonlinear control software function are generated using only its inputs and outputs. 
These models are then stored and used in real-time as a safety monitor to estimate torque error 
in the control software, demonstrated through a vehicle simulation. This concept is shown to 
have potential as a functional safety monitoring tool within its current limitations. 
 




5-1 – Principal Component Analysis 
 
With the computational and telemetric ability to capture large amounts of data from a system 
during development stages, the area of Statistical Process Control (SPC) has expanded as a 
viable control technique [120]. One of the most well-known and widely utilised SPC methods 
is that of Principal Component Analysis (PCA). PCA is a statistical technique based on 
variation between variables within a dataset. Traditionally, PCA is used to analyse a set of data 
of variables with possible underlying correlations, and rotate the data such that they become 
orthogonally uncorrelated (or at least less correlated) [120]. It seeks to fit a linear model to the 
training data, centred on the mean of all the recorded data points and with new orthogonal 
axes. The first principal component (PC) is found along the semi-axis of greatest variation in 
this data, the second PC along a remaining orthogonal semi-axis with the next greatest 
variation, and so on. The magnitudes of variation along the semi-axes are described by the 
eigenvalues of the data, and the semi-axes themselves are described by the corresponding 
eigenvector coefficients. The eigenvectors and eigenvalues are calculated using Singular 
Value Decomposition (SVD) [121]. The eigenvalues are arranged in decreasing order in the 
diagonal eigenvalue matrix Ʌ, and the corresponding eigenvector coefficients arranged in 
column format in the eigenvector matrix V; it is these matrices that describe the PCA model.  
 
Using a training dataset X, represented as an n x m matrix, where n is the number of data 
samples, and m the number of variables; Xi,j would be the value associated with the j
th variable 
of the ith data sample x. The first step of PCA is to find the mean of each column (variable) of 










Next, the covariance of each dimension needs to be determined: 
 
 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐗, 𝐘) =  






and the covariances assembled into the covariance matrix, C: 
  






An example of C is shown below for a 3-variable system (i.e. m = 3), with original variables 




𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑥, 𝑥) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑥, 𝑧)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝑥) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝑦) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝑧)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑧, 𝑥) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑧, 𝑦) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑧, 𝑧)
) (5-4) 
 
The next step in the PCA analysis is obtaining the eigenvectors and eigenvalues from the 
covariance matrix using SVD, whose theory follows as below [121]:  
 
 𝐀 = 𝐔𝐒𝐕𝑇    and     𝐀𝑇 = 𝐕𝐒𝐔𝑇 (5-5) 
 
Where A is some n x m matrix, U is the eigenvector matrix of AAT, V the eigenvector matrix 
of ATA, and S the matrix with the square roots of their eigenvalues along its diagonal (though 
it is not square). Then,  
 
 𝐀𝑇𝐀 = 𝐕𝐒𝐔𝑇𝐔𝐒𝐕𝑇 (5-6) 
 
Since U and V are eigenvector matrices, by definition their columns consist of orthonormal 
vectors, meaning they are square orthogonal matrices, and therefore satisfy the following 
condition: 
 
 𝐔𝑇 = 𝐔−1 (5-7) 
 
Thus, (5-7) can be re-written: 
 
 𝐀𝑇𝐀 = 𝐕𝐒𝐔−1𝐔𝐒𝐕𝑇 
𝐀𝑇𝐀 = 𝐕𝐒𝐈𝐒𝐕𝑇 
𝐀𝑇𝐀 = 𝐕𝐒2𝐕𝑇 
𝐀𝑇𝐀 = 𝐕Ʌ𝐕𝑇 (5-8) 
 
If we equate ATA to the covariance matrix C: 
 
 𝐀𝑇𝐀 = 𝐂 (5-9) 
 




 𝐂𝑣 =  𝜆𝑣 
(𝐂 − 𝜆𝐈)𝑣 = 0 
|𝐂 − 𝜆𝐈| = 0 (5-10) 
 
Once the relevant λ and v are obtained, V and Ʌ can be derived. V is the matrix consisting of 
eigenvectors corresponding to C in the columns, and Ʌ the matrix of eigenvalues 
corresponding to the eigenvectors of C, a square matrix with the eigenvalues λ along the 
diagonal. The columns of V and Ʌ are then ordered in descending order of eigenvalue 
magnitude. The ith PC is described by the eigenvector in the ith column of V, and the ith 
eigenvalue in the ith column of Ʌ. 
 
5-1.1 – PCA as a Fault Detection Concept 
 
Jolliffe [120] discusses two key methods typically used with SPC to identify whether a 
particular data sample x would fall within the known limits of variation in the PCA model, or 
if it is instead classified as an outlier (an indicator of faulty behaviour). The first is Squared 
Prediction Error (SPE, hereafter Q) which was introduced by Jackson and Mudholkar [123] as 
a means to approximate control limits, based on the distribution of Q. Jackson and Hearne 
[124] offer a variant of this process to detect groups of outlying new datapoints, rather than 
single outliers. The other key method is called Hotelling’s T2 statistic, introduced by H. 
Hotelling in 1931 [125]. It is a multivariate statistical method that is the generalized 
counterpart of Student’s t-test [120]. The equations for T2 and Q are shown below [126]: 
 
 𝑇2 = 𝑥𝐕(Ʌ)−1𝐕𝑇𝑥𝑇 (5-11) 
 𝑄 = 𝑥(𝐈 −  𝐕𝐕𝐓)𝑥𝑇 (5-12) 
 
If a new data sample x does not closely match the PCA model – i.e. it exhibits unusual variation 
relative to the model – the T2 and Q statistic values will increase. In short, T2 provides 
information on unusual variation within the model-space, whereas Q provides information 
about unusual variation outside the model-space [127]. For example, if the original dataset X 
is three-dimensional, and after PCA analysis it is decided that only two PCs can describe 99% 
of the data, the model-space can be reduced to two dimensions within a 3-D dataspace; x will 
still be described by the three coordinates in the dataspace. If a new sample x falls within the 
2-D plane that PC1 and PC2 describe in the 3-D dataspace, but falls far away from the normal 




PC1-PC2 plane, in ‘unmodelled’ space, a variation which would instead be captured by a Q 
value. Figure 5-1 illustrates the difference between T2 and Q. 
 
 
Figure 5-1: T2 and Q statistics on 2D PCA model in 3D data space. 
 
PCA-based fault detection concepts have been used in many industrial processing applications. 
Penha et al. [127] discusses how PCA was used to model the normal operation of five water 
temperature sensors in a nuclear reactor. The model was then used to robustly identify faulty 
temperature sensors, through both the T2 and Q residuals. Hao et al. [128] looked at multiple 
variants of PCA-based fault detection strategies as part of a concept for detecting faults during 
non-steady transient operational periods in a manufacturing plant, and found their particular 
Longitudinal-Standardization PCA-based Adaptive Confidence Limit method to be very 
effective in both capturing faults and being robust against false alarms.   
 
For application as a functional safety monitor, large amounts of data will need to be captured 
to derive a representative PCA model for all operating conditions of the system. Eggett and 
Pulsipher [129] conducted a simulation in order to compare the performance of T2, Q, and the 
Jackson and Hearne [130] variation of Q. They found that T2 was preferable for large datasets, 
whereas Q performed better with small samples. Therefore, only T2 will be considered within 





5-2 – PCA Safety Monitoring Concept Development 
 
This investigation seeks to investigate whether PCA is a functionally suitable safety monitor 
concept and a viable alternative for use in a vehicular torque structure, such that the fault 
reaction mechanism is effective in its mitigation of a fault. The key objectives pertaining to 
functional suitability of the PCA concept in this chapter are: 
 
1) Quickly detect that a fault has occurred. 
2) Determine direction of the fault (positive or negative). 
3) Determine the magnitude of the fault. 
 
In this section, the stages of development of the PCA safety monitoring concept are outlined, 
leading to a concept that meets these objectives. 
 
5-2.1 – PCA Safety Monitoring of Powertrain Software 
 
For application in an online vehicle safety monitoring system, PCA could be used to rapidly 
develop a model of the vehicle torque structure software, or a component thereof. The process 
can be described by four major phases: 
 
1) Define Scope of PCA Safety Monitor. 
2) Gather training data from normal operation. 
3) Derive PCA models during development. 
4) Store PCA models for online fault detection.  
 
5-2.1.1 – Define Scope of PCA Safety Monitor Concept 
 
A modern vehicle torque structure (functional software) contains many software components 
and functions that are used to calculate the appropriate torque demand from accelerator pedal 
and other inputs. Some of these include external factors such as vehicle speed and ambient air 
temperature; others compensate for powertrain dynamics, such as actuator or battery 
temperature performance characteristics; other examples include active control and/or 
deliberate intervention functions such as stability and traction control, driver-selectable pedal 
modes, high-voltage recharging control etc. The scope of the PCA Safety Monitor needs to be 
set such that inputs and outputs and their operating ranges are defined, such that 




5-2.1.2 – Gather Training Data 
 
The PCA Safety Monitor Concept needs to know the normal operation of the nominal torque 
structure, or a particular section thereof, in order to create the appropriate PCA models. The 
functional software acts as a black box for the PCA concept, as only the inputs and output are 
recorded for training data. The training data should be comprehensive in that the full range of 
possible input values are tested to fully capture the functional software operating space. A 
second set of training data is also captured with an artificial fault injected into the output signal, 
which is used to aid derivation and test performance of the PCA fault detection during 
development. The input and output signals will become the original variables during the PCA 
model generation process, where each data point x will exist in the m-dimensional dataspace.  
 
5-2.1.3 – Derive PCA models in development 
 
 This stage in the concept is the focus of this chapter. Here, the normal and faulty training data 
is used to derive PCA models based on the original variables. The PCA models seek to fit the 
normal data with little variation under normal operating conditions, but must be able to detect 
a fault if it causes unusual variation in the output based on the inputs. The PCA models must 
be tested, validated and verified in this stage. 
 
5-2.1.4 – Store PCA models for online fault detection 
 
With the PCA models defined, they are stored and used as reference for online execution when 
the vehicle is deployed. The PCA concept will compare newly measured data samples to the 
stored PCA models to monitor the behaviour of the inputs and output of the functional software 
components, and flag a fault if unusual variation occurs along with information regarding that 
fault.  
 
5-2.2 – Linear Software Function 
 
The first stage of development is to test the PCA and T2 fault detection capability, and 
demonstrate the method is viable on a simple case. The test will capture training data for two 
inputs and one output. This can be thought of as a torque demand pedal map, where the two 
inputs are accelerator pedal position percentage, p, and vehicle forward velocity, v, and the 
output torque demand, τ.  Note that any equations describing this torque demand pedal map is 




component that will be treated as a black box during a PCA model derivation process. Training 
data for this black-box component is generated using input parameter sweeps, where 
uniformly-distributed combinations of values for the inputs are used, the resultant outputs 
captured, and all the datapoints stored in X for PCA analysis to take place. PCA analysis 
produces the PCA model in the form of the eigenvector and eigenvalue matrices, V and Ʌ, 
which are then stored for online fault detection using T2. Figure 5-2 shows the result of a PCA 
development stage on a linear torque pedal map. 
 
 
Figure 5-2: Linear PCA Training and Test Data, and Model. 
 
In this test, pedal position percentage p has a range of 0-100%, and vehicle velocity v a range 
of 0-160 kph. 10000 unique input value combinations were used to generate the training data 
set. With this data, the PCA model is derived, and the three PCs are shown originating from 
the model centre in Figure 5-2. To test the online fault detection capability using this PCA 
model, a set of test data comprising of inputs and outputs of the software component is 
generated over a 100 s period, called ‘normal test data’. This tests the PCA model’s ability to 
prevent undue variation under normal operating conditions, which would otherwise cause a 




the first through the inclusion of a fault signal, a simulated ‘torque error’ effect additively 
applied to the torque output. Figure 5-3 shows the torque error signal used in these tests. 
 
 
Figure 5-3: Torque Error signal 
 
The set of normal data with this fault signal applied is called ‘fault test data’. When the normal 
and fault test data are used for their respective T2 online tests, the resulting T2 outputs are 
generated and shown in Figure 5-4. 
 
 
Figure 5-4: Linear PCA Online test, showing T2 output for normal and fault conditions 
(top) for given torque outputs (bottom). 
 
From Figure 5-5, it is clear that T2 is able to reliably identify fault occurrences, and with 




appropriately. However, the fault T2 tends to curve during each ramp, rather than increasing 
linearly as the torque error signal does, meaning that a single scalar will not accurately scale 
the T2 at all points to correspond with the torque error. Another drawback here is that 
information relating to fault direction is not available since T2 ≥ 0.  
 
5-2.2.1 – Output Data Offsetting 
 
Currently, there is no way to know whether a given T2 value signifies a positive or negative 
torque error, a metric which is required to appropriately mitigate an unintended longitudinal 
acceleration safety hazard, and which is the second objective of this investigation. It was found 
during investigation that when a positive constant a is added to the output of the T2 online test 
data – but not the training data – both normal and faulty T2 test signals have their T2 values 
increased. While this seems to worsen performance due to far greater T2 values under normal 
conditions, it reveals qualitative information pertaining to fault direction. Figure 5-5 shows the 
resulting T2 with a constant offset, a, of 1000 Nm applied to the output (torque) of the same 
normal and fault test datasets as previously shown in Figure 5-2.  
 
 
Figure 5-5: Conventional PCA Linear T2, with output offset a = 1000 Nm applied. 
 
Figure 5-5 now shows that qualitative information about torque direction is clearly visible, as 
now all positive torque faults are above the normal T2 line at a given time, and all negative 
faults lie below. Additionally, there seems to be a much more linear ramp, qualitatively 




interpretation effort. During this output offsetting investigation, it seemed that a sufficiently 
large a was needed to improve this aspect, as an a that was too small would yield similar 
erroneous qualitative fault T2 behaviour as seen in Figure 5-4. This is likely due to the fact that 
the offset needs to be greater than the expected largest absolute magnitude in Nm of the faulty 
behaviour, such that it doesn’t cross the plane created by a, i.e. the new baseline from which 
T2 calculations take place. An output offset of a > 1000 would work just as well. 
 
5-2.3 – Nonlinear Software Function 
 
In practice, most software components in the functional software are not perfectly linear. For 
a multiple input single output system, a curved and often non-smooth, non-linear surface is 
typically formed. Since PCA results in linear models centred at the training data mean, there 
will always be some difference between the model and the non-linear dataset in some areas. 
Therefore, if a single PCA model is used for the entire non-linear dataset, there will be some 
variation in the normal T2 test, particularly data points further away from the centre of the 
dataset. Consider now some non-linear relationship in the equation describing the torque 
demand pedal map: with the same input data trace and fault signals used in the linear PCA T2 
tests, the training data and T2 test data output yielded by such a non-linear equation could be 
















Figure 5-6: Nonlinear PCA Training and Test Data. 
 
Figure 5-6 shows that a curved surface dataset has been attained from the new function, with 
the same 500 Nm range in the output axis. The curved surface will likely lead to reduced 
performance from the linear PCA model, as normal operating data varies with respect to the 
third eigenvector (the smallest one), leading to variation in normal T2. Using the same output 
offset as before (a = 1000 Nm), the same T2 online test is conducted, and the results are 






Figure 5-7: Curved training dataset, and T2 offset with linear PCA model. 
 
Reduced performance on this dataset is clear in Figure 5-7 as normal T2 now varies 
considerably. As expected, greater normal T2 variation will make it difficult to detect and 
distinguish abnormal faulty T2 variation, leading to both many false faults being flagged, and 
some true faults may be missed altogether. This is all due to the fact that a single linear PCA 
model cannot accurately describe the nonlinear training data.  
 
5-2.3.1 – Local PCA Concept 
 
To remedy this, a simple concept has been devised that places multiple linear PCA models in 
the dataspace to fit the non-linear training dataset. The training data is segmented into cells by 
creating boundaries on the axes of original input variables; an individual PCA model is derived 
for each cell k. In theory, this means that each individual PCA model will be a better 
representation of the local training data than a single model covering the whole dataset would. 
This concept will be called Local Principal Component Analysis (Local PCA), and the basic 





Figure 5-8: Comparing Conventional PCA (left) to Local PCA of two cells (right). 
 
In Figure 5-8, the model centres in the Local PCA concept is found much closer to their local 
training data, and the individual Local PCA eigenvectors more closely resemble the data it is 
estimating than the regular PCA. The second eigenvalue is also much smaller, meaning that 
there is less variation in the ‘fault direction’ (output axis), and would theoretically mean better 
distinction between fault and normal data. Only the input axes are divided, because only faults 
are being checked on the outputs; if the output axis was also divided, then a fault could move 
the data sample x into a different cell, and could lead to a missed fault. Therefore, only the 
input axes are divided to create cells. Using the same non-linear data as before, and with the 







Figure 5-9: Local PCA T2, with an offset applied. 
 
From Figure 5-9, the Local PCA concept now causes T2 to experience sharp discontinuities as 
the current data sample x passes from one cell to another; this, naturally, is due to differences 
in the PCA models. These discontinuities are significant enough that even large faults cannot 
be robustly identified. However, within each cell k, normal variation stays within a narrower 
relative threshold, and using the average value of normal variation as a baseline better 
distinguishes faulty from normal T2 behaviour within each cell. Therefore, if the average 
normal T2 value, b, during an online test was captured, it could be used offset all future T2 
values for that cell, such that each cell has the same average baseline (i.e. zero). Then a 
common ‘normal threshold’ can be used to identify faulty behaviour, regardless of which cell 
it occurs within. This ‘average T2 offset’ b can be calculated purely from normal training data, 
without knowledge of fault response.  
 
The average T2 offset calculation is demonstrated in Figure 5-10, taking the previous result of 
Local PCA online test from Figure 5-9, considering only the normal T2 values of cell 2, and 





Figure 5-10: Example demonstrating how average offsets are derived a posteriori from 
normal T2 online test for each cell’s Local PCA model. 
 
The average T2 offset for cell 2, b2, would roughly be 1.7e4 from Figure 5-10, and is shown 
by the dotted black line. The T2 online test is repeated for the same normal and fault test data, 
but this time using the cell membership already calculated for each new data sample x (based 
on its input axis coordinates) and the corresponding average T2 offset bk is subtracted from the 
nominal normal and faulty T2 outputs.  
 
 





Comparing Figure 5-11 to Figure 5-7, it is apparent that using average normal T2 offset for the 
cells means that faults are much more easily distinguishable. Additionally, obtaining 
information about fault direction and magnitude is simpler, as a negative torque error (i.e. too 
little torque demanded) now tends to be a negative value. This is not a complete concept yet, 
though: the normal T2 still varies by a considerable amount and will benefit from reduced 
normal variation. Moreover, a fundamental problem persists: T2 is a qualitative statistic as 
opposed to a useful, quantitative value for use in fault detection. T2 needs to somehow be 
interpreted into a useful metric, akin to the familiar ‘torque error’ typically used by the fault 
detection system.  
 
5-2.3.2 – T2 Normalisation 
 
Although the cells now share a common baseline of zero T2 under normal conditions, the 
interpretation of a given fault magnitude is not common. Therefore, there also needs to be 
some form of T2 interpretation scalar, a possibility that has now been made possible with the 
introduction of this average normal T2 offset. In order to select the correct scalar, a different, 
more comprehensive T2 test is introduced   
 
Instead of using a varying additive fault signal from Figure 5-3, a constant 100 Nm fault f is 
now applied to examine the behaviour between cells as a comprehensive input parameter 






Figure 5-12: Input parameter sweep under normal conditions and with constant 100 Nm 
fault f on subdivided nonlinear training data. 
 
A constrained view of the x-axis in Figure 5-12 can be found in Figure 5-13, showing more 






Figure 5-13: Input parameter sweep under normal conditions and with constant 100 Nm 
fault, f, on subdivided nonlinear training data; first 10 seconds only (see Figure 5-12). 
 
The variation in the fault offset T2 generally varies around some average value in the same 
way as normal offset T2 varies around zero, but it is clear that Local PCA models 1 and 2 tend 
to produce greater T2 outputs for the same fault compared to models 3 and 4, indicating that a 
single scalar for the all cells will not correctly estimate torque error. With that in mind, the 
average fault offset T2 value has to be found for each cell, 𝑇2̅̅̅̅ 𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡,𝑘, obtained by averaging all 
the fault offset T2 values for a given test that is produced when cell k is active. Then, all of the 
T2 values produced in each cell can be divided by the corresponding 𝑇2̅̅̅̅ 𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡,𝑘 such as to 
normalise each cell’s response to the same 100 Nm fault, f. Since normal offset T2 is already 
centred on zero, there will not be a further offset change in normal offset T2. The result of this 
is that normal offset T2 in each cell will now vary around zero under normal conditions (as 
before), but now around 1 for fault offset T2 whenever the fault magnitude equals f. With all 
of T2 normalised, the (𝑇2̅̅̅̅ 𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡,𝑘)
−1
 scalar for each cell can be scaled by the known fault 
magnitude f to produce the T2 torque error estimate, 𝑇𝐸𝑇𝐸




and reaction mechanism to act upon. Considering all of these steps, then, a single T2 scalar ck 
can be derived for each cell k, which is used to obtain 𝑇𝐸𝑇𝐸
2  at any given time. Deriving ck is 
summarised in Equation (5-13): 






where f is the constant fault used in the faulty T2 test, and  𝑇2̅̅̅̅ 𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡,𝑘 the average fault offset T
2 
for cell k captured after the test. Using the same test as before (Figure 5-12), the T2 scalar ck 
for each cell k is derived and stored. When a new set of input parameter sweeps are then 
conducted, the T2 output is multiplied by the corresponding T2 scalar ck based on which cell is 
active for the current T2. This test includes the normal offset T2 test, the previous faulty offset 
T2 test from a constant 100 Nm fault f, and two more faulty offset T2 tests – constant 50 Nm 
and -75 Nm faults – to provide indication whether a given derived ck is valid for any fault 
injection magnitude. Figure 5-14 compares the T2 estimated torque error, 𝑇𝐸𝑇𝐸
2 , outputs of 
these tests.  
 
 
Figure 5-14: T2 estimated torque error outputs for normal and fault data with subdivided 





From Figure 5-14 it can be seen that the T2 normalisation process has successfully normalised 
the cells in the T2 estimated torque error outputs, such that a fault on the output will be quickly, 
and with reasonable accuracy, be detected by this concept. The original fault of 100 Nm is 
easily distinguishable from normal operation, with a variance range of -10 Nm to +20 Nm.  
 
Furthermore, both the 50 Nm and -75 Nm faults are correctly classified (with like variance) 
during their T2 online tests using the cell membership k to determine appropriate Vk, Ʌ𝐤, bk 
and ck. This important finding should indicate that, regardless of which value for f is used to 
derive b and c during development, these will provide a correct 𝑇𝐸𝑇𝐸
2  for any encountered fault 
magnitude. In summary, the methods employed to calculate 𝑇𝐸𝑇𝐸
2  can be described by the 
following equations. 
 
 𝐌𝐤 = 𝐕𝐤(Ʌ𝑘)
−1𝐕𝐤
𝐓 (5-14) 
 𝑥𝑎 = 𝑥 + [0,0,… , 𝑎] (5-15) 
 𝑇𝐸𝑇𝐸
2  =  [[𝑥𝑎𝐌𝐤𝑥𝑎
𝑇] − 𝑏𝑘] × 𝑐𝑘 (5-16) 
 
where k is the determined cell membership of datapoint x, and x itself is a vector whose 
elements are the original dataspace coordinates, with all the inputs first, then the output at the 
end. Since the PCA models do not change once they are released with the vehicle, (5-14) can 
be pre-multiplied to produce the single [m x m] PCA model Mk, such that a lesser burden is 
placed on the computational and storage resources during real-time execution. These are 
promising results, but variation around the ideal in both fault and normal 𝑇𝐸𝑇𝐸
2  is still 
significant enough to potentially inhibit consideration of this concept as a viable fault detection 
method for this application. Therefore, the next section seeks to reduce this variation through 
the introduction of an automated refinement process.  
 
5-2.4 – Automated Subdivision PCA 
 
It was demonstrated in the preceding section that through the creation of divisions in the input 
axes of the training data such that cells of training data are produced, better matching PCA 
models could be found for the local training data within the cells they are being derived from, 
leading to reduced variation in T2. It seems reasonable, then, to assume that further cell 
divisions could yield improved performance by reducing normal variation, and thereby 
improving the fault detection robustness of this method. However, simply dividing the cells 
indiscriminately will quickly lead to impractical amounts of data needing storage, exacerbated 




An automated cell subdivision process has been conceived, whereby cell divisions are tested 
and refined, such that improved performance can be obtained while not drastically expanding 
the amount of data storage required; this process has been called Subdivision PCA. The basic 
principle is straightforward: test if a subdivision improves the fault detection capabilities above 
a desired amount, and if so create that subdivision. Figure 5-15 illustrates one iteration of the 
subdivision refinement process.  
 
 
Figure 5-15: One iteration of cell subdivision in subdivision refinement process, with 
green cells showing earmarked cells for future subdivision. 
 
Figure 5-15 shows the input space of a three-dimensional training data dataspace. The starting 
cells and their boundaries (solid black lines) for this iteration is shown in 1), and the 
performance of the T2 tests stored. Then in 2) through 5), the same tests are repeated, but with 
new probationary subdivisions in one cell at a time (dashed lines) to determine if these 
subdivisions bring benefit; green-shaded cells yield improvements whereas red-shaded cells 
do not. Cells that show improvement then have their subdivisions confirmed, ready for the 
next iteration 6).   
 
5-2.4.1 – Error Integral, Cell Selection Function and Subdivision Refinement 
 
In order to determine which cells to subdivide, some way to quantify their performance needs 
to be established. One way to understand the performance of the set of PCA models during the 
T2 tests is to determine how distinguishable a fault is from normal operation. Variation in either 
normal or faulty offset T2 will tend to reduce this discernibility, and reduction of this variation 




take this into account, called the ‘error integral’ e. With a known constant fault magnitude f 
being used in the T2 online tests, the error integral e can be calculated using (5-17). 
 
 𝑒 =∑( |𝑇𝐸𝑇𝐸,𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡
2 − 𝑓| + |𝑇𝐸𝑇𝐸,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙
2 | ) (5-17) 
 
With perfect PCA model matching, faulty offset T2 will equal f and normal offset T2 will equal 
zero, leading to e = 0; any deviation from these baselines will increase e. This is calculated for 
each datapoint during the T2 online test and cumulatively summed together. The criteria for 
the subdivision refinement process is therefore to minimize e. With each iteration of 
subdivision refinement, each cell needs to be tested for improved subdivision performance. 
This is called the Cell Selection Function, and is comprised of the following steps: 
 
1) Start the subdivision iteration. 
2) Take an untested cell k of the current subdivision, and create a probationary 
subdivision (which includes all other cells of the current subdivision). 
3) Derive PCA models of the whole training data using the probationary subdivision. 
4) Conduct T2 test using PCA models from probationary subdivision. 
5) Derive average offsets and T2 scalars, and apply to normal and faulty T2.  
6) Calculate error integral e for probationary subdivision, and compare with e from 
current subdivision.  
7) If the probationary e is greater than the current e, earmark cell k for subdivision 
refinement in the next iteration. Otherwise, do not subdivide it.  
8) Revert back to the current subdivision in step 2 until all cells are tested. 
9) Subdivide earmarked cells, end subdivision iteration. 
  
There are a number of criteria that can control the number of subdivision iterations performed, 
such as a minimum cell size (related to a set number of subdivision iterations), maximum 
number of PCA models, error integral requirement, the ‘knee point’ in error integral 
improvement, or until no improvement could be made to error integral by any further 
subdivision. The earmarked cells could be sorted based on percentage e improvement and only 
those above a certain percentage chosen for further subdivision. Figure 5-16 shows the 







Figure 5-16: Subdivision Refinement Process with Cell Selection Function. 
 
Continuing on with the same data from Figure 5-16, the subdivision refinement process is 
carried out to see if variation can be reduced. After three subdivision refinement iterations, a 
set of 64 cells are created with corresponding PCA models, offsets, and T2 scalars. Figure 5-






Figure 5-17: Normal and Fault T2 estimated torque error outputs after three subdivision 
iterations. 
 
With more PCA models describing the nonlinear training data due to the automated 
subdivision process, variation in both fault and normal T2 estimated torque error are 
dramatically reduced, with a variation of >2 Nm in both signals across the whole input space.  
 
5-2.4.2 – Weighted Subdivision 
 
Up to this point, the only type of cell subdivision considered has been to create a new cell 
boundary halfway between the existing ones along a particular input axis. There is scope to 
investigate altering the ‘weighting’ of these new subdivisions, whereby additional tests are 
conducted to find if biasing boundaries would yield improved performance at no additional 
storage cost. Figure 5-18 illustrates the difference between the nominal Subdivision 










Figure 5-18: Regular Subdivision (a) compared to an example Weighted Subdivision (b) 
after two subdivision iterations. 
 
The Weighted Subdivision Refinement process is also easily automated, and included as a 
subroutine within the Cell Selection function of Figure 5-16. When the next cell is tested, all 
allowed combinations of boundary weighting are tested individually, and the best performing 
one (with the lowest e) is compared to the current subdivisions, and if e has been reduced, then 
that cell is earmarked with the corresponding subdivision weightings. It allows the refinement 
process to better match non-linear data with fewer subdivision iterations. 
 
5-3 – Implementation of PCA in a simulated vehicle torque 
structure 
 
To test the Automated Weighted Subdivision PCA concept for implementation, a Simscape 
vehicle powertrain model has been developed in the Simulink environment. The vehicle 
modelled is a twin-axle EV from Chapter 3 (first shown in Figure 3-7), with an electric motor 






Figure 5-19: EV Powertrain Architecture. 
 
The model consists of two main sections: 1) the physical drivetrain and vehicle model, and 2) 
the torque structure control software, similar to a typical modern vehicle control setup. A 
torque demand is sent to the actuators from the torque structure control software, which itself 
is controlled by the accelerator pedal demand from the human driver model and the measured 
physical vehicle velocity. The PCA FSC will seek to detect faults in the torque structure. 





Figure 5-20: System view of simulation model. 
 
Birch et al. [112] defines a safety goal to address the hazard of unintended acceleration: 
“vehicle positive longitudinal acceleration shall not exceed driver demand by more than 1.5 
m/s2 for longer than 1 s’. They found, for their particular EV vehicle, that the maximum 




safety requirement and fault reaction mechanism to limit erroneous excess torque to 150 Nm. 
Considering the same safety goal Birch et al. defines, the same test was conducted on the 
Simulink vehicle model in this chapter to find that a ~140 Nm fault would result in a maximum 
1.5 m/s2 acceleration. Therefore, with respect to this safety goal, the PCA module must be able 
to always detect a fault of 140 Nm in the torque software to achieve safety with respect to this 
hazard. 
 
5-3.1 – PCA Development Stage 
 
The PCA derivation and online implementation process previously outlined will be put into 
practice for this application. 
 
5-3.1.1 – Define Scope of PCA Safety Monitor Concept 
 
This first step in the development stage is to identify the item being monitored and scope. In 
this case, the simplified vehicle torque structure is being monitored, with inputs of accelerator 
pedal position and measured vehicle velocity and an output of torque demand; this is the part 
that will be extracted for PCA model development.  
 
5-3.1.2 – Gather Training Data 
 
 With the scope defined, the software component is extracted for analysis. In this case, two 
uniformly-distributed random number generators are used as inputs to generate 10000 data 
samples of pedal position, velocity, and torque for the PCA models to be trained on. Random 
number generators of different seeds are also used to generate test data for refinement in the 
next stage.   
 
5-3.1.3 – Derive PCA models 
 
The training data and test data is used to calculate the PCA models in the automated weighted 
subdivision process. After four subdivision iterations, the final M, b, and c are derived and 
stored for each 256 cells; for this application, a = 10000. Figure 5-21 shows the performance 






Figure 5-21: T2 for Normal and 100 Nm Fault 
 
Compared to Figure 5-17, there does exist some greater variation in both normal and fault T2 
here in Figure 5-21, which can be attributed to the greater complexity system being modelled. 
Furthermore, it was found that the instances of greatest variation are found specifically in just 
two cells. Depending on design requirements, more iterations and cell refinement could in 
theory be used to increase fidelity and improve robustness at the expense of increased storage 
requirement. The ability to choose the number of iterations of the PCA model development 
for a particular application highlights the capability to tune the PCA module in the 
development stage to the particular need or constraint of the application.  
 
5-3.2 – PCA Module Online Implementation and Test 
 
With the PCA module derived, the final step is to now implement it into the vehicle. The same 
input and output signals are routed to the module, and the estimated torque error output from 
the PCA module would be sent to the fault decision and reaction mechanism. Fault detection 
is the focus of this thesis, so no active fault reaction will take place. A test can now take place. 
 
The human driver model will attempt to match a simple target vehicle velocity – recorded real-
world driving data – by actuating the accelerator pedal and brake pedal. Eight fault events will 
take place over the course of the 100 s drive cycle, which will be additively injected on the 
torque output, as per Figure 5-20. Figure 5-22 shows the fault signal injection schedule, which 






Figure 5-22: Fault injection signal schedule. 
 
The aim of this exercise is to see whether the PCA module will be able to replicate these faults, 
as they are torque errors. Both positive and negative faults are included to test correct 
estimation in both directions.  The resulting estimated torque error output from the PCA 
module for this test case is shown in Figure 5-23. 
 
 





The results in Figure 5-23 are very promising. With the exception of a small amount of 
expected noise, the PCA module manages to capture each fault event in the test case. The 
largest variation occurs in the last fault event, where a momentary spike of 5 Nm occurs. Other 
periods of signal noise exist, but generally it is kept low. 
 
With the current PCA module noise, the error threshold for fault detection would need to be 
reduced slightly to ensure a true hazard isn’t missed. For example, if the true hazard was 145 
Nm, but due to noise the estimated torque error from the PCA module read 135 Nm, a fault 
that violates the functional safety requirement would be missed. The amount of reduction 
would be related to the expected normal variation following the PCA model derivation during 
development. Even so, the noise in Figure 5-23 is generally low with respect to the signal 
fidelity required for fault detection in a vehicle. 
 
5-4 – Time-Dependent Functions 
 
The Subdivision PCA concept has been shown to work quite well on multi-variate static MISO 
systems, where there is no dynamic time-element. In the previous examples, a given set of 
inputs would always result in the same output irrespective of preceding inputs. However, the 
functional software for vehicle torque management in modern cars will invariably have some 
form of dynamic time-dependent behaviour in the function. Some examples would include: 
 
• Torque blending function 
• Traction Control function 
• ICE dynamics compensation 
 
These cases present a fundamental issue for PCA: a given set of instantaneous inputs may 
produce different outputs, depending on what the inputs were in the time preceding the current 
data sample. When the software function being monitored includes a time-dynamic behaviour 
such as a time-delay or smoothing function, the training data produced resembles a ‘cloud’ of 
datapoints as opposed to a surface. The variation in this direction results in a much larger 
eigenvalue in the last PC, decreasing distinction between a fault and normal behaviour.  In the 
literature review, PCA was shown to have been successfully implemented in industrial 
engineering applications, such as chemical process and nuclear power plants. Indeed, these are 
also dynamic systems that have some level of time-dependent behaviour to them, papers by 
[127] show the typical sample interval to be about one minute, as opposed to the 0.01 s in the 




but rather just system and sensor variables (temperature, pressure, flow rate etc.) which would 
change less rapidly than a control input, unless a clear fault is present. Therefore, the time-
behaviour performance of the Subdivision PCA needs to be examined. The simplest form of 
this would be to include a time delay on the output of the system, capturing the inputs and the 
delayed output.   
 
Great consideration for the Subdivision PCA method needs to be given to how the training 
data is gathered, because to build a comprehensive dataset of inputs and outputs would require 
a sufficiently representative combination of possible preceding inputs to the current state of 










where di is the chosen representative resolution of the i
th input variable (e.g. dpedal = 101, where 
each integer percentage of a possible 0-100% pedal positions is captured), ω is the sampling 
frequency in Hz, and t is the time constant of the non-linear behaviour that takes the longest 
historical effect into account (e.g. t = 1 for a 1 second delay on the output). Clearly then, this 
would surmount to an extremely large number of data points to build a representative dataset 
for the Subdivision PCA to train on, but which is not necessarily impossible to do 
computationally in a software environment. A major drawback is that each non-linear 
behaviour would need to be analysed for its time constant, which in itself may actually change 
depending on some other influence, such as different torque blending transfer functions for 
different pedal maps.  
 
5-4.1 – Compensating for Time-Dependent Function Dynamics 
 
A possible remedy would be to model these time-dependent characteristics outside of the PCA 
model, effectively negating the temporal behaviour. Depending on the nature of the time-
dependent behaviour, the PCA safety monitoring concept could be arranged in one of two 
ways: 
 
1) Use other inputs as inputs into an external dynamic model of the time-dependent 





2) Use the output of the PCA module as an input into a dynamic model, the output of 
which is then used for the fault detection.  
 
Both approaches would incur additional initial design costs as it makes each PCA module 
more application specific, but would also depend on whether or not the dynamic behaviour 





Figure 5-24: Architecture of separating out dynamic behaviour from PCA for Fault 
Detection. 
 
In the architecture shown in Figure 5-24, PCA is performed on the non-linear, non-time-
dependent part of the functional software with T2 torque error as the output. The T2 torque 
error output can then be added to the current torque demand from the functional software to 
obtain the expected torque demand. This is then sent into a safety software version of the 
dynamic function (time dynamic), and the outputs of this is compared to the same output in 
the functional software to get the error for the whole scope of the safety monitor. Separating 
out the dynamic component of a function is very difficult in practice, especially as there can 
be multiple dynamics interacting with each other; gathering the required training data becomes 
exponentially infeasible when additional dynamics are considered. 
 
Another potential remedy that does not explicitly separate out the time dynamic component of 
the functional software is the inclusion of an inverse of the dynamic function on the output 
going to the PCA model, or in some cases a duplication of the dynamic model on the inputs 
going into the PCA model such that the dynamic component is cancelled out; for example, if 




that the dynamic effect is cancelled out. Examples of these two layouts are represented in 




Figure 5-25: Inverse time dynamic model on functional software (L1) Output 
 
 
Figure 5-26: Time-dynamic offsetting models on Inputs 
 
In theory, and with a bit of extra work bespoke to each type of dynamic considered, this could 
negate the time-dynamic between inputs and outputs. Unfortunately, three drawbacks have 
been identified: 
 
1) Consideration for the Fault Tolerant Time Interval 
2) Separating out time dynamic component for modelling still required 




5-4.1.1 – Fault Tolerant Time Interval 
 
ISO 26262 Part 1, 1.45 [26] defines the Fault Tolerant Time Interval (FTTI) as “time-span in 
which a fault (1.42) or fault can be present in a system (1.129) before a hazardous (1.57) event 
occurs”, (International Standards Organization, 2014). With this in mind, ‘undoing’ the time 
dynamic by adding an inverse model effectively will double the ‘Diagnostic Test Interval’ 
between ‘Fault’ and ‘Fault Detection, increasing the burden on the ‘Fault Reaction Time’ in 
order for the system to reach a safe state within the FTTI. This is illustrated in Figure 5-27 
with the dotted line, which takes twice as long to detect a fault, and leaves very little time to 
get the system to a Safe State.  
 
 
Figure 5-27: Fault reaction time and fault tolerant time interval (ISO 26262 Part 1-1.44, 
Fig. 4 [26], with modification) 
 
While simpler dynamics with a short time constant may still leave sufficient space for a 
successful fault reaction, the environment in which passenger cars operate will likely demand 
a short FTTI for unintended acceleration. 
 
5-4.1.2 – Separating Out Dynamic Components 
 
In order to derive an inverse dynamic model, the dynamic component needs to be known and 
the inverse function modelled. This second method therefore suffers from the same problem 
as the architecture in Figure 5-24, in that separating out the dynamic component of a function 





5-4.1.3 – Complex and Inaccurate Inverse Models 
 
Even if the dynamic component was known, the inverse model may not be able to be modelled 
such that it can accurately counteract the dynamic component or requires significant 
computational resources to operate. The time dynamics in the torque structure may well be so 
complex that to attempt to model them would not be a commercially feasible approach, 
particularly as these models would independently need to be verified, quickly adding to initial 
design cost reducing simplicity and modifiability. Doing so may well make the concept near-
identical to how the Continuous Torque Demand Monitor is developed, negating the benefit 
of using the PCA concept. 
 
5-5 – Further Constraints and Feasibility  
 
The PCA Safety Monitor is shown to have promise as an FSC, but a number of constraints are 
present in this concept that are yet to be overcome.  
 
5-5.1 – Validation and Verification 
 
Before this concept can be implemented in a real vehicle, robustness and verification methods 
will need to be explored further to ensure the PCA safety monitor will fully ensure the safe 
operation of the software component it is monitoring at all times. Verification will form much 
of the future work on this concept, with some of the key aspects explored in Chapter 6. 
 
5-5.2 – MIMO Functions 
 
Currently, only multiple-input-single-output (MISO) systems are able to be monitored. This is 
due to the fact that T2 varies when there is variation in the direction of the smallest eigenvalue 
(last PC), and it is not currently known if the error could be reconstructed when two outputs 
are being monitored by the same PCA module in a multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) 
system. However, it is believed that if a system has multiple inputs and outputs but only one 
output needs to be monitored, a PCA concept could set up in a way that treats the remaining 
outputs as inputs and are subdivided accordingly. A fault could, in theory, only be triggered if 
the monitored output did not match the known input and other output value combinations. By 
extension, multiple PCA modules can then be individually developed to be sensitive to errors 




outputs are combined to create an overall MIMO monitoring function. Figure 5-28 




Figure 5-28: Example Architecture for applying PCA Module to MIMO Functional 
Software. Red labels in the PCA Modules indicate signals that are treated as “outputs” for 
the purposes of PCA error estimation. 
 
In Figure 5-28 each PCA Safety Software Module is a MISO model that considers the same 
inputs and outputs in the estimation of errors, but each is derived to be sensitive only to 
estimate errors with respect to one output from the MIMO Functional Software. This is done 
by selecting one of the Functional Software outputs as an output for the PCA derivation 
process (i.e. it does not get subdivided during automated subdivision development), while the 
other output gets treated as an input. The number of PCA Modules will depend on the number 
of outputs that need to be monitored. In such an architecture, dynamics between output signals 
(e.g. where output 1 affects the value of output 2) can also be captured in the relevant MISO 
PCA Modules. Of course, such an arrangement increases requirements for storage and 
computation, as well as increases design, implementation, and verification effort.  
 
5-5.3 – Hardware Storage Requirements 
 
While PCA is excellent at describing large amounts of data with just a few matrices, the 
subdivision process creates a relatively large amount of data to be stored, which is likely to be 
a constraint on modern vehicle ECUs. Each cell k consists of an [m x m] model matrix Mk, the 
boundaries matrix Bk of size [minputs x 2], the T
2 scalar ck, and the T




single output offset constant a is stored. This means the number of ROM-stored values (nval) 
for one PCA module (excluding code for execution) is described in Equation (5-19): 
 
 𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙 = ((𝑚
2 + 2𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 + 2) × 𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙) + 1 (5-19) 
 
where ncell is the number of cells contained in the PCA module. The per-cell storage 
requirement is squarely dependent on the number of monitored system variables in this 
concept, so increasing this quickly increases the storage requirement. The other aspect of this 
to consider is that as the number of monitored system variables is increased more nonlinearities 
are introduced into the resulting PCA system, and would need more subdivisions to capture 
these non-linearities. Each subdivision made on a cell increases the number of cells to a total 
of 2𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 1, and subsequently gives more opportunities to further refine in the next 
subdivision, likely increasing the number of cells exponentially. The PCA safety monitor 
investigation included test cases with different m, leading to storage requirements differing by 
nearly two orders of magnitude. For example: 
 
• One of the test cases on a three-variable system (two inputs, one output) yielded 13 
cells in the subdivision process, resulting in 780 bytes of data.  
• One of the comprehensive test cases on a four-variable system (three-input one-
output) yielded 481 cells, resulting in 46176 bytes of data.  
 
 There are a number of storage optimisation methods that could drastically reduce the number 
of cells, such as allowing for a very small amount of increased variation if it meant sharing a 
PCA model for near-congruent cells, rather than storing separate models. Additionally, more 
complex cells could be derived, at the cost of increased storage space to describe their more 
complex boundaries.  
 
5-5.4 – Computational Requirements 
 
Finally, the computational requirement also needs consideration. The T2 analysis equations 
are similarly dependent on the number of system variables being monitored. Once the cell 
membership is determined, calculating the T2 estimated torque error, 𝑇𝐸𝑇𝐸
2 , just requires the 
T2 analysis, output offset and T2 normalisation; the number of multiplications, opsmult, to be 
performed in real-time on the ECU for calculating are: 
 
 𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡 = 𝑚





and the number of summation calculations, opssum, is: 
 
 𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚 = 𝑚
2 (5-21) 
 
leading to the total number of operations, ops, to be: 
 
 𝑜𝑝𝑠 = 2𝑚2 +𝑚 + 1 (5-22) 
 
Figure 5-29 shows the number of summation and multiplication operations requiring 
execution on the ECU per timestep, as the number of measured variables, m, increases 
(excluding cell membership calculation and other executable code): 
 
Figure 5-29: Computational requirement per step for increasing numbers of PCA 
Variables 
 
Increasing the number of monitored system variables will increase the calculations nonlinearly 
due to the squared m term. Many factors will play into the computational requirements 
feasibility for this concept. Storage of the necessary data for the PCA module is a major 
limiting factor in modern vehicle ECUs, particularly when the module monitors more than 
three system variables on very nonlinear functions. However, storage and computational 
resources are ever increasing as ECU technology continues to develop, and could lead to more 
complex functions, such as this PCA monitoring concept seeing commercial feasibility in 




5-6 – Conclusions 
 
This chapter has explored and detailed the stages of development that has led to a viable 
method for deriving a PCA-based safety monitor as part of a functional safety concept. The 
PCA safety monitor can meet the goals of being able to quickly detect a fault and determine 
its direction and magnitude. An automated subdivision refinement process was then detailed, 
whereby multiple cells of PCA models were created to improve performance and better 
describe non-linear datasets.   
 
The process was then successfully carried out within a simulated vehicle environment, where 
a software component was identified (torque structure), training data was generated, the PCA 
models derived, and the PCA safety monitor implemented. The PCA safety monitor was able 
to detect all the injected faults during the drive cycle with a small amount of variation, and 
correctly estimate the magnitude and direction of each fault. Within the constraints and 
limitations discussed in the final section, the PCA safety monitor holds merit as a viable safety 
monitoring concept, pending the thorough verification and robustness testing required by ISO 
26262. 
 
The next chapter considers the verification and validation considerations for both the PCA 
safety monitor of this chapter, and the adaptive safety monitor, before revisiting the ideal 
attribute scores preliminarily assigned in Chapter 3 and updating the attributes with 
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6 – Summary 
 
The PCA Safety Monitor and the Adaptive Safety Monitor have both been shown to hold value 
as safety monitor candidates, according to initial testing. In order for these to be progressed 
commercially, attention needs to be paid toward any unique validation and verification (V&V) 
considerations that have been identified as a result of these investigations. A full V&V analysis 
of either concept is out of scope for this project, but key questions are discussed, and are 
addressed with potential solutions. Finally, the concepts will be each re-evaluated according 
to the ideal concept attributes identified in Chapter 3 to produce a final Pugh matrix score.   
 
• Objective 5: Determine if candidate concepts could be suitable for a future production 




6-1 – Validation and Verification Considerations 
 
6-1.1 – Principal Component Analysis Validation & Verification 
Concerns 
 
As PCA is a process-history-based quantitative analysis method [84], many of the concerns 
are rooted in ensuring the validity and integrity of the data used for deriving and testing the 
PCA models, in addition to certain limitations of the current PCA system that pose other V&V 
concerns. 
 
6-1.1.1 – Training Data: Verification of Training and Test Data 
 
As the PCA models are derived from a set of training data captured from the functional 
software component to be monitored, the models can only be as good as the quality of the 
training data. As such, the verification of the training data is a key question, since poor training 
data could lead to PCA models that are either unrepresentative of the software component, or 
include any systematic problems in the software component. Similarly, a separate set of the 
same source of data is used for the T2 testing and verification process, which checks the 
performance of the PCA models over the range of inputs and outputs. Should the test data be 
invalid, the test would also be invalid, and could mean poor performance and loss of functional 
suitability by the PCA module.  Furthermore, for the T2 testing process, there is a need to 
ensure that enough test data is captured for the process to verify the PCA models. Using too 
little test data could mean too sparse a representation of the functional software in the test data, 
possibly invalidating a test. Of course, with a deterministic software component, a finite 
number of possible states exist, and each possible input combination could be tested at the 
significantly increased expense of development resources. Thus, if there were to be some 
reduced set of test data (as there currently is), it must still be valid and comprehensive enough 
to satisfy verification of the PCA model performance. 
 
Possible Solution: The Data Safety Initiative Working Group was established by the Safety 
Critical Systems Club, with the aim of developing clear practices of handling data (as opposed 
to software and hardware) in safety-critical systems through the publication of the Data Safety 
Guidance [131]. Structured around ISO 31000 (with the purpose of assisting data safety 
consideration in future standards), a four-phase “Data Safety Management Process” (DSMP) 





• Establish Context 
• Identify Risks 
• Analyse Risks 
• Evaluate and Treat Risks                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
The DSMP first considers the whole context of system development context, requirements, 
and design, in order to establish the rigour devoted to addressing the risk appetite. Here, the 
type of data can be identified from the list provided in Section 6.1.6 and Appendix E of the 
Data Safety Guidance, with PCA training data possibly falling under “1- Predictive” (“data 
used to model or predict behaviours and performance”) or “9-Machine Learning” (“data used 
to train the system to enable it to learn from the characteristics of the data”), and PCA test data 
falling under “verification” (“data used to test and analyse the system”). Sources of risk are 
then identified along with potential consequences to produce a comprehensive list of possible 
risks, for which the Data Safety Guidance handbook provides data-related HAZOP 
guidewords. With a list of risks established, these risks can then be individually analysed and 
the data-safety related risk level determined by the Data Safety Assurance Level (DSAL) on a 
scale of lowest assurance (DSAL 0) to highest assurance (DSAL 4). Each risk’s DSAL is 
calculated based on parameters of ‘Likelihood’ and ‘Severity’ using Table 6-1; calculation of 
Likelihood and Severity is found in Section 6.3.1 of [131]. 
 












Negligible DSAL 0 DSAL 0 DSAL 1 
Minor DSAL 0 DSAL 1 DSAL 2 
Moderate DSAL 1 DSAL 2 DSAL 3 
Major DSAL 2 DSAL 3 DSAL 4 
Catastrophic DSAL 3 DSAL 4 DSAL 4 
 
The use of DSALs is reminiscent of ASILs in ISO 26262 [26] and SILs in IEC 61508 [53]. 
Mitigation of the risks are then either conducted within the software or the data itself, with 
numerous techniques recommended based on the DSAL of each risk. With the introduction of 
the Data Safety Guidance, a clear structure to determine the best countermeasures and 
mitigation techniques against poor training data are provided, and could be used to ensure the 




6-1.1.2 – Training Data: Validity of Data Collection Method 
 
The method that is used to collect both the training data and T2 test data needs to be 
representative of the full range of possible states the functional software component could take 
on. Currently, obtaining training and test data is achieved through sweeping the input 
parameters on the functional software component and measuring the resulting output(s), to 
create the training data sets Xtrain and Xtest. For a functional software component with no state 
dynamics, each data sample tested can be chosen randomly, as testing on one data sample has 
no impact on the next one tested. However, if there was a software component which contains 
some dynamics, such that the test outcomes of each data sample are affected by the order in 
which they’re tested, the data collection method would need to be validated in order to ensure 
the captured data sets being used for training and testing are valid.  
 
Possible Solution: It is possible that a system with state dynamics in the functional software 
component could need to rely on a vehicle simulation model incorporated into the data 
collection method to ensure the data is captured in the manner that the functional software 
component processes it; simulator usage is a highly recommended technique for DSAL 3 and 
DSAL 4 data applications by the DSMP in Section 6.4.2.8 [131]. Two further issues are, 
however, introduced: 1) the verification of the vehicle model used, and 2) the completeness 
concern surrounding a comprehensive data capturing exercise. An automated systematic test 
schedule is a possible option, but needs to be ensured that both enough data, and the right data, 
is captured; this could be verified through other processes found in the DSMP, such as 
Statistics-Based Sampling, a highly recommended technique for DSAL 3 and DSAL 4 data 
applications in the DSMP Section 6.4.2.5. 
 
6-1.1.3 – PCA Model Derivation: Systematic Errors in Functional Software 
 
If all the training data has been validated and verified to be suitable for model derivation using 
the methods stated previously, there would still exist concerns relating to the derivation of the 
PCA models themselves. These models need to be valid representations of the functional 
software through the training data and need to be verified to show they are functionally 
suitable. Three key concerns are present with regards to the PCA safety monitor model 
derivation. If some systematic behaviour is present in the functional software component that 
leads to a violation of the safety goal – as opposed to a malfunction in the software after release 
– the training data collected on such a software component would likely also contain such 
behaviour, leading to a PCA module that would consider potentially hazardous behaviour as 




averaged out when the PCA models are derived, but if a significant part of the training data is 
captured on flawed operation, the PCA safety concept may allow such functionality to 
continue without fault detection, as it was trained on this data. Verification of the absence of 
such behaviour is therefore imperative. 
 
Possible Solution: Possibly the most significant verification concern with the PCA concept, 
the verification method used in Chapter 5 would not be able to detect such faults, as it tests 
relative to the training data. There are two possible ways to address this concern, with both 
testing for violation of safety goals at the simulated vehicle level. Firstly, more rigour could 
be applied to ensuring the training data itself is free from such behaviour in the first place, 
which would include some sort of rule-based checking throughout a systematic test schedule 
as part of a full vehicle model. Testing the training data is essentially testing the functional 
software for systematic errors, as opposed to malfunctions after deployment. As such, this 
method would require a good understanding of the safety goal(s), and what conditions would 
violate them, such that the rules are able to capture any systematic flaws in the functional 
software. The second method is to go through with PCA model derivation and implement the 
PCA safety monitor as the safety software with the functional software. The full system is then 
subjected to the similar tests as the first method, as part of a full vehicle simulation systematic 
test programme, this time testing whether the fully derived and implemented system violates 
any vehicle-level safety goals.  
 
The second method has the advantage of being able to be the final sign-off in terms of 
verification since it is testing the end product (thereby adding assurance), but does mean any 
necessary modification that might result from the tests will be more costly. This is since 
finding errors in the late stage could mean reverting all the way back to the first stage of 
gathering training data, if it is a systematic error. The first method, meanwhile, will allow for 
more rapid changes to be made in the functional software and/or training data before deriving 
PCA models. Furthermore, it may not be possible to trace any resulting safety goal violations 
back to systematic flaws in the training data, as it could be a problem in the PCA model itself, 
unless this is also verified; even then, further testing would be required to specifically identify 
the region of training data responsible for the systematic flaw. It is possible that the 
development effort required to define and create the data/system testing environment yields a 
situation similar to what the benchmark method would yield, driving up cost for the PCA 





6-1.1.4 – PCA Model Derivation: Unmonitored Signal Produces Significant 
Adverse Effect 
 
Reducing the number of functional software signals to monitor in the PCA safety software 
module is a key way in which computational resources, storage requirements, and initial 
development effort can be reduced, especially when considering the trend of increasing 
functional software complexity. Similarly, it will need to be verified that excluding certain 
signals will not lead to a point where the PCA models are not representative enough such that 
the T2 estimated torque error is too inaccurate, as that could mean reduced reliability of 
availability, or worse, a missed fault. Testing in Chapter 5 showed that the linear PCA safety 
monitor is sensitive to non-linear data, leading to the conception of the Local PCA concept 
and automated subdivision process. If a signal in the functional software component is left 
unmonitored, an unmodelled non-linearity could easily cause the T2 torque error estimate to 
be inaccurate. Therefore, it would need to be verified that such non-linearities do not exist or 
can only exist within a constrained magnitude.  
 
Possible Solution: This concern is congruent to simplifying the safety software model in the 
benchmark safety monitoring concept, with the adverse effect essentially being increased 
torque error under normal conditions due to an unmodelled noise factor. Therefore, established 
methods such as P-diagrams could be used to examine the effect of each of the noise factors, 
to determine which should and shouldn’t be included in the safety software.  
 
6-1.1.5 – PCA Model Derivation: Unknown State Dynamics in Functional 
Software Component 
 
Testing in Chapter 5 showed that the PCA safety monitor is sensitive to temporal state 
dynamics that may exist in the functional software component being monitored. A PCA 
module could be set up in such a way that those dynamics are accounted for, effectively 
removing the burden on PCA to monitor time-dynamic behaviour. Such modelling requires 
expert knowledge by the engineer, and the safety software component would need to be 
verified as per the current benchmark. However, it must be verified that all temporal functions 
of the functional software are compensated for, such that the resulting PCA models are able to 
produce an accurate estimate of torque error through T2 at all times.  
 
Possible Solution: With a fully comprehensive data collection routine, it is expected that such 




training data does not capture any such unknown dynamics, at worst the resulting PCA module 
will flag a false positive and reduce availability to the driver. If the training data does capture 
such unknown dynamics, a significant normal variation will manifest itself as part of the T2 
test and should be easily identifiable, after which the engineer will be able to take measures to 
analyse the source of the normal variation, persisting until the dynamic is accounted for. 
 
6-1.1.6 – PCA Model Derivation: Validity of T2 Normalisation method 
 
The step which maps T2 values (after output signal offsetting and normal baseline offsetting) 
measures the average T2 output in each cell for a known fault magnitude f. T2 is normalised by 
dividing by this average, and then multiplying by f to produce the T2 scalar, ck. The concern 
stems from choosing which f to use in this step, and whether this method is sensitive to the 
selection of f during the cell subdivision process, as a poor choice of f could lead to sub-optimal 
cell selection. 
 
Solution: A brief test was actually conducted during the development of the PCA concept to 
test whether choice of f impacts the way the subdivisions are decided during the automated 
subdivision process of the PCA module. It was expected that if f did affect cell performance, 
then two different choices of f would result in different subdivision cell boundaries being 
drawn. A comprehensive set of data was not yet used at this point of the investigation. Three 
inputs (accelerator pedal position, vehicle speed, and actuator temperature) were subdivided 
using 100 Nm and 50 Nm for f. The subdivisions on the input spaces are examined and 










Figure 6-1: Three-dimensional input dataspace with training data (blue) and subdivision 
cells for 100 Nm f  (left) and 50 Nm f (right).   
 
Figure 6-1 shows the 3D input space subdivisions for both choices of f, and the training data 
used. It was confirmed that the exact same subdivisions had been made irrespective of fault 
magnitude – provided the fault magnitude stays constant throughout the data. This finding was 
pivotal in enabling the justification of using the T2 normalisation method, as this indicated that 
choice of f was arbitrary, and therefore valid for finding the T2 scalar, ck. For full assurance, 
this could be retested with a comprehensive set of data across the whole input space.  
 
6-1.2 - Adaptive Safety Monitor Validation &Verification Concerns 
 
The adaptive safety monitor, being an adaptive version of the continuous torque demand 
monitor, faces most of the same validation and verification challenges as the benchmark 
system with regards to the overall structure of the fault detection and reaction mechanisms. 
The focus of this section is the adaptive module, and its interactions with the simplified safety 
software model.  
 
6-1.2.1 – Adaptive Module Parameters: Validating Maximum Adaption Rate 
Limit 
 
The maximum adaption rate limit is a very important tuning parameter of the concept, which 
is calculated using the sum of the maximum adaption rate limits for both long-term and short-
term calculations. On the one hand, if the maximum adaption rate limit is set too high, the 




a hazardous fault is deemed acceptable and dismissed. On the other hand, the adaption rate 
could be set too low, which means it begins to behave more like the continuous torque demand 
monitor, losing the adaption ability; depending on how the safety model had been simplified, 
this could lead to an increase in torque error due to noise factors, reducing reliability through 
unnecessarily limiting availability to the driver. Ideally, the maximum adaption rate limit is 
set to the most one can expect the driver to adapt to, but a safety margin could be given such 
that a slightly lower maximum adaption rate limit is chosen; this is to ensure that the adaptive 
safety monitor doesn’t adapt too quickly and miss a fault, as it is preferable to instead lose 
some robustness of availability for the sake of safety.  
 
Possible Solution: It is important to determine how quickly the driver is able to adapt to such 
torque errors, a straightforward task in principle, but once the variation of driver ability is 
considered, finding that answer is not simple as each and every driver has a different ability, 
often with various abilities in different situations. The controllability parameter in ISO 26262 
Part 3 is evaluated on “the probability that the driver … [is] able to gain sufficient control of 
the hazardous event, such that they are able to avoid the specific harm.” [27]. While this refers 
to determining the controllability of the hazard, it could be argued this statement indicates that 
some level of driver ability is assumed, and that the driver is given some responsibility for 
interacting with the system to comply with the safety goals. Indeed, ISO 26262 Part 3-8.4.2.6 
supports this by supplying guidelines for specifying the necessary actions of the driver in order 
to comply with the safety goals. One could argue, then, that there can be an assumption on the 
driver ability. NOTE 1 of Clause 3-8.4.2.6 b) suggests a driver task analysis could be helpful 
in determining driver behaviour, such as the prevention of surprise/panic/shock, which could 
currently be the best approach to validate the maximum adaption rate limit – and other adaptive 
module parameters such as driver delay and offset limit – that is used.  
 
6-1.2.2 – Adaptive Module Parameters: Verifying Parameters across Operating 
Range 
 
Chapter 4 showed that the adaptive safety monitor parameters could be optimised for a specific 
use case, but it is likely that the parameters result in the ‘best compromise’; it could be that the 
chosen set of parameters perform very well in one area, but not very well in all areas. At worst, 
this could mean the performance is really no different than that of the benchmark, meaning the 
adaptive capability is eliminated and a more complex safety software is required to ensure the 





Possible Solution: To address the issue of parameter verification across the entire operating 
range, an automated software-based Monte-Carlo simulation with a representative set of 
scenarios created through design of experiments could be conducted to ensure that the chosen 
set of parameters meet the functional suitability requirements [132, 133]. It is likely, though, 
that some robustness of availability is sacrificed in order that the chosen parameters can 
achieve safety throughout the whole operating range. Therefore, a possible solution for 
improving robustness of availability while still maintaining safety is to subdivide the operating 
range, such that the parameters need only be verified for a subset of the operating range; 
multiple sets of parameters could then be stored and interpolated between as the operating 
conditions change, for example if the driver selects a different drive mode. Maximum rate 
limits, sampling time windows, and driver delay parameters are all easily changed on the go, 
but the total offset limits are not as straightforward to interpolate between subdivisions, and 
could simply not be included in the parameter scheduling process. Of course, this increases 
the storage requirement of the adaptive module somewhat, depending on the subdivisions 
created; investigation of such an operating range subdividing and parameter scheduling 
concept forms much of the future work for this concept. 
 
6-1.2.3 – Safety Software Simplifications 
 
The simplifications made in the safety software of the adaptive safety monitor concept can 
affect the ability of the adaptive safety monitor to detect faults. The core reasoning that enables 
the adaptive safety monitor to work is the idea that the driver is able to adapt to slow moving 
torque errors. If the nominal torque error produced by the simplified safety software is 
propagates quickly and significantly, the adaptive safety monitor will not adapt to it fast 
enough (as per the max adaption rate limit) and will result in some offset torque error. Should 
the source of such nominal torque error be a fault or malfunction, then that is the right course 
of action by the adaptive safety monitor. However, if such fast and significant nominal torque 
error occurs due to noise factors, this could lead to false positives. 
 
Moreover, consider a situation where some noise factor produces a nominal torque error of 50 
Nm, to which the adaptive safety monitor has adapted to. Should it suddenly ‘switch off’ (i.e. 
suddenly produce a nominal torque error of 0 Nm) the adaptive safety monitor will produce a 
-50 Nm offset torque error, as that is the relative change. However, if there immediately 
follows a fault of 125 Nm (to an error threshold of 100 Nm, for example) the offset torque 
error from the adaptive module would be 75 Nm. This could potentially be a missed fault, as 
initially the nominal torque error was produced due to unmodelled functional software 




vehicle behaviour. By switching to a new drive mode, the driver could expect a -50 Nm change 
in torque, but instead receives 125 Nm more than the driver expects from the new mode, but 
only a 75 Nm increase when compared to the baseline from the previous mode 
 
The problem here could highlight a potential shortcoming of the adaptive module when trying 
to mimic the driver behavioural model: the adaptive module itself is a reactive system, 
responding to historical behaviour from the nominal torque error output, whereas the driver 
also has a feedforward element; consider that the driver may anticipate a change in the 
functional software before it happens (e.g. manually selecting a different drive mode) in a way 
that the adaptive safety monitor could only adapt to after the change takes place and resulting 
torque error changes.  
 
Possible Solution: To overcome this, though, the function could just be included into the 
safety software, at the expense of simplicity, such that the nominal torque error is not 
introduced in the first place. One point to note is that switching between modes while driving 
is typically achieved through torque blending for drivability and safety, so for the majority of 
cases no changes need to be made. However, there could be a need to verify that such 
behaviour is not present in the simplified safety model. Therefore, extra care must be taken 
when developing the simplified safety model to ensure certain switching modes - or any other 
noise factors - do not cause a large sudden change in the nominal torque error. As it’s a 
software-based function, an automated full factorial and/or Monte Carlo approach could be 
conducted with a systematic test schedule [132, 134, 135]. 
 
6-2 – Concept Evaluation and Scoring 
 
PCA and the adaptive safety monitor have been shown in the preceding sections as viable 
safety monitoring concepts. The experience of developing and implementing each concept has 
identified the strengths and weaknesses of both PCA and the adaptive safety monitor concepts 
when compared to the continuous torque demand monitor. The ideal monitoring attributes can 
therefore be revisited and scores adjusted based on these experiences.  
 
6-2.1 – Post-Investigation Scores 
 
In the literature review (Chapter 2), four safety concepts were identified. Chapter 3 used expert 
knowledge from Jaguar Land Rover, considerations from ISO 26262 [26], and principles of 




individual weightings. The concepts were then scored based on the anticipated experience of 
investigation to identify PCA safety monitor and the adaptive safety monitor as the concepts 
with the highest potential of success, excluding the other candidates with little promise.  
 
Following the development and testing investigations of both candidate concepts, considering 
the validation and verification considerations, and with input from experts at Jaguar Land 
Rover during development, the concepts have been rescored based on research findings. The 
final ideal attribute score for each concept is shown in Table 6-2, with the previous, pre-
investigation scores in parentheses. 
 
Table 6-2: Post-investigation attribute scores of PCA safety monitor and the adaptive 
safety monitor; pre-investigation attribute scores in parentheses. 
 
6-2.2 – Discussion 
 
This section will discuss the justification for each attribute score of both concepts, before a 
final recommendation is made. 
 
6-2.2.1 – Functional Suitability 
 
6-2.2.1.1 – PCA Safety Monitor 
 
For time-invariant non-linear systems, the subdivision PCA is shown to detect faults as they 
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to both direction and magnitude, which are important for fault classification and an appropriate 
and correct fault reaction. While there is some small variation under both normal and faulty 
conditions due to modelling errors, with further refinement of subdivisions it is believed noise 
under normal conditions can be reduced further using other subdivision techniques. 
 
The biggest counter to the PCA safety monitor with regards to Functional Suitability, however, 
is the ability to handle time-variant dynamic behaviour within the system. The current system 
deals very well with static behaviour, in the sense that certain inputs will give certain outputs 
every time, but if the output is a function of both the current and previous inputs, then without 
knowledge of that behaviour PCA is shown to be ineffective in the current form. Some 
remedies were proposed, but more development would be required to understand how these 
problems could be overcome for different applications.  
 
Another important consideration is that PCA may only be valid on a MISO system. Since there 
is only a single T2 value that determines the current error of the system, and the fact that the 
subdivisions are only made on input variables, systems with multiple output variables that 
need to be monitored may not work with the subdivision PCA method. This will mostly be 
because interpreting a single T2 value to describe two or more outputs errors will not enable 
accurate information to be obtained, since the single T2 value may not be able to distinguish 
between an error on one output versus the other.  Additionally, the necessity of offsetting the 
output data in the data space to provide information on fault direction may not be as effective, 
since the data would need to be offset in two axes. A MIMO system would likely require 
multiple PCA models, where the same inputs variables are used, but with one output signal 
per PCA module, and the multiple T2 values interpreted somehow.  
 
In the end, the PCA safety monitor is functionally suitable under certain conditions, such as 
simplifying complex yet non-temporal functions. More work is needed to overcome problems 
associated with temporal dynamics. 
 
6-2.2.1.2 – Adaptive Safety Monitor 
 
As the adaptive safety monitor is an adaptive version of the current continuous torque demand 
monitor, many of the strengths of functional suitability are carried over. With the reasoning 
explained in Chapter 4, and the tests demonstrating the effectiveness, the adaptive safety 
monitor holds real promise as a functionally suitable concept. By nature, sudden and 




the continuous torque demand monitor, as in these times it behaves just as the conventional 
variant would.   
Accuracy is often improved; as was shown in the experiments, noise factors can yield a torque 
error that is offset from the true error. In these instances, and depending on the nature of those 
torque errors, the adaptive safety monitor can provide a more accurate torque error estimation 
than the continuous torque demand monitor could.  
 
6-2.2.2 – Reliability 
 
6-2.2.2.1 – PCA Safety Monitor 
 
A motivation behind the subdivision PCA concept was to improve robustness in identifying a 
fault using the T2 statistic. Using a single PCA model on a non-linear dataset caused significant 
variation (noise) to occur in T2 under normal conditions, such that there was little improvement 
over simply using the raw torque output since faulty T2 in one area would overlap with normal 
variation in another. Noise reduces the reliability of the concept, as a true safe condition 
calculated with noise may yield a false positive. 
 
With the introduction of the subdivision PCA, however, it was shown that variation in both 
normal and faulty T2 could be made to be more easily discernible by reducing variation within 
each subdivision cell. The PCA models were able to reduce noise to the point that the T2 values 
were considered sufficiently low for non-linear time-invariant systems. Still, some noise on 
the T2 output exists which; further subdivision refinements could be conducted, motivated 
through attempting to reduce this noise. The criteria for normal variation could even be varied 
across the data space according to the derived technical safety requirements. For example, a 
25 Nm fault at low-speed low pedal position could be an unsafe condition, whereas even a 50 
Nm fault could be tolerable at high speed in sixth gear, and would not need as high robustness, 
meaning normal data could be tolerated to vary more. 
 
Unfortunately, testing on time-variant dynamic plants showed that the training data came to 
resemble more of a cloud of training data, as opposed to the surface seen previously. This 
causes a greater amount of variation in each cell, and in turn causes large variation in normal 
and fault T2, such that they again overlap by significant amounts, and mean that faults cannot 
reliably be identified: in fact, typical faults aren’t at all identifiable, with the exception only of 







6-2.2.2.2 – Adaptive Safety Monitor 
 
The main strength of the adaptive safety monitor, and indeed the motivation behind the 
concept, is to improve the reliability of the safety software concept when its safety software 
model is simplified. The increased torque error from the uncompensated noise factors in 
simplifying the safety software is offset by the adaptive safety monitor, leading to more 
availability for the driver as slow propagating or constant torque errors are deemed safe for 
the driver, and are therefore adapted to, correcting the minimum headroom. This was shown 
through the tests conducted in Chapter 4, with most of the false positives were compensated 
for in a way that would prevent a fault reaction.   
 
Equally, if a fault in the system occurs slowly, or is reasonably small, the adaptive safety 
monitor will compensate for this such that a second small fault that occurs later in the drive 
cycle would not unnecessarily reduce availability to the driver, as the driver would have 
already adapted to the first fault.  
 
In a couple of instances during the creep control simulations, the torque error changed faster 
than the adaptive safety monitor was allowed to adapt to it, typically on uphill or downhill 
sections where brake torque or driving torques are generally greater to overcome gradients. 
The adaptive safety monitor still represented a significant improvement of reliability over the 
conventional monitor in this aspect, but the safety engineer would still need to be mindful of 
where these torque errors originate from as before, and could still be required to compensate 
or account for the noise factors causing them, where possible.   
 
6-2.2.3 – Verifiability  
 
6-2.2.3.1 – PCA Safety Monitor 
 
ISO 26262 requires that the safety software can be proven to comply with the standard, 
meaning that the software will maintain safety throughout the lifetime of the vehicle. 
Subdivision PCA consists of many steps in deriving the PCA models due to subdivisions and 
optimisations, but once the set of models have been created they would not change. A number 
of verification concerns exist with the subdivision PCA method, as discussed earlier in this 






The training data used to derive and test the PCA models needs to be validated and verified, 
as errant data will lead to poor models. Additionally, the validity of the data collection method 
itself needs to be ensured, so that the data is representative of the system being modelled, such 
that functionally suitable PCA models are derived. With the recent publication of the Data 
Safety Guidance [131], a framework has been provided to address these concerns about data 
safety through a Data Safety Management Process to identify, analyse, and treat risks 
associated with data, and give useful techniques for risk mitigation strategies.  
 
Even with good data, the PCA models need to be verified to make sure they are functionally 
suitable. The T2 testing process can be used to comprehensively test the nominal performance 
of the PCA models, with high relative normal T2 variation tending to indicate poor matching 
of the training data, when no real fault is present; this can be automated as part of a design of 
experiments or Monte Carlo systematic testing strategy, with the use of P-diagrams to identify 
noise factors in the system. Concerns relating to model fidelity are addressed this way, and 
could indicate whether certain signals need to be included in the PCA model. However, 
concerns regarding the verification of absence of systematic hazards is of a higher concern, as 
it may be possible that such hazards would be hidden in the training data itself. Any additional 
software needed to package the PCA model needs to be verified too, and while this is expected 
to be a familiar exercise, it could negate the benefits that this concept brings. 
 
A predicted issue with using the subdivided PCA method was that Part 4 Section 7.4.3.6 of 
ISO 26262 states: ‘…a decision not to re-use well-trusted design principles should be justified’ 
[29]. Addressing these verification concerns to a satisfactory degree could be the justification 
needed to satisfy this clause for higher ASIL-rated applications. 
 
6-2.2.3.2 – Adaptive Safety Monitor 
 
With the adaptive safety monitor being an adaptive version of the continuous torque demand 
monitor, the verification techniques used to verify the simplified safety model would – in 
general – remain the same. In fact, the burden of verification is likely to be lessened 
considerably, depending on the amount of simplification made to the safety software model 
versus the benchmark. This is due to less software components being included in the safety 
model, and less signals that need to be verified to be correct.  
 
With the introduction of the adaptive element to the software, new verification efforts are 
needed to both validate the concept approach, and to verify that the concept will meet the 




monitoring concept relates to validation of the adaption rate of the concept, to ensure it is 
representative of the human driver; this concern can be addressed with a driver task analysis 
(suggested by ISO 26262 [27]) to quantify the boundaries of adaption rate of a driver, and to 
choose the expected driver adaption rate baseline relative to the ASIL of the safety goal. 
Secondly, verification of the other adaptive parameter values needs to be conducted due to the 
concern that reliability performance may be better in certain operating ranges than in others. 
This could be remedied with a parameter scheduling concept, whereby the full operating range 
is subdivided into cells, each with its own parameters that perform best within that cell’s 
operating range; derivation of these cells and parameters is expected to be automated, as is the 
verification of the parameters within these ranges, through a Monte-Carlo simulation. Finally, 
the verification of the simplified safety software – when coupled with the adaptive module – 
is a concern, as sudden changes in nominal torque error under normal operating conditions 
could cause the adaptive safety monitor to be vulnerable to false positives or missed faults. 
The solution to this could be some software-based full factorial and/or Monte Carlo approach 
to see if any such behaviour is present, and account for this behaviour in simplified safety 
software at the cost of complexity [135]. 
 
In general, it is expected that the adaptive safety monitor concept is verifiable, with each of 
the verifiability concerns addressed with a possible course of action, being just short of a 
perfect score due to the novel work that is needed to validate and verify.   
 
6-2.2.4 – Compatibility 
 
6-2.2.4.1 – PCA Safety Monitor 
 
It is believed that if PCA is indeed a functionally suitable, verifiable, and reliable fault 
detection concept, then it can be incorporated into an existing torque structure with a few small 
changes. A fault monitor basically calculates an expected torque demand using the same inputs 
as the functional software, then compares the expected torque demand to what is actually being 
demanded, flagging a fault if there is an issue. The difference with the PCA in the current form 
is that the module output is not expected torque, but a T2 estimation of torque error based on 
the inputs and outputs of the functional software. Ultimately, however, the PCA T2 fault 
detection function is essentially a lookup table and some straightforward mathematical 
operations to obtain an output value.  
 
Compatibility becomes less clear when multiple sets of PCA models are needed for a defined 




arrangement which may be required for discrete signals such as selectable drive modes. The 
architecture becomes more complex and dissimilar to the safety software module it would 
replace, but as long as the inputs and outputs remain the same it should not be considered as 
less desirable.  
 
Another aspect of compatibility, however, is how deriving the PCA models is substantially 
different to the development process of the current safety software. Engineers would need to 
be trained on how to develop the PCA correctly, including training data gathering, setting up 
the test and derivation environment, and integrating it within the torque structure, and the 
verification of the modules derived. It should be noted that much of the PCA derivation and 
optimisation work could be automated. 
 
6-2.2.4.2 – Adaptive Safety Monitor 
 
The adaptive safety monitor is, as stated, an adaptive version of the continuous torque demand 
monitor, with an adaptive module in the safety software. The strengths that the adaptive safety 
monitor has over the conventional method are accounting for the fact that the safety software 
model can be simplified. First, this potentially reduces the hardware and computational 
requirements, so less additional resources would be required to run the safety software. 
Secondly, since less needs to be compensated for due to the simplified safety model, there is 
potential for coexistence with further independence from QM-rated functional software. 
Thirdly, the new concept can quite simply replace the continuous torque demand monitor with 
little-to-no architectural changes to the way data is handled, other than changes relating to 
which signals are needed for the simplified safety software model.  
 
However, one change in the process the safety engineer follows to derive the simplified safety 
model is perhaps deciding which signals can be left for the adaptive safety monitor to 
compensate and which ones still need an explicit signal from the functional software. 
Understanding the adaptive nature of the safety monitor may require some additional training 
for engineers seeking to implement the adaptive module into the safety software.   
 
6-2.2.5 – Hardware and Computational Requirement 
 
6-2.2.5.1 – PCA Safety Monitor 
 
PCA is excellent at describing large amounts of data with just a few matrices. Linear models 




of data points. With non-linear data sets, however, multiple PCA models are needed to 
describe the dataset, which – while still vastly more efficient than storing the raw data – can 
significantly increase the storage requirements. This is related to the number of measured 
variables in the PCA module, as it was derived that both the storage of PCA module-related 
data, and number of computations required per timestep, had a second-order relationship with 
the number of measured variables. Significant improvements were made by pre-multiplying 
the eigenvector and inverse-eigenvalue matrices V and Ʌ−𝟏, but despite these improvements 
the storage requirement is nevertheless still an inhibiting factor with Subdivision PCA, due to 
the number of models needed for accurate operation. For this reason, this attribute score 
dropped significantly following the investigation.  
 
6-2.2.5.2 – Adaptive Safety Monitor 
 
In general, it is expected that an adaptive safety monitor with a simplified safety software 
model is expected to have a lower data storage and computational requirement than the 
continuous torque demand monitor with a typical safety software model. Naturally, this is due 
to – and depends on – the reduced number of components that are needed to calculate the 
nominal torque error, but the possible reduction is difficult to quantify. 
 
However, the added adaptive module adds a small amount to the storage and computational 
requirements. The length of the long-term and short-term sampling windows add to the 
memory requirement, as a moving average for both long-term and short-term error offsets are 
calculated using the most recent values for nominal torque error. Not accounting for the driver 
delay function and other rules relating to rate limits, the base functionality of the adaptive 
safety monitor requires additional summation, multiplication, and storage of previous 
variables as follows: 
 
 𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚 = 𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 + 𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 2 (6-1) 
 𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡 = 2 (6-2) 
 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 + 𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 (6-3) 
 
where nlong is the number of previous values of the nominal torque error needed, and nshort the 
number of long-term torque error values needed to calculate the short-term error offset. For a 
100 Hz operating frequency (a timestep of 0.01 s), the ideal nshort from the Chapter 4 
optimisation exercise would be 10, and the nlong ideal of 26.3 s would be 2630. Unlike PCA, 




scale exponentially as these values are increased, as in general only the torque error is 
monitored. Possible future concepts that include parameter scheduling could use other ASIL-
rated signals to aid in the calculation, increasing the computational requirement to some extent, 
but much of this computational requirement is offset, by the simpler safety model that can be 
used.  
 
6-2.2.6 – Initial Design Effort 
 
6-2.2.6.1 – PCA Safety Monitor 
 
Reducing the initial design effort was a key driver to investigating PCA as a potential safety 
monitor, as the method would not need to have detailed expert knowledge of the system to 
derive PCA models, just the data. In reality, initial design effort is difficult to quantify given 
the novelty of this concept. Much of initial design work consists of defining the functional 
software scope within which the PCA module would be applied, which signals are necessary 
to capture for training, and how the PCA architecture would need to be designed. Also, initial 
design cost would include any additional modelling that could be required where PCA couldn’t 
be used, such as in time-variant systems. The verification of the derived PCA module(s) would 
also need to be undertaken.  
 
However, given that this is a software environment, and the fact that many of the development 
processes could be automated, once the expert design setup has taken place and the code 
environment for automated processes defined, there would not be much effort left other than 
verification, which itself could be automated to some extent. In fact, once the initial design of 
the automated environment had been completed it could be used for future PCA module 
developments, perhaps with some minor tweaks; in addition, lessons learnt through design 
setup can be carried forwards to future developments to decrease future design costs. There 
are three points for consideration:  
 
1. If there is a small change in the functional software, PCA would likely only need to 
be retrained on new training data, which can be automated and therefore would not 
require much effort. If a substantial change takes place in functional software that 
requires a redesign of the safety software, however, expert design setup would again 
be required; it should be kept in mind, though, that the current system does require 
expert design for any change in functional software.  
2. The second point is whether onboard vehicle testing is required for training data 




expensive undertaking, especially if changes in functional software are continuously 
being made during development.  
3. The cost of verifying training data is not currently known, and likely has many 
variables affecting the effort required by the manufacturer.  
 
6-2.2.6.2 – Adaptive Safety Monitor 
 
By enabling a simpler safety model to be used, the adaptive safety monitor concept reduces 
the initial effort of design required by the manufacturer in this area. The simplified safety 
model is, however, still architecturally the same as the benchmark model and not 
fundamentally different (such as the PCA concept). As such, the simplified safety model lends 
itself to some of the same fundamental drawbacks faced by the current benchmark, but at a 
reduced magnitude. A source of additional initial design effort with the adaptive safety monitor 
over the benchmark is that more analysis may be required to know which software components 
that are left unaccounted for may affect the adaptive safety monitor negatively, as a somewhat 
large and fast change in the nominal torque error could negatively impact performance. The 
adaptive module itself, however, is easily transferrable and can be automatically calibrated for 
a given set of functional software and safety model through a systematic design of 
experiments.  
 
It is expected that development would become an iterative process of starting with an initial 
safety model, optimising the adaptive safety monitor for it and testing it. Then, the necessary 
additional functional software components would be included into the safety model, the 
adaptive module re-calibrated, and the concept tested again; this cycle is repeated until 
satisfactory results are achieved. The iterative process is similar to that of the benchmark, with 
the small added effort of including the adaptive safety monitor, but with less components that 
need including in the safety model. 
 
6-2.2.7 – Simplicity 
 
6-2.2.7.1 – PCA Safety Monitor 
 
There are many steps necessary to derive the PCA models during the initial design stage, and 
the investigation shows that some expert understanding of the PCA process will be required 
to perform the initial setup. PCA can quickly become quite an abstract method, particularly 
with regards to multiple-dimensionality of the eigenvectors, which in theory could be n-




automated. The most complex aspect of this concept is the expert setup design, choosing which 
signals are necessary for the PCA to be trained on, and modelling and verifying non-PCA 
components that may be required within the scope, the last of which is necessary for the current 
safety software design to a greater extent.  
 
Once the PCA models have been derived in the initial design with the corresponding 
boundaries, T2 scalars and average normal offsets for each cell, the online process is a fairly 
simple one, since it is essentially a lookup table to find the correct PCA model given the current 
operating point, multiplying it by the current data sample, subtracting a stored number, and 
multiplying by stored scalar.  
 
6-2.2.7.2 – Adaptive Safety Monitor 
 
The adaptive safety monitor directly addresses the safety software complexity problem by 
enabling a simpler safety model to be used, with just the addition of a single module within 
the safety software. The solution is elegant, easy to understand by current engineers, and does 
not require a major change in the way the safety software is developed. Once the reasoning is 
understood, the adaptive safety monitor is intuitive, and uses familiar terms and units unlike 
the level of abstraction introduced through the PCA safety monitor.   
 
The adaptive safety monitor falls short of a perfect score, however, as some extra thought does 
need to be given as to which software components can be left out in the simpler safety software 
model. Additionally, the automated optimisation of the adaptive parameters require some 
expert knowledge of the system in order to set up the design of experiments programme 
properly. Overall, the creation of safety software package as a whole is understood to be a 
simpler task with the simpler safety model and adaptive safety monitor than the current 
benchmark demands. 
 
6-2.2.8 – Modifiability 
 
6-2.2.8.1 – PCA Safety Monitor 
 
If a PCA module needs to be modified, be it for a change in functional software or for 
application in a new powertrain, it is theorised that there would be four levels of modification; 





1) Partial Retrain: this would be the case where a distinct and containable part of the 
functional software was changed, for example a change in just the sand-based 
selectable drive mode pedal map. Since a change here would not affect the pedal maps 
in other selectable drive modes, only the PCA subdivision models that are affected 
here need to be retrained on new data. Depending on the architecture of the online 
PCA module, however, a full reverification may be required. Verification would only 
be necessary on the part of the PCA that was changed. 
 
2) Full Retrain: same as above, but where parameters are changed in the functional 
software that affect the whole operation for a PCA module. Reverification will likely 
be required for that PCA model.  
 
3) Partial Redesign: where a component within the safety software scope needs to be 
changed and re-verified that doesn’t also require retraining of a PCA module; typically 
this would be a module that accepts the PCA output as an input, whose output does 
not affect PCA operation. Verification would only be needed on the part that was 
changed, and not of the PCA module itself. 
 
4) Full Redesign: where a non-PCA component inside the scope has been changed, 
which would affect the training data and would thus also require reanalysis of PCA 
module signals, any required changes to non-PCA components, and naturally a full 
retrain of any PCA modules. The whole safety software scope would need to be 
rederived and reverified. 
 
The main assumption here is that the majority of PCA retraining would be automated in a 
software environment, making retraining straightforward and inexpensive. Otherwise, any 
retraining would be difficult, and would likely make Partial Redesign the least effortful 
modification task. Transferring the module between powertrains could be possible, if the same 
architectural design is used, requiring only retraining of the PCA module and possibly some 
parameter changes in non-PCA components.  
 
6-2.2.8.2 – Adaptive Safety Monitor 
 
Modification of the adaptive safety monitor takes place in the two major components: the 
simplified safety model and the adaptive module. The simplified safety model is expected to 
contain less components in the first place, so a change at the functional level is less likely to 




accounted for in the safety model is changed, however, the modification process in the safety 
model will be largely the same as the benchmark, though it is possible that such modification 
is less effortful as the number of interdependencies that could require reverification is less in 
the simpler safety software. The impact of all changes on the ability of the adaptive safety 
monitor to appropriately adapt to them would need to be assessed, however, so some 
reverification and re-tuning of the adaptive module would possibly be required with each 
change. A modification to a component in the functional software that is not accounted for in 
the simpler safety model could change the nature of the torque error under normal conditions 
in a way that the adaptive safety monitor cannot reliably handle, requiring that component to 
be included in the simplified safety model, making it slightly more complex. On the other 
hand, such a change could require no modification of the safety software, as the adaptive safety 
monitor would be able to account for it, significantly reducing the effort required when 
modifying the functional software, though general re-verification may still be required. 
 
Modifications to the adaptive module, on the other hand, are currently just a matter of tuning 
the parameters, which has been shown can be automated. Changes to the driver-delay function 
rules, and any other such components in the adaptive module, would need more careful 
consideration when modifying, but testing and verification would be carried out in the same 
way unless major changes are made.  
 
6-2.2.9 – Commercial Feasibility 
 
6-2.2.9.1 – PCA Safety Monitor 
 
PCA has shown a lot of promise as a fault detection concept in an automotive application, with 
the lure of automated model derivation and lessened expert knowledge requirement. It appears, 
however, that the PCA in its most basic form cannot handle non-linear systems, and while 
Subdivision PCA solves this shortcoming, it consequently now requires significantly more 
storage capacity, and some additional processing power. Despite overcoming the issue of non-
linear data handling, time-dynamics has shown to cause large variance in normal T2 torque 
error estimation, leading to faults are not reliably identifiable. In order to get Subdivision PCA 
to work, much architectural work is needed to the point that initial design effort becomes too 
great, and becomes more complex. While it is expected that Subdivision PCA can be verified 
with some more work, and that it could in fact be automated to reduce costs, it is ultimately 
the storage requirement that makes Subdivision PCA infeasible in a commercial application 






6-2.2.9.2 – Adaptive Safety Monitor 
 
The adaptive safety monitor sets out to address the problem of safety software complexity by 
directly enabling the use of a simplified safety model through the reframing of the term 
‘unexpected’ for the driver. The concept behaves almost identically to the benchmark when 
fast and significant faults are experienced, but crucially adds reliability of availability to the 
driver when slow, and less-hazardous faults propagate. In doing so, an adaptive safety monitor 
is more tolerant to the use of a simplified safety model, provided it is simplified in the right 
way.  
 
The adaptive safety monitor is, however, very compatible with the current benchmark, as it 
simply adds a tuneable adaptive module to the nominal torque error of the benchmark concept. 
The hardware requirement is lessened somewhat by the simplified safety model, though 
attention should be paid to the storage and computational requirements of the adaptive module, 
even though they are expected to be have a net reduction over the benchmark and would scale 
well. The initial design effort is lessened with a simpler safety model and the possibility of 
automated calibration of the adaptive safety monitor. Modifying the functional software 
should be less effortful in general, but the efforts required could be larger than expected if 
certain components are changed that require them to be included in the safety model; this is 
not unique to the adaptive safety monitor, but with less functional software components 
included in the simplified safety model than in the benchmark, it is more likely to occur. 
Finally, the adaptive safety monitor provides some level of evolution as it can adapt to changes 
in the powertrain over time. More active evolution of the adaptive module parameters 
themselves presents a difficult verification problem. Overall, the adaptive safety monitor 
provides a positive case for commercial feasibility.   
 
6-2.2.10 – Evolvable 
 
6-2.2.10.1 – PCA Safety Monitor 
 
The PCA concept is not evolvable currently, because the PCA models are trained offline and 
the calculated models stored on the vehicle. In order for the PCA models to evolve, they would 
need to be retrained online. Retraining would require again testing a range of different 
subdivision combinations, each time performing calculating the offset bk and T
2 Scalar for each 
cell and verifying the subdivisions within a testing environment. The demand on the ECU in 




hardware could make online evolution possible. The main question remains as to whether 
online PCA evolution is verifiable, as the current verification method requires known fault 
data to compare and be discernible from known normal data. 
 
6-2.2.10.2 – Adaptive Safety Monitor 
 
As the vehicle ages, the performance of the vehicle may not match that of the functional 
software. Depending on the functional safety concept, and the assumptions made in the safety 
model (for simplicity) could lead to a great amount of nominal torque error produced under 
non-malfunction conditions; this could be due to sensor drift, mechanical wear, increased 
friction losses etc. As such, the reliability – and possibly even the functional suitability – of 
the safety software could be compromised. However, the adaptive safety monitor is able to 
adapt to these very slow-moving changes over time if they result in some sort of an offset.  
 
Active evolution could be realised through dynamically changing the adaptive module 
parameters, such that the adaptive module behaves optimally. Doing so presents an interesting 
yet challenging verification problem, as these changes must always ensure compliance with 
the FSRs and TSRs. This would require significantly more initial design effort, and greater 
computational requirements for active analysis and change. Most significantly, the verification 
effort would be significantly larger as it would be required not only the initial set of adaptive 
module parameters, but all possible states of tune. To include active evolution would require 
significant effort and appropriate constraints but could mean changes to the functional 
software could lead to reduced effort of modification to the safety software. As of now, 
however, the verification challenge is great and is not being considered as feasible.  
 
6-3 – Conclusions 
 
The investigation has shown that the PCA concept, while having many strengths, is not a 
suitable safety concept in the current form. Primarily, the poor functional suitability when 
faced with system dynamics over time diminishes the range of functional software components 
the PCA concept can monitor. Furthermore, the high hardware and computational requirement 
is a great limitation. While Moore’s Law [4] could be cited, the ACEs trends will similarly 
increase software complexity, resulting in an exponentially more complex PCA module. With 
regards to the adaptive safety monitor, however, the scores show the concept provides a 
feasible improvement to the benchmark continuous torque demand monitor, matching or 




verification techniques will be needed due to the adaptive module, though verification effort 
of the simplified safety model will be reduced. It is, however, expected to be the case that as 
software complexity increases further, the total verification effort is expected to be less than 
the continuous torque demand monitor. The investigation concludes with the recommendation 
of further investigation of the adaptive safety monitor as a replacement for the continuous 


































7 – Summary 
 
The original research question is revisited following the completion of the research objectives, 
and an overall conclusion is made. The novel research outcomes are then discussed, before 




7-1 – Overall Conclusion 
 
The prospect of increased software complexity is a concern of modern automotive OEMs. It 
has been brought on by the propagation of the ACEs trends: autonomy, connectivity, and 
electrification. Of the three trends, electrification is the most immediate with EV or electrified 
vehicle already widely available from most major OEMs; autonomy and connected vehicle are 
in development with some degree of each trend already finding itself on the market; they are, 
however, less pressing in the present than electrification. In this context, software complexity 
is problematic for the OEM who is responsible for still meeting the development, verification, 
and implementation requirements as before, but with a much more complex software product.  
 
In light of the concerns that increased software complexity raise for the OEM, novel functional 
safety monitoring software concepts were investigated to answer the following research 
question: 
 
• Could a new approach or method of implementing safety software reduce the cost 
burden on the manufacturer, while still ensuring the safe operation of the functional 
software in vehicle powertrains? 
 
In summary, the answer to the original research question is “yes”. After identifying ideal safety 
monitoring attributes and investigating two novel safety concepts, an adaptive safety monitor 
has shown great promise as a feasible alternative functional safety monitoring concept through 
enabling simpler safety software to be used to meet safety requirements, whilst maintaining 
sufficient reliability. A PCA safety monitor has also shown promise as a method of reducing 
the burden of initial design effort through automated model derivation, perform sufficiently 
within a limited scope.  
 
7-2 – Summary and Discussion of Research Outcomes 
 
7-2.1 – Ideal Safety Monitoring Attributes 
 
The identification of the ideal monitoring attributes was an important step in selecting suitable 
and viable concept candidates for detailed investigation. ISO 26262 is an excellent tool and 
engineering framework, but is broad enough to cover both safety-critical software and 
hardware. That is why ISO 25010 was explored: while functional safety and verifiability are 




in this software quality standard instead. The weightings given to each attribute for scoring 
was chosen through discussion with safety experts at Jaguar Land Rover. It is possible that a 
different application of safety software could look to alter the weightings to be more in line 
with constraints. For example, if a safety monitor is needed for a relatively simple power 
assisted braking – as opposed to a full set of powertrain control functional software – the 
attribute of simple may be more important. Or, for example, a bespoke one-off sports car may 
heavily weight importance to modifiability to aid in setup and calibration, and less importance 
on hardware and computational requirements, because adding a more expensive/capable ECU 
hardware for one car is much more feasible than a mass-market production run. The aim with 
the ideal monitoring attributes was to distil the desirable attributes for safety from ISO 25010 
and ISO 26262, and allow the engineering safety manager to decide which attribute weighting 
best captures their application, and be able to make informed decisions on safety concept 
suitability.  
 
7.2.1.1 – Novel Research Outcomes 
 
• Ideal Safety Monitoring Attributes: This was the first time a set of ideal safety 
monitoring attributes were identified beyond the basic requirements of ISO 26262, 
where additional desirable traits are also considered to this extent. Combining 
elements from both ISO 26262 and ISO 25010, and distilling them into a set of distinct 
attributes that include crossovers from both standards is the novel highlight in this 
chapter. These are: Functional Suitability, Reliability, Verifiability, Compatibility, 
Hardware and Computational Requirement, Initial Design Effort, Simplicity, 
Modifiability, Commercial Feasibility, Evolvable, and Security. 
 
7-2.2 – Principal Component Analysis Safety Monitor 
 
During literature review, a safety concept based on PCA seemed promising. The prospect of 
being able to let the safety software learn for itself the complexities of the functional software 
as opposed to the safety engineer needing to understand, interpret, and design, was desirable 
and novel. The investigation proved successful, with it being successfully applied to a vehicle 
torque structure, and it yielding favourable results in detecting torque errors. The initial 
investigation has shown that using a PCA safety monitor requires a rethink of how to derive 
safety software, as the ecosystem surrounding the PCA concept derivation had to be 
conceived. It was also found that for something as complex as functional software in a torque 
structure, the nonlinearities are such that an exponential number of PCA models would likely 




handful of alternative architectures were also identified, using numerous PCA modules 
arranged in such a way that each set is responsible for a smaller part of the full system. Any 
linear subsystem would benefit from the low storage requirement of a single PCA model, but 
there are still a few limitations that need to be overcome by PCA, primarily, the handling of 
temporal-dynamics. Overall, there are certainly benefits in using PCA as a safety concept in 
vehicle software in certain situations, but its current limitations make it unsuitable for this 
application.  
 
7-2.2.1 – Novel Research Outcomes 
 
These are the set of novel research outcomes relating to the PCA safety monitor: 
 
• Implementation of PCA module as a vehicle software safety monitor: This was 
the first time PCA has been investigated and shown to hold some merit as a real-time 
powertrain control software safety monitor, including compatibility with the existing 
fault reaction mechanism. Despite the current limitations, there is scope that certain 
applications could benefit from this concept, not just a torque structure. It is abstract 
enough that any software where an error is quantifiable, a PCA module may be able 
to monitor the output.  
 
• PCA safety monitor derivation process: A PCA-based safety monitor of any kind 
has not been seen in the automotive sector before. The investigation established a full 
workflow process for producing a PCA module for real-time fault detection 
application, starting with appropriate training data collection, derivation of PCA 
models for a torque structure, refining the models for better performance, 
testing/verification of these models, and implementation into a software monitoring 
application. The whole process has not been seen before in any industry, and indeed, 
many of the smaller elements of the process are believed to be completely novel across 
all industries.  
 
• Output signal offset: This is the first time, as far as the author is aware, that a method 
was applied to extract qualitative information about fault directionality, through the 
simple process of adding a constant offset to the output signal of the plant training 
data – in this case, the torque demand. It also has the added benefit of resulting in a 
more linear mapping of T2 to estimated torque error. While it does not result directly 





• Local PCA Concept: The local PCA concept is a novel method of estimating torque 
error in the functional software based on comparing training data with current software 
states. Similar concepts have been seen before and certainly linearizing a non-linear 
surface is a well-established practice, but has not been seen in the application PCA to 
software monitoring.  Being initially conceived as a solution to modelling nonlinear 
data, local PCA uses known information about the training data to correctly adjust and 
scale the measured T2 signal to produce a reasonable torque error estimation. 
Translating and scaling data is itself not a new method, but combined with using 
known artificially injected faults into the system training data to correctly calibrate the 
T2 scale normalisation is novel, as is the investigation indicating the validity of using 
a single scalar as opposed to having to map the whole.  
 
• Automated Subdivision process: The automated derivation and refinement of Local 
PCA models through subdivision, and the inception of the performance metric e used 
for refinement of PCA models in the automated routine, is a creative way to ease the 
manual calibration effort required by the development engineer in deriving PCA 
models for fault detection. Additionally, the idea of a weighted subdivision for 
improving PCA module performance per model stored is also a creative solution to 
reducing the storage and computational requirement.  
 
7-2.3 – Adaptive Safety Monitor 
 
A new functional safety concept called the adaptive safety monitor was investigated, seeking 
to address the issue of safety software complexity by enabling a simpler safety software model 
to be used with an adaptive element in the safety monitor, overcoming many of the drawbacks 
that would otherwise prevail. The novel thought process behind this concept has led to an 
investigation and development of a viable functional safety concept to ease the development, 
implementation, and verification burden on vehicle manufacturers. It was shown in the 
investigation that the adaptive safety monitor can successfully improve the robustness of a 
less-complex variant of safety software by adapting to slow-propagating torque errors as a 
human would be able to adapt, while still capturing real faults with more accurate 
quantification. It also enables more accurate indication of safety goal violation, as it provides 
a better depiction of what the driver is experiencing at the vehicle level, as opposed to simply 
measuring how the system is behaving or malfunctioning. It was also shown how the adaptive 
safety monitor parameters could be analysed for sensitivity using a design of experiments 




performance. Future research will focus much on this aspect, seeking to derive a similar 
automated calibration process from lessons learnt through the PCA derivation process.  
 
While the adaptive safety monitor is a commercially feasible answer to the software 
complexity problem for powertrain safety software, a possible exception could be in the case 
of autonomous vehicles. The adaptive safety monitor relies on the fact that a driver is still 
driving the vehicle. Though autonomous vehicles are actively being developed, the current 
market is still very much non-autonomous, and as such most cars currently sold and in 
foreseeable future will still require a driver in the loop. The adaptive safety monitor could still 
be used in an autonomous context, but possibly with a calibration suited to the autonomous 
driver. More investigation needs to be taken on this matter, but it can be argued that vehicle 
autonomy will not make the adaptive safety monitor redundant. The added benefits of being 
simpler, less resource intensive, and demanding less initial design effort than the benchmark 
continuous torque demand monitor ensures the viability of the adaptive safety monitor as a 
successful concept candidate in this research into novel safety monitoring concepts. 
 
7-2.3.1 – Novel Research Outcomes 
 
These are the set of novel research outcomes relating to the adaptive safety monitor: 
 
• Adaptive safety monitor reasoning: The reasoning behind the adaptive safety 
monitor is the core of its innovation. By redefining the nature of ‘safety’ by examining 
the word ‘unintended’ (as in ‘prevent unintended acceleration’), and including the 
human driver into the equation, a better-defined understanding of safety can be used 
to justify the possibility of the adaptive safety monitor. Whereas before just the fault 
magnitude was examined, now it can be justified that all slow-propagating faults can 
be adapted to by the driver, and do not cause a threat. If this is permissible, it opens 
the door to making adaptive safety software, that itself can adapt to unmodelled noise 
factors in a less complex safety software model. All of this stems from the innovative 
reasoning that precedes the adaptive safety monitor. 
 
• Two-stage adaptive algorithm: Reasoning aside, the way the adaptive safety monitor 
fundamentally operates is not exactly new, as it is simply a statistical moving average 
being subtracted from the current value. However, the two-stage algorithm that has 
been developed leverages the long-term and short-term memory of the driver in its 
design to better imitate expected driver behaviour, and allow for more tuning options. 




monitor beyond its fundamental diagram, and are essential in achieving the calibration 
to match driver behaviour; indeed, these were developed and tested specifically to that 
end. 
 
• Automated optimisation procedure: The automated optimisation procedure was 
conceived to improve the performance of the adaptive safety monitor. It is a design of 
experiments approach, which itself is not novel, but the performance metric and trend 
analysis conducted to improve adaptive safety monitor performance is the foundation 
for possibly an innovative parameter scheduling derivation process; this will be 
discussed more in Future Research. 
7-3 – Future Research 
 
The investigations in this project were completed insofar as meeting the objectives set out in 
the introduction. Throughout the investigation, it has been alluded to that plans have been 
made for future work. The overall aim of the future research activities is different for the two 
concepts: for the adaptive safety monitor, the aim is to deploy it on a production vehicle, which 
means addressing the verification and validation concerns; for the PCA safety monitor, it is 
continuing the investigation to overcome the limitations of the concept. Verification and 
validation concerns will not be looked at for the PCA safety monitor until the functional 
suitability limitations are overcome. For the sake of brevity, the topics will just be noted here, 
with detail and initial work on these topics found in Appendix C. 
 
For the PCA safety monitor, the following topics are to be investigated in the future: 
 
• Using alternative PCA module architectures to improve performance. 
• Using last eigenvalue for determining T2 scalar ck.  
 
For the adaptive safety monitor, the following topics are to be investigated in the future: 
 
• Using a Driver Task Analysis to validate the driver delay parameter. 
• Development of a systematic test environment to verify the concept. 
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B-1 – Data Collection 
 
At the start of the project, seven sets of vehicle data were collected using a test vehicle at the 
Gaydon Proving Ground in Warwickshire, UK. The Proving Ground is home to a range of 
different driving circuits used to simulate various operational conditions that could be 
encountered by a production vehicle; Figure B-1 highlights these circuits. The data was 
collected in a 2014 Range Rover Hybrid development vehicle, captured using INCA software 
[136] as the vehicle was being driven on four different circuits of the Proving Grounds, with 
appropriate Terrain Response mode [137] selected. A description of the conditions under 
which each dataset was produced is shown in Table B-1 
 
Table B-1: Vehicle Data driving conditions 
 
Data Circuit TR mode Description 
1 Emissions General Tarmac, general drive; high speed. 





















Sand and muddy; low speed, though much 
wheel spin. 








Figure B-1: Map of Gaydon Proving Grounds with test circuits highlighted [138]. 
 
B-2 – Range Rover Hybrid Powertrain 
 
The vehicle model is based on the vehicle in which the data was collected, the 2014 Range 
Rover Hybrid. It utilises a parallel-hybrid powertrain with a 250 kW 3.0L Diesel V6 ICE 
coupled to a ZF 8-speed automatic transmission. Along this connection, and between the K0 
clutch and automatic transmission, a 35 kW e-machine is located. The transmission is 
connected to a transfer case that distributes the torque to the front and rear axles, via their 
differentials. An inverter connects the high-voltage battery with the e-machine. Figure B-2 








Figure B-2: Schematic of Range Rover Hybrid HEV powertrain. Black connections 
indicate mechanical coupling, and orange indicates HV electrical connections. 
 
B-2.1 – Simscape Model 
 
Using the available known parameters of the vehicle, a Simscape model of the Range Rover 




Figure B-3: Range Rover Hybrid Simscape Vehicle Model 
 
The model contains rotating mechanical connections (green), electrical connections (blue), 
Simulink control signals and calculations (black), and Simscape physical signals (brown). A 




the expense of runtime. A fast runtime was an important design driver, as it would allow a fast 
throughput of automated design of experiments test schedules, ideal for any verification, data 
collection, and comprehensive performance analysis of safety concepts. Additionally, since 
the safety concepts will be novel, a high-fidelity model would contain much complexity, 
slowing research time.  
 
Many of the top-level components are modified versions of example models that are included 
in the Simscape package. The initial model used a distributed control strategy in order to track 
a target vehicle speed, whereby an individual PID controller and surrounding gains and 
saturation limits would produce a control signal for each torque actuator (ICE engine, e-
machine, brakes), based on the error created between target vehicle speed and current vehicle 
speed. While this was not ideal for testing safety concepts, seeing as the effective functional 
software was distributed and not controlled by a central supervisory controller, this allowed 
rapid development of the individual components. These controllers were then calibrated 
together once each component performed correctly and the powertrain is assembled. Problems 
with a fully cohesive clutch control program and stable runtime led to the omission of a K0 
Clutch for simplicity, which only affects the model during gearshift events. An 8-speed 
epicyclical automatic transmission model was attempted, but a working version was unable to 
be completed. Therefore, a simulated 8-speed automated manual gearbox with synchronisers 
was created, which is acceptable within the scope of the project. However, this component, 
required very small simulation time steps during gear changes to avoid diverging continuous 
states, leading to longer runtimes. The brakes were simply modelled with negative ideal torque 
actuators, as was engine friction using a tabulated friction model supplied by Jaguar Land 
Rover. The vehicle dynamics uses a half-car model, since this project is focused on forward 
longitudinal motion (as per the safety goal).  
 
The inverter is, in fact, a DC:DC inverter, and the e-machine technically a DC motor/generator 
as opposed to AC. The e-machine is an ideal torque source controlled directly by the e-machine 
controller, and the required current draw to deliver the torque demand and account for 
mechanical and electrical losses would be calculated. Such a ‘backwards’ strategy differs from 
the actual powertrain, in which the torque demand would instead be received by the inverter, 
which then decides the correct amount of current to drive the e-machine. However, within the 
scope of this project, the torque demand simply needs to be actualised by the e-machine, and 
how this is calculated does not matter. The equations governing the calculation of current draw 






















   𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑒𝑚 < 0
 
               0               𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑒𝑚 = 0
 (B-1) 
 
where Iem the current draw by the e-machine, Vinv the voltage from the inverter, Pem and τem the 
mechanical power and torque generated by the e-machine, and ηel a constant electrical 
efficiency, which includes the resistance of the system and also the proportional torque-to-
current coefficient. The numerator being subtracted from Pem is a simple model of electrical 
losses, proportional to the square of the current.  When Pem > 0, the e-machine is in motoring 
mode so these losses are added to the total motor current draw. When Pem < 0, the e-machine 
is in generating mode, so the current draw is negative, and the current losses must be 
subtracted. Figure B-4 shows the e-machine model, based on the model provided by the 
Simulink Simscape Driveline package [139]: 
 
 
Figure B-4: E-machine Simscape Model, with controller torque demand input (black, 
bottom right), mechanical connection (green), and electrical connection (blue). 
 
B-2.2– Model Validation 
 
The simplified Simscape model of the Range Rover Hybrid powertrain was validated using 
vehicle test data collected at the Gaydon Proving Ground [138]. The control target of each of 
the individual actuator controllers is a desired vehicle speed. A recorded speed trace was used 
as the control target for a simulation, with the notion that if the model vehicle speed closely 
matches the recorded vehicle speed, a valid comparison of the model and recorded powertrain 
torque outputs could be made. The transmission was controlled by the recorded gear position 




owing to the simplified nature of the vehicle model versus a production vehicle. However, the 
aim of this exercise was to identify whether the torque outputs are generally within a 
reasonable range at the vehicle level, not that they necessarily match up entirely at all points.  
 
The dataset chosen to for validation was dataset number 2 (see Table 4-4), due to the fact that 
the least number of noise factors are present, such as wheel spin from varying road surface 
conditions and wading, and since it has special programs turned off that could interfere with 
torque demand and delivery. These are not accounted for in the model, with the exception of 
road surface through a set constant friction coefficient similar to the tarmac of the Emissions 
Circuit. Figure B-5 shows the vehicle speed for both recorded and model vehicle speed over a 
period in dataset 2; only a portion of the dataset is shown for detail in subsequent figures. 
 
 
Figure B-5: Simscape model tracking recorded vehicle speed in Dataset 2. 
 
Figure B-5 shows the model is able to track the vehicle data very well, with the largest error 
reading below 0.5 m/s. There is a small amount of lag, visible in the acceleration events around 
260 s and 300 s, which can be attributed to transient dynamics and lag in the controllers; while 
this could be fixed with some feed-forward control or recalibration, for the purposes of this 
project this is sufficient. Figure B-6 compares the total torque output of the model actuators 







Figure B-6: Model powertrain torque output compared to total torque output from 
recorded vehicle data. 
 
In general, the torque outputs from the model are within reasonable range of the recorded data. 
Particularly at steady state, the model torque stays very close to the recorded torque (averaging 
4.6% of the maximum 600 Nm, or 27.6 Nm error-per-second between 279 s and 295 s, for 
example) with some noise that is likely due to the various controllers working individually and 
not cohesively. There are, however, two areas where the model differs from real world data. 
First is during gearshift events, such as at 275 s, and a number of times between 320 s and 330 
s. The result is a large, sudden increase in torque as vehicle speed drops or increases relative 
to the recorded vehicle speed in between gear changes, leading to an undesired reaction by the 
controllers. The model does, however, quickly settle back to a reasonable torque output 
following the gearshift. The second discrepancy occurs during the acceleration events seen in 
Figure B-5, where torque tends to be slightly higher in the model than the recorded data. 
Between 250 s and 275 s an average error of 16.4% is seen, and between 295 s and 303 s an 
average error of 23.2% is experienced. This is primarily due to a combination of modelling 
limitations in the ICE engine, and a reactive control strategy attempting to ‘catch up’ with the 
velocity target. The test vehicle was a development vehicle, whereas some vehicle parameter 
values (such as the vehicle mass and component inertias) are from the production vehicle. 
However, in general, the vehicle model is a close match of overall performance of the test 
vehicle recorded data, close enough to be considered a valid test bed for qualitative concept 
testing. 
 
B-3 – Twin-EV Powertrain Model and Functional Software 
 
The rapid development of the Range Rover Hybrid powertrain in the first year of research led 
to a distributed control system developed to match the general performance of the test vehicle. 




vehicle, so much of the calibration was a system identification exercise. As is apparent in 
Figure B-6, the calibration lacks refinement, and sometimes the systems could work against 
each other. It was planned, therefore, to change the control system such that a total torque 
demand was calculated by a controller, and the responsibility of meeting that demand split 
between the e-machine and ICE; this matches the Continuous Torque Demand Monitoring 
concept adapted from E-Gas, and is the basis for the current functional safety concept used by 
the OEM. Before this modification could be implemented for the Range Rover Hybrid, at the 
start of the second year of research, the OEM provided control software for a pre-production 
twin-EV powertrain, which led to the decision to work on this platform instead of the hybrid 
one.  
 







C-1 – Future Research 
 
The investigations in this project were completed insofar as meeting the objectives set out in 
the introduction. Throughout the thesis, it has been alluded to that plans have been made for 
future work. The overall aim of the future research activities is different for the two concepts: 
for the adaptive safety monitor, the aim is to deploy it on a production vehicle, which means 
addressing the verification and validation concerns; for the PCA safety monitor, it is 
continuing the investigation to overcome the limitations of the concept. Plans for these future 
investigations will be discussed in this section. Verification and validation concerns will not 
be looked at for the PCA safety monitor until the functional suitability limitations are 
overcome.  
 
C-1.1 – Adaptive Safety Monitor 
 
The adaptive safety monitor showed the most promise of the concept candidates during the 
main investigation. In order to deploy the concept on a road vehicle, the validation and 
verification concerns in Chapter 6 need to be addressed. 
 
C-1.1.1 – Driver Task Analysis 
 
A concern was identified with ensuring the adaptive module adapts in a way that is 
commensurate with driver expectation. If it adapts too slowly robustness of the system suffers, 
and if too fast it could adapt to a hazardous malfunction faster than a human can, leading to a 
safety goal being violated without detection. Therefore, a driver task analysis has been 
suggested as a way to validate correct driver behaviour. 
 
A driver performance testing framework has been proposed by Fastenmeister and Gstlater 
[140] through a driver task analysis and driver requirement assessment called SAFE (‘Situative 
Anforderungsanalyse von Fahraufgaben’, or ‘Situational Requirement Analysis of Driving 
Tasks’), for the purpose of aiding traffic safety research. SAFE seeks to approach driver task 
analysis by combining objective task properties (including the physical nature of the task, the 
subject matter etc.) with the behavioural requirements (mental and psychomotor performance, 




situations being investigated precisely, driving tasks can be derived as analytical units and 
analysed through a human information processing model, which the SAFE framework 
proposes using Rasmussen’s model of information-processing [141]. These activities lead to 
a compiled list of all the necessary behavioural requirements – such as driver reaction time – 
that can be used to drive tuning of the adaptive safety monitor. The outline of the SAFE 




Figure C-1: Structure of SAFE driver task analysis and behavioural requirements 
derivation [140] 
 
Surprisingly, but perhaps predictably, Rasmussen’s model of informational processing 
resembles the two-stage adaptive algorithm in many ways, with the inclusion of long and 
short-term memory functions, generation of expectation, decision making, and error checking 
aspects; this is encouraging as it gives further credibility to the foundational reasoning of the 
adaptive safety monitor. A schematic of a model for deriving behavioural requirements as part 







Figure C-2: SAFE behavioural requirement derivation model for driving tasks [140]. 
 
The driver task analysis will be an interesting avenue to explore in future research, as it leads 
further into human-machine interaction, and how this can be leveraged to both improve safety, 
and maximise the results of the efforts spent by automotive OEMs developing safe and reliable 
systems. It will also form a justifiable basis from which to validate adaptive safety monitor 
parameters.  
 
C-1.1.2 – Systematic Test Environment 
 
Another concern was that of the verification of the simplified safety model. If the safety 
software is simplified in such a way that a noise factor causes a sudden switch between modes 
that changes the nominal torque error very suddenly, it would cause a sudden change in the 
offset torque error too, which either results in a false positive, or a torque error that would be 
adapted to over time. If a true fault were to occur during this period, it could be possible that 
an inaccurate offset torque error is produced, depending on the change in nominal torque error. 
Therefore, the safety model needs to be verified in such a way that this does not occur, as well 
as the other verification procedures. 
 
The suggested method would be to build a systematic testing environment to identify these 
potential issues in the software, their source, and let the engineer decide whether to adapt to 
them or add them to the simplified safety model, at the expense of simplicity. The investigation 
will seek to determine if a full vehicle model is needed for the systematic testing environment, 
or if simply a software perturbation or Monte Carlo simulation [132] would be enough to 




also seen success previously [135]. The experiment would be completed in Matlab/Simulink 
to make use of the existing code of the adaptive safety monitor.  
 
C-1.1.3 – Parameter Scheduling 
 
The investigation will also look at improving the performance of the adaptive safety monitor, 
as discussed in Chapter 6. A set of adaptive parameters will often be the “best compromise” 
in order to meet functional suitability requirements, but will not necessarily be the most robust, 
or least complex, or won’t take full advantage of the adaptive safety monitor capabilities. As 
mentioned in Chapter 6, subdividing the operating range into cells, each with a set of adaptive 
parameters calibrated to it for optimised localised performance. In principle, this is similar to 
the PCA subdivision concept which significantly improved performance of the PCA safety 
concept. Such a method is expected to enable even further simplification of the safety software 
through improved localised – and thus global – robustness.  
 
The process will effectively involve performing optimisation processes (as detailed in Chapter 
4) on tests covering limited operational boundaries to produce a set of localised adaptive 
parameter values. Within a single function, this could be localised calibration regions, and on 
discrete functions this could be separate adaptive safety monitor modules altogether. When 
the monitor is deployed, these values can then be referenced in a lookup-table based on those 
operating conditions for optimum performance. A necessary caveat, however, would be that 
only readily available ASIL inputs (e.g. pedal position and vehicle velocity) can be used for 
parameter scheduling, as performance gains would likely be minimal for the effort required to 
conduct additional ASIL verification on another input during development 
 
Furthermore, investigation into the potential of blended or interpolated parameters across the 
operating space could yield even further improved performance, balancing outright functional 
suitability with hardware storage and computational requirements, but could also bring with it 
further verification concerns. Similar blending studies were initialised as part of the PCA 
safety monitor investigation, but tabled due to more promising avenues of research; those 









C-1.2 – PCA Safety Monitor 
 
C-1.2.1 – PCA Module Architectures 
 
The most significant limitation of PCA is that of handling temporal-dynamics found within 
the model. Initial attempts were made at using one or many PCA modules in an arrangement 
such that the time-based dynamics can be separated or accounted for explicitly, and more 
investigation could yield alternative arrangements that overcome some of the PCA concept 
limitations; identification of possible research avenues were shown in Chapter 5. One example, 
is to extract and explicitly model temporally-dynamic functions in the safety software outside 
of the PCA safety monitor, on either the output or the inputs of the PCA module.  
 
The investigation could also look at whether separate PCA modules are useful for some 
discrete noise factors, such as switching between driving modes. Some initial work was 
conducted on this topic during the Chapter 5 investigation, whereby three pedal maps could 
be switched between. Using a discrete input such as drive mode led to data resembling a 
layered surface, with some sections of the data surfaces intersecting and passing through one 
another. This leads to a very difficult dataset to train PCA models on, with poor performance. 
Instead, an arrangement with separate PCA modules for each discrete operational mode could 
extract the nonlinearity and better manage the transition between these modes or whichever 
discrete signals are noise factors.  
 
In summary, the investigation will seek to find what software systems or functional software 
components could benefit from a PCA-based safety monitor in such a way, which dynamics 
can be extracted and modelled explicitly. 
 
C-1.2.2 – Using last eigenvalue for determining T2 scalar ck  
 
One of the novel developments during the PCA investigation was that of method of 
normalising all cell outputs through the derivation of the T2 scalar, ck, for each subdivision cell 
k. Without scaling, the T2 values after offset would vary significantly, seen before scaling was 
introduced in Chapter 5. Prior to this development, a number of possible avenues were 
explored for deriving this scalar, the most promising of which is related to the smallest 
eigenvalue (the mth eigenvector or principal component in an m-dimensional PCA model). To 
illustrate this, PCA models were derived for a four-dimensional plant (pedal position, velocity, 
actuator temperature, and torque demand) but T2 normalisation through scaling was not 




and the cells ordered by increasing value of the last (4th) eigenvalue; Figure C-3 compares 




Figure C-3: Maximum T2 value in each cell for 100 Nm fault, sorted in ascending order 
by PC4 eigenvalue, scaled linearly on y-axes. 
 
Figure C-3 does seem to show some relationship between PC4 and maximum T2 fault, where 
the cells with the largest maximum T2 values roughly correlate to where the smallest PC4 
eigenvalues are. Since the eigenvalues appear to change logarithmically, the y-axes of Figure 







Figure C-4: Maximum T2 value and (unfiltered and Savitzky-Golay Filtered) in each cell, 
sorted in ascending order by PC4 eigenvalue, scaled logarithmically on y-axes. 
 
Savitzky-Golay filtering [119] was applied to better identify the general trend the maximum 
T2 values follow by ascending PC4 value. While the unfiltered maximum T2 values are quite 
noisy, through filtering it is clear that there is some inverse relationship between maximum T2 
value and eigenvalue. It is theorised that there is some way that the last eigenvalues can be 
used to better predict ck for each, possibly reducing development time and improve model 
accuracy.  
 
